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ABSTRACT
The interest in the use and development of intelligence from information by law

enforcement has escalated since the events of 9/11. This dissertation investigates the
contemporary phenomenon of intelligence in police work from its real life context and
explores the critical factors of the Intelligence-led policing model through an assessment

of how these factors are perceived by supervisors and decision makers of the Chicago

Police Department’s Organized Crime Division. This is a case study which will use

inductive qualitative analysis and assessment on themes derived from semi-structured

interviews and observations of police supervisors who are involved in decision-making

tasks that require the use of intelligence products.

The extant literature on the use of information in policing and the design of the
Intelligence-led policing model is extensive. However, there is little research devoted to
any interpretive study which seeks to understand the phenomenon of intelligence in

police work through the meaning that practitioners, i.e., police, assign to them. This study

presents the basis for further research on the relationship of the critical factors involved in
the intelligence-led policing model and how those factors are perceived in a real-life

context. The research presents a unique view of comparative factors focused on the
complexity of human sense-making as situations emerge and will be developed during

the course of this study, which can be of value to future researchers.

x

CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
Before the summer of 2001 had faded, American law enforcement was forced into the
position of dealing with some unpleasant realities. Despite the perception that the
Problem Oriented Policing (POP) model of the early nineties worked as an effective tool
to strengthen ties between citizens and the police by combining scarce resources to
combat a common crime problem, overall, the failure of the criminal justice system
continued (Weisburd & Eck, 2004). The POP model is a police response strategy
intended to address the causes of specific social and crime disorder problems through the
use of analysis, assessment, and feedback in conjunction with the engagement of public
and private community groups to resolve common issues. To compound these problems,
the dreadful attacks on New York and Washington D.C. and the subsequent anthrax scare
exposed the country to unanticipated vulnerabilities in a free society which caught law
enforcement unprepared.
The purpose of this case study is to explore a new strategic approach, intelligence-led
policing, and examine the relationship between this new approach and police efficiency.
Specifically, the study will determine if the intelligence-led policing model contributes to
the organizational goals, i.e., crime reduction and investigative efficiencies, over and
above that accounted for by existing practices of the Chicago Police Department’s
Organized Crime Division.
1
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The specific research questions addressed are:
1. How can the critical factors of intelligence-led policing contribute to police
efficiency in addition to that accounted for or perceived through current
practices in the Organized Crime Division of the Chicago Police Department?
2. How can the critical factors of intelligence-led policing contribute to the
organizational goals of the Chicago Police Department beyond that accounted
for or perceived by current practices of the Department?
3. How does intelligence-led policing present a separate construct from existing
police practices used by the Organized Crime Division?
Intelligence-led policing may be defined as an approach which emphasizes
information gathering, from a variety of sources, and information sharing and
collaboration among authorized agencies to establish strategic solutions to combat crime
(Ratcliffe, 2008). This concept involves arrangements of joint participation among law
enforcement agencies to solve problems ‘that cannot be achieved, or achieved easily, by
single organizations’ (Agranoff and McGuire, 2001 p.296). Beyond the ways in which
information is shared and used to develop intelligence, Intelligence-led policing is a
managerial tool used by decision-makers to plan and implement focused strategies.
Rather than reacting to an incident driven agenda, e.g., calls-for-service, intelligence-led
policing proactively focuses on known criminals and their activities with the intention of
anticipating and defeating the opportunity for criminal activity before it happens.
The interest in intelligence-led policing (ILP) has escalated dramatically among the
members of the American law enforcement community since the events of 9/11. The
Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States
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stressed that significant failures to share information between law enforcement agencies
charged with national security tasks contributed to the country’s vulnerability (The 9/11
Commission Report, 2004). A year later, the inability of law enforcement agencies to
coordinate information contributed to the terror perpetrated by the ‘Beltway sniper.’ In
both instances, information relative to on-going investigations which might have
contributed to the aversion or avoidance of catastrophe was available to various law
enforcement agencies but because the mechanism for a coordinated sharing plan for use
in directing and sharing resources was lacking, that information was not used efficiently
and the consequences proved dire. The development of intelligence related to a particular
person or circumstance is the first casualty when information is not shared.
The extant literature on information management, the development of intelligence
from information, and knowledge management is extensive and multi-tiered. Information
is the basis on which groups organize their components, connect them, mobilize them,
and leverage them in a collective setting toward common objectives (Churchman, 1971,
Ackoff, 1981). While the private sector has been the main beneficiary of this body of
work, challenges to the way the public sector manages scarce resources has compelled
them to investigate new options in the ways information may be used and transformed to
intelligence for leveraging and maximizing those resources. Intelligence-led policing
provides one of these options.
Existing models of policing demonstrate reactive and investigative approaches to
crime rather than a preventative approach (Weisburd & Eck, 2004). Under this
arrangement, police are driven by ‘calls for service’ or the occasional response to an onview crime which serves the perception, though not the actual practice, of an increased
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police presence. Routine follow-up investigations contribute to the myth of a ubiquitous,
efficient police presence as, for example, when the news media present scenes of scores
of police converged at the scene of a crime following a major criminal incident. Although
it may be reassuring to see a police presence on the scene in response to crime, the
question of what might have been done to prevent the crime must always be considered.
In conventional police work, the use of ‘intelligence’ is traditionally restricted to use
on a case-by-case basis for the purpose gathering information and supporting
prosecutions under an arrangement which is better defined as investigative-led
intelligence (Cope, 2004). This practice contributes to the misunderstanding of the
meaning of intelligence so that practitioners often use the terms ‘information’ and
‘intelligence’ interchangeably so that an investigator may assume she is ‘collecting
intelligence’ when in fact she is gathering information.
Simply put, intelligence is information which has been subjected to meaningful
analysis (USDOJ/BJA 2006). Analysis is the process of reducing complex information to
a simpler form. Products of analysis may become intelligence. Intelligence forms the
basis for actionable knowledge, i.e., activities in support of a directed mission. Currently,
literature related to the process and products of intelligence as they relate to the public
sector is scant (Wise, 2002, 2006).
Under former police Superintendent O.W. Wilson, the Chicago Police Department
was transformed, in the late sixties, to an agency in which ‘progressive, preventive patrol’
served as the mantra that drove all preliminary police activities (Chu, 2001). Wilson
believed that a police presence, in and of itself, was the greatest deterrent to criminal
activity. George Kelling, who co-authored the 1982 Atlantic article ‘Broken Windows’
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and contributed significantly to the advent of community policing, provided research
from a Kansas City study which concluded that random patrol had little effect on crime
prevention (Kelling, 1972). Others go further and maintain that the inference of police
having a substantial, broad, and independent impact on crime is a myth, regardless of
strategies or tactics used (Eck & Maguire, 2000).
Over the past decade, technology has provided our society the means to join
previously dissociated groups for the purpose of coordinating activities that advance
productivity; not all of the opportunities available are lawful ((NJSP, 2006). Agencies in
law enforcement are aware they must engage in the effort to keep pace with the changing
communications environment in which the criminal element is more agile and quick to
respond. The use of the Internet, disposable cell phones, and counter-intelligence tactics,
such as providing misinformation to distract police, give criminals a distinct advantage
over the police who, as an organization, are slow to adapt to changes in the environment.
A current practice among gang members is to post pictures of themselves, weapons, and
narcotic paraphernalia on open source Websites like U-Tube and MySpace. The Gang
Investigations Unit of the Chicago Police Department was unable to access these sites
from police computers because of restricted use policies until 2008. Intelligence-led
policing, as a strategy, focuses on the involvement of decision-makers to provide the
tools necessary to obtain source information by establishing exceptional policy.
In February of 2008, the newly appointed Superintendent of the Chicago Police
Department, Jody Weis, stated that the Department would seek new ways and methods to
increase police efficiency. Among the methods he cited was ‘Intelligence-driven
policing.’ The research in this project will be based on interviews, both structured and in
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depth, with command staff personnel and supervisors of the Chicago Police Department’s
Organized Crime Division (OCD) which oversees the activities of the Department’s
Gang Investigation, Narcotics, and Intelligence Sections. The interviews will focus on the
respondent’s perspective of the meaning and use of intelligence as it is used within the
Chicago Police Department, their experience in the use of intelligence, and their position
on which features of existing practices are, or may prove to be, most salient in the use of
intelligence in police work.
The results of this study will be of interest to law enforcement practitioners, students
of criminal justice, and academic researchers. Both local law enforcement and state
intelligence agencies have an interest in this research because it has implications on the
efficient use of resources as well as on whether the model presented can contribute to the
effectiveness of existing strategies. How information is used is directly related to how, or
if, it is relayed; information which is relayed and not used is useless (Shannon and
Weaver, 1947). Students of criminal justice must be made aware that the needs of law
enforcement is changing and future of the criminal justice system requires skills
involving knowledge management, analysis, and an ability to demonstrate critical
thinking skills. Because Intelligence-led policing is a relatively new strategy, researchers
have the opportunity to expand on the knowledge base related to the concept and to
further test its validity. Overall the research presented is intended to contribute to current
law enforcement practices by examining the relationship and purpose of information
collected, the type and extent of analysis conducted, and whether organizational benefits
may be derived from Intelligence-led policing. Conclusions from this research are
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expected to be applicable to the use of Intelligence-led policing throughout the
Department.
Limitations
Data used in this research will be collected from interviews. The sample size is
representative of the population of supervisors of the Chicago Police Department’s
Organized Crime Division (OCD), who are charged with tasks involving the use of
intelligence processes and products. The OCD is comprised of three sections; Gangs,
Narcotics, and Intelligence.
A pilot case study will be conducted prior to administering formal interviews. This is
a formative step intended to refine the relevant questions used in later data collection. Yin
(2009) maintains Pilot studies can be useful for the purpose of concept clarification prior
seeking IRB approval. The selection of participants in the pilot case study will be from
OCD supervisory personnel who will not be included in the actual research and will
address basic methodological issues related to the logistics of the proposed field inquiry.
Additionally, responses to the pilot case study will be compared to a continuing review of
relevant literature on intelligence-led policing. This approach supports the notion that the
subsequent study will reflect on contemporary theoretical issues as well as issues which
are case specific.
Interviews related to this research will be administered following the introduction of
the interviewer and an explanation the purpose for interviews by the Chief of OCD.
Personnel to be interviewed are assigned to different ‘watches’ (schedules) covering three
shifts each day with rotating day-off groups. When possible, interviews will be conducted
at the interviewee’s principle place of business.

8
The sample size used in this research is derived from the population of supervisors
within the Organized Crime Division’s (OCD) Gang Investigation, Narcotics, and
Intelligence Sections. At the highest level, the Chief of the unit represents the fourth
highest ranking officer on the Department followed by the Deputy Chief and three
Section Commanders. Additionally, fifteen lieutenants assigned to OCD will be
interviewed.
Definition of Terms
Analysis: the ability to reduce complex information to a simpler form for examination on
solutions intended to resolve more complex problems in support of possible decisions.
Collaboration: the work of two or more agencies that provide resources and expertise
with the goal of maximizing the ability to detect, prevent, respond, or defeat threatening,
criminal or terrorist activities.
Data: a general abstract descriptor which is initially unbiased.
Intelligence-led policing: a management philosophy in support of optimal resource
allocation based on the understanding of the operating environment.
Intelligence Process: a method for managing the flow of data across the horizontal and
vertical levels of government in order to integrate information and analysis, develop
intelligence, and provide decision-makers with the options required to develop actionable
knowledge.
Information: data that has been synthesized and is biased.
Intelligence: information to which value has been added through analysis.
Intelligence Community: Fourteen (14) U.S. agencies responsible for intelligence
activities necessary for national security, headed by the Director of Central Intelligence.
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State and Tribal Law Enforcement Agencies: Fifty (50) state and two hundred (200)
tribal Indian law enforcement agencies which function below the federal level and above
local law enforcement level.
Local Law Enforcement: any of the estimated 800,000 sworn officers representing
agencies below the state level.
Fusion Centers: state agencies charged with developing and managing intelligence based
on information received from federal, tribal, and local law enforcement partners.

CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW
This chapter provides a review of the literature related to the concept of intelligenceled policing and its effect on police management, operations, effectiveness, and
efficiency. The goals of this review are not to be exhaustive but rather to point out
seminal themes under study by scholars of intelligence-led policing and its use in law
enforcement. In the extant police literature, intelligence-led policing, as a phenomenon,
has not been fully explored or theoretically developed (Hale, Heaton, Uglow 2004;
Oakensen, Mockford, and Pascoe, 2002). The practitioner literature, however, represents
an extensive and growing collection of articles that detail various aspects on the interest
and use of intelligence-led policing as a strategic tool in police work. Cooper (1984)
suggests that a literature review should be used as a means to an end, and not as an end in
itself. The literature review addresses questions about the topic that needs to be studied.
Given this purpose in literature reviews, the research objectives of this study are: (1) to
explore the definitions and use of information and intelligence currently existing within
the context of existing police models and (2) to uncover critical factors employed by the
newest model of intelligence-led policing which may serve to enhance the Chicago Police
Organized Crime Division in attaining goals related to crime detection and prevention.
Each of these issues is important from scholarly and practical perspectives.
10

Existing studies on the use of intelligence in law enforcement fall into two general
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categories. The first involves definitions of intelligence in policing and how, as a
resource, intelligence products are managed by organizations. The second examines
intelligence as a process and is concerned with the development of source information
and whether it contributes to organizational objectives.
In the first instance, the management of intelligence, studies consider the product
environment related to intelligence including resources, ownership, exchanges, and the
impact or feasibility for action based on intelligence (IACP, 2002; White, 2004; GIWC,
2005; Osbourne, 2006 ). Two major concerns regarding the use of intelligence in law
enforcement involve sharing of the products which result from intelligence work and
issues of civil rights. The protection of citizen’s rights in gathering and sharing
information by law enforcement is strictly outlined by the guidelines in the Code of
Federal Regulations (28 CFR 23) which provides the basis for police policy. The tenets
of 28 CFR 23 preclude gathering information on individuals who are not the subject of a
criminal investigation. Gundhus (2005) addressed obstacles to sharing information
between agencies and observed that no standard practices exist. Sheptycki (2004)
described a list of ‘organizational pathologies’ that were problematic to the internal and
external flow of intelligence requiring managerial intervention to correct. Research by
Jaranpaa and Staples (2001) found positive associations between individual beliefs
regarding information/intelligence ownership and the ability to exchange products of
intelligence between and among organization members. These issues will be addressed
later in this research.

In the second instance, the process of intelligence creation is examined from a
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perspective on data collection, the analysis and development of information, the
relevance and meaning of information in the context of crime, the synthesis and creation
of intelligence which is appropriate to criminal activity, and the dissemination of the
intelligence products to decision makers in order to generate action (Osborne, 2006;
IACP, 2002; Clark and Eck, 2005; Desouza and Vanapalli, 2005; Brodeur and Dupont,
2006; de Lint, O’Connor, and Cotter, 2007; Ratcliffe, 2008). In its simplest form,
intelligence is recognized as information to which analysis has been applied (Carter,
2004; NJSP, 2005). The distinction in the types of analysis used in intelligence-led
policing and other police models will be discussed throughout this research. Analysts are
the ‘knowledge workers’ within an organization. Drucker (1959) first postulated the use
of ‘knowledge workers’ within organizations as those individuals who work primarily
with information to develop and uses knowledge in the workplace. Nicholl (2004)
emphasized the need for a strong analyst-client relationship if the information under
analysis is expected to be converted to intelligence and subsequently, actionable
knowledge. Actionable knowledge represents intelligence products on which policy
makers determine strategic plans and the allocation of resources necessary to implement
the strategy. This notion is crucial to the intelligent-led policing model which emphasizes
the requirement that the intelligence conveyed must fit within the boundaries of the
resource limitations and capabilities (Simon, 1983) of the organizational client (Ratcliffe,
2008).
The purpose of this study is to assess the perception of police supervisors on the
critical factors employed by the model of intelligence-led policing. Additionally, current

practices in the use of intelligence by the Chicago Police Department’s Organized
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Crime Division will be examined.
The research questions which will be addressed in this study are:
1. How can the critical factors of intelligence-led policing contribute to police
efficiency in addition to that accounted for existing practices?
2. How can the critical factors of intelligence-led policing contribute to
organizational goals of the Chicago Police Department in addition to that
accounted for by existing practices?
3. How does intelligence-led policing present a separate construct from those of
existing police practices?
The Policing Paradigms
The traditional paradigm of local law enforcement fosters reactions to information
provided voluntarily, uses ex post facto arrests and trial governed by rules of evidence,
and protects the rights of citizens as part of a tactical approach (Carter, Deutsch, Zelikow,
1998, p.82). The importance of this statement emphasizes that (1) police response to
crime is reactionary; a crime must have occurred before it is investigated and (2)
information used by police is provided voluntarily from sources other than the police, for
example, from witnesses, victims, or from offenders. In this instance, the apprehension of
the offender, i.e., the arrest is the primary goal of investigative methods. This approach,
and the scope of local law enforcement, changed dramatically following the events of
September 11th.
The extant literature on law enforcement indicates there is a new trend in policing
which fosters aggressive, active intelligence gathering with the intention of anticipating

threats in advance of any criminal activity by planning preventative actions against
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suspect targets as part of a strategic approach which encourages the development and
allocation of resources as part of policy planning. Carter, Deutsch, Zelikow (1998)
suggest this approach is similar to methods used by federal intelligence agencies. The
principle distinction between traditional policing and the new model is the strategic focus
on the use of intelligence to drive police strategies through risk assessment. Risk
assessment takes into account threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences posed by the risk
in anticipation of actions. It is important to note that this risk assessment strategy does not
replace tactical investigative techniques; rather it complements them.
The development of intelligence for use in the police environment is complex and
subject to a variety of interpretations as supported in the literature (Gill, 2000; O’Shea
and Nicholls 2003; Cope, 2004; Ratcliffe, 2008). As a concept, intelligence-led policing
was originally articulated in the U.K. as an operation strategy to reduce crime based on
the crime trends developed through the use of information generated from a variety of
sources (Ratcliffe, 2008). It has evolved as a business model in which the analysis of
crime information results in the development of intelligence products to serve decision
makers as the foundation to determine priorities, resource allocation, and subsequent
actions by law enforcement i.e., intelligence-led policing drives police strategies. As a
police strategy, intelligence-led policing builds on, and indeed borrows from, the tenets
established a decade ago under the philosophies of Community Oriented Policing (COP)
and Problem Oriented Policing (POP) (Skogan, 2006; BJS, 2006). The rational for
exploring and later implementing these alternatives to traditional police methods arose
for two reasons which were not directly related to intelligence. First, until the late ‘60s,

there was the societal perception that the police represented order and served a real
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purpose by legitimizing the barrier between the legal standard and crime (Wood and
Shearing, 2007). This perception eroded during the political and civil upheavals which
carried into the ‘70’s during which police activities were often interpreted in terms of a
fascist-like reaction of suppression in response to individuals or groups who sought,
sometimes violently, to express their Constitutional guarantees. Secondly, traditional
police methods which centered on reactive or investigative responses to crime seemed
incapable of containing or impacting a rising crime rates (Ratcliffe, 2008). The
combination of these factors contributed to a revaluation of police procedures, including
alternative programs, on how best to (1) reconnect with citizen-stakeholders and (2)
contribute more effectively to strategies for crime reduction through the use of
information and the development, through the analysis of information, of intelligence.
The Relation Between Intelligence-led and Other Policing Strategies
Conventional policing strategies operate on the assumption that greater detection
leads to more arrests which, in turn, serves as a deterrent to crime. Assuming there were
realistic measurements to establish equilibrium, such a strategy might function but, in
reality, criminal activity outpaces the criminal justice system’s ability to keep it in check.
The criminal justice system entails all processes related to crime from detection, arrest,
prosecution, and conviction; the ‘crime funnel.’ Ratcliffe (2008) notes for every 1,000
crimes committed, less than 8 percent are detected and less than 1 percent result in prison
sentencing. For the purpose of this research, we focus on the detection phase and how
information leading to intelligence is instrumental in contributing to the criminal justice
system’s process.

For police, the detection of crime is accomplished in two ways; it is reported by a
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victim or witness source or, it is viewed ‘on scene’ (in progress) by law enforcement. The
former represents the majority of crimes detected. As part of the paperwork involved,
crimes are indexed and cataloged in the United States, by two principle methods. The
first is Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) system which was initiated in the late ‘20’s and
taken over by the FBI in the early 30’s (Foster, 2004). The second, the National Incident
Based Reporting System (NIBRS), involves an extension of the UCR method and
includes greater detail
Twenty-eight years after the introduction of the UCR program, the FBI produced its
first national aggregate of crime totals (Pattavina, 2005). The system relies on local law
enforcement to self report criminal activity which is then categorized by a UCR
classification number and archived. UCR numbers indicate the type of crime committed,
for example, 0110 is a homicide, 041A is a battery committed with a firearm, and 0430 is
a battery committed with another dangerous weapon. UCR classifications are also applied
to the location in which the crime took place so that 304 will indicate a crime took place
in the street while 290 would indicate the crime took place in a residence. The UCR
classification system is the most widely used method employed by law enforcement
today and crime data gathered from 93% of the nation’s population is represented in the
annual report entitled Crime in the United States (Maltz, 1999).
The main function of the UCR classification method is to ‘count incidents of crime’
and store them in order to monitor crime trends, a task for which the system is limited
(Biderman and Lynch, 1991; Maltz, 1999). For example, the UCR system includes a
hierarchy mechanism which requires the reporting of only the most serious crime in

instances were multiple crimes are committed. A Loyola study in Chicago (Block and
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Block, 1992) demonstrated that homicides were often the end result of other crimes, such
as robberies which went unreported under the hierarchy rules. UCR numbers are self
reported by local law enforcement and therefore subject to under-reporting. Under
reporting occurs for two reasons; first, crimes occur without ever being reported and
second, there are times when reported crimes are reclassified through the discretionary
police practice known as ‘killing crime’ in order to downplay the severity of a crime
problem. For example, a burglary which is a Part I Index crime against property may be
reclassified as a theft, a ‘lesser crime’ not part of the Part I index. The motivation for
killing crime varies but when it is employed, it serves to distort the overall crime picture
and, in some situations, make an area appear to have fewer types of crimes than are
actually occurring. Without scrutiny, such activity serves to defeat the purpose of
information and subsequently intelligence.
The UCR system was intended as a ‘summary based’ method for collecting data on
reported crimes. The system did not allow for information related to dates or victim
demographics thereby limiting its value in use for in depth analysis or efficient policy
making decisions. By the late to mid-eighties, The FBI addressed these concerns and
introduced the National Incident Based Reporting System (NIBRS) to correct some of the
deficiencies inherent in the UCR system (Pattavina, 2004; Foster, 2005). The NIBRS
system is more eclectic in its approach to the criminal incident which is defined as an
offense or offenses as committed by and offender or offenders acting in concert at the
same time and place (FBI 1998). Additionally, information related to victims, multiple
offenders, property classifications, and categories which included crimes against society,

e.g., narcotics trafficking, in addition to crimes against people or property. Because
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NIBRS functions as part of a standardized Records Management System (RMS) which is
provided with data from local jurisdictions, there are strict compliance standards for users
who must adhere to design requirements. As a result of the NIBRS program, local
jurisdictions are able to perform analysis of information on criminal activity and police
response that contributes to a broader perspective which is helpful in two principle areas.
First, crime data may be examined on a larger scale than would be available at just the
local level. Research by Faggiani and McLaughlin (1991) and Faggiani, Bibel, and
Brensilber (2001) tied incidents of narcotics trafficking across multijurisdictional areas
which demonstrated a previously undetected regional problem that impacted noncontiguous localities. Second, effective analysis prepares policy makers to make more
informed decisions. The work of Faggiani et al (2001) led to memorandums of
understanding between cooperating agencies to better address regional drug problems.
Similarly, tracking the police response domestic violence incidents in which arrests were,
or were not made led to policy changes in procedures and subsequent legislation
involving domestic violence (Pattavina, 2004). NIBRS demonstrated that for the first
time, local law enforcement could use advances in technology that enhanced the ability to
collate large amounts of data for analysis related to criminal activity and transform it to
useful information upon which actionable intelligence could be used effectively to
proactively address crime issues.
Analysis of situational data from the NIBRS system relied on reported incidents of
crime. Kelling and Wilson (1982) and Kelling and Cole (1996) argued that because other
factors, many affecting ‘quality of life issues,’ contribute to information on the conditions

that result in crime, law enforcement should strengthen ties with the community to
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expand their sources of information. Government support of this notion led to various
models which collectively became known community policing.
Under the Clinton Administration, a number of initiatives were begun at the federal
level to bolster the criminal justice system including the Community Policing
Competitive grant program (COPS Program) to put 100,000 police officers on the streets
in community policing programs (Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of
1994). Nationally, local law enforcement agencies competed for billions in federal
funding in order to subsidize hiring provided they subscribed to policing strategies which
involved community input and the use of defined problem solving models. Problem
solving requires the identification of a community concern and an exchange of
information related to the concern. As with conventional policing, community problems
were incident driven but are more generalized, e.g., a focus on abandoned buildings that
provided the venue for illegal activities such as prostitution or narcotics use. In addition
to arrest and service data that was available to law enforcement, police would work with
the community and other agencies to access additional types of information such as
property ownership records, utility information, and other demographics in order to
analyze conditions surrounding criminal activity and access alternative solutions to a
problem beyond arrests.
Both Problem Oriented Policing (POP) and Community Oriented Policing (COP) rely
on gathering information, often from local community groups or Beat Officers, in order
to expose and correct underlying or endemic causes which contribute to disorder
problems, including any conditions that support crime. Both POP and COP were

promoted and advanced as policing strategies but in practice were more tactical and
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focused on specific problems. As such, the use of information or intelligence used in the
practice of these strategies, when successful, served to address specific problems which
Tilley (2003) believes served to satisfice communities, i.e., provide the best solution, or
one that was ‘good enough’ (Simon, 1996), without resolving the problem. Under
conditions of ‘satisficing,’ for example, conditions of crime might be eliminated in one
area simply because it relocated in another area. Information or ‘intelligence’ in this
instance is restricted to situational data for tactical crime support which differs from the
broader sense of intelligence analysis used in intelligence-led policing.
Community Oriented Policing
In practice, community oriented policing is difficult to define as it is based on the
intention that police must confer and consult with public stakeholders regarding
operational matters in order to be effective (Bennett, 1994). Mastrofski, (2006) suggests
that because community objectives are so varied and fluid, community policing can not
be evaluated effectively because of its all-things-to-all-people character. Harcourt (2004)
studied Chicago’s Alternative Policing Strategy (CAPS), a variation of community
policing, and argued that no quantifiable results were ever produced by the program. This
is likely related to the that fact that goals of community policing were most often
‘measured’ in terms of community satisfaction and a perception that police were actively
participating in activities that addressed community-driven concerns (Tilley, 2003). In
some ways, the effects of community oriented policing may be compared to the effects
on behavior during the Hawthorn experiments at the Westinghouse facility in Chicago
(Mayo, 1949). There, the response in participant behavior to a change in the environment

related more to the attention given the participants rather than as a result of the
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change itself (Landsberger, 1959). From the information and intelligence perspective,
COP-like programs provided sources of data which had previously not been used.
Because of the ties established through community-police relations, associative data
related to problem analysis was used as a foundation for intelligence based action and
policy. This provided a new way in which police were required to consider available,
though previously unused, information sources for situational analysis.
Problem Oriented Policing
Like COP, POP involves the identification and analysis of specific crime and disorder
problems, in order to develop an effective response. Unlike COP, POP places the police,
rather than the community, in the position of deciding which problems should be
addresses. Oliver and Bartgis (1998) concluded that the practices of Problem Oriented
Policing are actually an integral part of Community Policing. This observation serves to
blur the distinction between the two programs (Scott, 2000). However, programs such as
these indicate the implied necessity on the part of the police to seek non-traditional
methods for doing their jobs and represent a beginning in seeking alternative solutions to
conventional policing methods. Problem-identification and problem-solving however,
represent different ends of the same spectrum; while it is easy to identify a concern, it is
another matter to resolve the concern.
Bynam (2001) contends that police are better at identifying problems than solving
them, a simple but important observation. Problem Oriented Policing represents a first
step towards intelligence-led policing as it employees an analytical lens through which
conditions or participants in crime are specifically viewed and research and assessment

are emphasized as part of a continuing problem solving process. This point provides
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the main distinction between Community Oriented and Problem Oriented Policing as
while it is a common practice for police agencies to store volumes of data there was never
direct attention given to use of the data for analysis beyond its evidentiary, case-by-case
use.
Problem Oriented Policing introduced a simple problem solving method which was
developed in conjunction with the pioneering research that created POP as a model
(Goldstein, 1979, 1990). Eck and Spellman (1987) suggested an analytical approach to
problem solving that was applied to identifiable police problems which were then
examined through four steps; scanning, analysis, response, and assessment (SARA). For
the first time in policing, solutions and assets were regarded as part of a process in the
comprehensive analysis on a problem in which feedback and assessment were vital.
Traditional policing strategies and tactics involve mobilizing resources and
operations, without question, in response to achieving a goal and outcomes were
measured in terms of immediate results or ‘performance indexes,’ such as arrests,
citations issued, or contacts initiated (Smith, 1995; Scott, 1998; Tilley, 2004). Without a
mechanism for assessment, these conditions present a numbers-game that resulted in an
interesting paradox. Because police are tabulating or ‘counting’ results rather than
assessing the impact of their actions based on situational analysis, the conditions creating
the problem simply relocate as opposed to being resolved (O’Shea and Nicholls, 2003;
Foster, 2002); this is known as ‘moving crime.’ Additionally, a reliance on ‘performance
indicators’ requires decision makers to focus on internal performance rather than external
problems (Scott, 1998; Tilley, 2004; Ratcliffe 2008). If a problem area is saturated for

enforcement for any period of time, supervisors become concerned by the fact that
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numbers fall off as an operation progresses without regard to the changing conditions
brought on by an increased police presence. Bichler and Gaines, (2005) maintain that
such ‘single phase’ solutions to crime problems tend to involve increased police presence
for complex problems affecting areas and crime prevention for specific sites facing
single-crime problems. Social problems involving police solutions are complex and in
addition to reaction, may involve analysis, further study, and feedback. A key feature of
organizational learning suggests the variables under investigation should be scrutinized,
assessed, and evaluated in order to transform large problems into smaller, attainable
objectives (Argyris and Schön, 1974).
Research on the use of analysis in police work indicates that police managers
preferred their analysts to focus on tactical outcomes or in support of the investigative
process (O’Shea and Nicholls, 2003). Under such arrangements, analysis is intended to
maximize the impact of enforcement and is directly tied to offender identification and
apprehension on a case-by-case-basis (Cope, 2004). This is understandable. Under
existing practices Police supervisors and managers are tied to the current and existing
condition of crime which they are expected to immediately address through standards of
traditional and acceptable practices. While analysis would help to focus, possibly drive,
police initiatives, it is the consequences of existing managerial decisions that have a
direct impact on the analytical processes used in policing (Gill, 2000).
With a rise in the use of technology during the late ‘90s, both POP and COP began
applying tools like Geographical Information Systems (GIS) to data. GIS systems use
mapping programs to spatially render data. Spatial rendering is the visual representation

of data used in graphs, computer assisted diagrams (CAD), or maps (Foster, 2005;
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Pattavina, 2007). Advances in computer technologies allowed desktop computer users to
integrate data and mapping through the technique of geocoding, a process that transforms
latitudes and longitudes into points on a map. This feature proved useful to problem
solving and analysis since it allows the user to ‘layer’ information (data of interest)
related to areas of concern onto maps. The ability to layer information on maps meant
that a variety of variables e.g., crime data, proximity data related to other social
problems, business data, or building data, could be viewed at one time although the data
may come from different sources. Previous theories on crime, notably rationale choice
theory (Clark, 1997; Clark and Eck 2003) and routine activity theory (Felson, 1998;
Felson and Clark, 1998) could be examined spatially in greater detail. Rationale choice
theory maintains criminal acts occur when specific conditions, e.g., lack of a police
presence, exist. Routine activity theory holds that victims are often the habit of routine
which an offender may study and use to his advantage. Both theories focus on the
conditions which contribute to the opportunity for crime and may be analyzed in order to
rationalize the ‘why’ as well as ‘where’ crime occurs or develop as trends. It should be
noted that in the nineties a combination of practices and hybrid programs using elements
from previous problem solving models were employed by many law enforcement
jurisdictions.
In Chicago, the Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy (CAPS) was implemented
citywide among twenty-five police Districts in 1994 and was based on the premise that
police alone lacked the resources to solve the city’s crime problems but might serve as a
conduit between the community and other city agencies in an effort to resolve quality of

life issues which contribute to crime. The CAPS model differs slightly from the
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COPS approach to problem solving in that it incorporates an element of a strong
organizational buy-in which includes the condition of accountability on the part of
District Commanders. These notions were similar in concept to the CompStat approach
which was developed by the New York Police Department and will be discussed later in
this section.
Following the provisions of a pamphlet entitled ‘Together We Can” police Districts
developed Beat Teams and Beat Team Meetings under police supervisors. All Districts
are divided into nine to twelve Beats (depending on the District size). Beat Team
meetings are held once a month at which time citizens are encouraged to attend and
present concerns to the police Beat Team. Concerns generally centered on quality of life
issues including matters related to neighborhood maintenance such as street lighting,
clean up, graffiti removal, or tree trimming. Beat Teams acted as conduits to other City
agencies to address such concerns. The Beat Team Meeting agenda and the procedures
for holding the meetings are under the exclusive control of the police. A commercially
available GIS application, MapInfo© was employed to a limited extent for mapping
problem concerns. The application some experience with database management although
the CAPS program provided no training in the use of databases. CAPS identified
‘computerized crime-analysis’ as one of the program’s objectives though training beyond
fundamental problem identification was never achieved.
While the COPS program measured success in terms of community satisfaction with
the job done through police driven initiatives, CAPS emphasized centralized oversight by
the Department in order to audit practices and to review the participation of District rank

and file. CAPS required a Departmental reorganization and a call for decentralized
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prioritizing of problems at the District level, but a ten year review of the CAPS program
by Northwestern University maintained the program suffered from too little training, a
lack of analytic capacity, and a lack of organizational commitment (Skogan, 2004). Such
limitations were reflected in the solutions provided through the CAPS program and
CAPS successes were often reported in terms of community satisfaction with a police
presence to a crime issue affecting a neighborhood. For example, the installation of ATM
machines within police Districts was seen as a CAPS success because it was presumed
citizens would be safer making cash withdrawals while in a police facility. Although this
type of activity centers on methods to deflect crime, once implemented, there are no
provisions for feed back or follow up on information as to whether the steps taken
significantly impacted crime.
At the same time COP-like programs were being initiated, William Bratton,
Commissioner of the New York City Police Department (1994-1996), is credited with
taking the analytical approach to crime reduction a step further by integrating police
practices with a management style that stressed supervisory accountability as policy. The
process he designed required supervisors to aggressively use statistical data on crime as a
means to pinpoint ‘hot spots’ of criminal activity in order to develop tactics and counteractive measures to fight crime. This process has become known as Compstat.
Compstat
The literature devoted to the origins and development of Compstat is considerable
(Kelling and Coles, 1996; Bratton, 1998; Silverman, 1999; McDonald, Greenberg, and
Bratton, 2001). Compstat is intended to be an internal managerial tool in which middle

management i.e., commanders, would be held accountable for the ‘management of
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crime’ within their respective areas of influence (Ratcliffe, 2008). In New York, the
Police Commissioner William Bratton (1994-1996), restructured his Department’s
organization so that tactical requisites, including the flow of intelligence and resources,
would be made available to specifically address issues of crime. Ratcliffe (2008) notes
that data provided to commanders is more properly defined as ‘information’ rather than
‘intelligence’ and this distinction will be addressed in depth in the ensuing section. The
seminal difference that distinguishes the Compstat model from other police problem
solving approaches is that it successfully combined managerial and technical resources
through a process of organizational change (Moore, 2003; Silverman, 2006); the issue of
managerial buy-in was not an option, it was an imperative.
In support of his commanders, Bratton mandated the timely delivery of crime related
data and instituted twice-a-week meetings to review tactics and progress his commanders
were experiencing on specific crime problems or issues involving ‘hot spots,’ the
geographic areas of concern. Based largely the decline in the homicide rate, Bratton’s
Compstat model was heralded as an effective deterrent to crime and adopted, in various
forms, by other law enforcement agencies country wide (Silverman 1996; Remnick,
1997; Gurwitt, 1998; Mass, 1998; McDonald, 1998). A key component of Compstat
involved the spatial representations of crime in specific areas. This required the
conversion of data to points on a map which so that changes could be plotted for specific
date ranges and displayed visually during Compstat meetings. Levitt (2004) maintains
there were other factors at work which may have contributed to the perceived and actual
reduction in crime that New York experienced under Bratton’s plan and is skeptical that

Compstat alone was responsible. During the same time period, and without a program
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like Compstat, Los Angeles and Washington D.C., experienced crime reduction on par
with New York when the size of the respective departments is factored in (Thompson,
1997). In addition to a new police strategy, for example, stricter gun laws, additional
police officers, the strong economy of the 90’s and changing demographics may have
contributed to a decline in the crime rate in New York, as well as in the Nation (Moore,
2003; Levitt, 2004). While it is widely accepted that a variety of conditions can
contribute to conditions of crime, Compstat represented a ‘strategic control system’
intended to gather and disseminate information on crime as well as to track police efforts
to impact crime (Weisburd, Mastrofski, Greenspan, and Willis, 2004). It is unlikely that
Compstat alone was responsible for all reported drops in crime but it is also unfair to look
at broad societal changes which may have contributed to crime reduction in order to
detract from what Compstat established. The Compstat model was founded as a strategic
management tool that determined how data and information is managed through crime
analysis of specific crime data in order to develop intelligence on crimes and to influence
policy maker decisions related to resource allocation within police precincts. The idea of
executive buy-in to a strategy supported from the top by Mayor Giuliani and coupled
with the use of analytical tools to develop an efficient intelligence system is an important
precedent to intelligence-led policing.
Chicago Police Community Oriented Police Initiative
As discussed earlier, the Chicago CAPS program was strictly modeled after the
federal COPS program for developing a community-police bond. Concurrently, Chicago
also employed Compstat-like methods in which information on crime was used to

develop intelligence that could be used in support of police operations. The Chicago
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Police Department implemented the Deployment Operations Center (DOC) in 2003, a
unit charged with generating intelligence obtained through analysis of violent crime
reports from throughout the City which was then dispersed among the city’s twenty five
police Districts. The DOC efforts were aided by the development of the Illinois Citizen
and Law Enforcement Analysis system (I-CLEAR), an interactive database system which
allowed officers to mine data from all police records through District terminals. As with
Compstat, regular DOC meetings were conducted at headquarters to review operational
progress on citywide violent crime. In 2007, the Department instituted the Crime
Prevention Information Center (CPIC) to specifically address violent crime reduction and
homeland security terrorist threat assessments (CPD 2007 Annual Report). The CPIC
provides continuous assessment of data received from the field including data received
from stationary cameras deployed throughout the city.
In 2008 the DOC meeting was modified slightly in order to focus on specific Districts
during a weekly designated Crime Analysis Review (CAR) accountability meetings.
During DOC and CAR meetings the only crimes addressed involved homicides and
incidents of aggravated batteries in which victims were wounded or killed by handguns.
This rationale was based on an intention to develop strategies to drive down gun related
violence.
At these meetings the unit commanders of the focus Districts are required to explain
and defend activities initiated to curb street level violence. Despite the restructuring and
technology employed by the Department, both violent crime and homicides in 2008 have
increased in Chicago when compared to the previous year’s numbers. This may indicate

that Compstat-like programs, while useful as a concept, fails as a construct as most of
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the literature dealing with Compstat relates only to program implementation and not to
the results of the program (Moore, 1995). In reviewing the literature related to crime
strategies, two common themes recur but are overlooked; (1) while crime analysis, to
some degree takes place, analysts themselves actually assume the role of technicians who
retrieve data produce maps that pinpoint hotspots (Osborne, 2006) and (2) the focus of
each strategy is on an event or location, not the persons involved in the criminal act.
As part of the original COPS initiative, prosecutors were asked to "focus on the
offender, not simply the specific offense, and impose individualized sanctions [such as]
conflict resolution, treatment, counseling, and recreation programs" (Violent Crime
Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994). Analysis in the use of Compstat in three
cities suggested that some data is ‘invisible’ as Compstat focused on locations, not
people, and included no mechanism for tracking individuals involved in crimes, such as
domestic violence, who were likely to become repeat offenders (Willis, Mastrofski,
Weisburd; 2003). In practice, ‘pointer systems’ such as the Drug Enforcement Agency’s
(DEA) National Drug Pointer Index (NDPIX) have proven useful as a tool that identifies
offenders who may be the subject of multiagency investigations since 1997 (Foster,
2005). Such indicators are often important to law enforcement to avoid embarrassing
conflicts which can arise when two agencies, one federal and one local, for example, are
investigating the same target. McDonald and Boland (2003) conducted a John Hopkins
study which concluded the practices of the best police executives consistently used data
for strategic decisions and integrated aspects from each of the existing strategies (COP,
POP, Compstat) without regard to labeling successes under one enforcement approach.

Pattavina (2005) contends that through experimentation, the most effective policing
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results from integrating the strategies of COP, POP, and Compstat systematically and
scientifically. It was the integration of best practices among the three strategies combined
with the notion that a "focus on the offender, not simply the specific offense” might
provide a better solutions which remained unanswered under existing strategies that led
to the concept of intelligence-led policing.
Intelligence-led Policing
One COPS office report first referenced “intelligence-led strategy” as a method that
allowed decision makers to place resources where they would have the most impact on
crime in 1994 (Gest, 2005, 2007). Since then, there has been considerable debate as to
whether the notion of intelligence-led policing is actually an extension of existing
problem oriented policing strategies. Several authors interpret Compstat, for example, as
a tool that evolved from community policing because the methods used in each of the
models were non-traditional (Daniels and Smith, 2001; Carter, 2004; Clarke, 2006). A
similar argument considers intelligence-led policing to be grounded in the Compstat
approach and, by association, to the earlier models of POP and COP which are
considered to be proactive in that they seek to discover and inspect elements which may
contribute to conditions in support of crime rather than relying on conventional police
response to, and subsequent investigation of, a crime after the fact (Dannels and Smith,
2001).
Ratcliffe (2007) believes intelligence-led policing (ILP) resembles a hybrid model
which includes elements of problem oriented policing and Compstat as intelligence-led
policing involves the some of the analytical features of the former and the executive buy-

in of the later. Unlike either of the earlier models, ILP intentionally focuses on how
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key individuals are related to intelligence products which may have been derived from
key incident analysis and requires intelligence analysis as a whole rather than specific
crime analysis related to events. Earlier models devoted to crime prevention are restricted
as they depend on limited data available from available sources. The ILP task requires
that agencies be linked to other authorized law enforcement groups for additional
information resources.
The element that connects each of the precursors to intelligence-led policing is the
various use of analysis on many data sources to derive a better understanding of the
circumstances surrounding criminality and to apply analysis to prolific offenders. An
over reliance on law enforcement as the dominant sources of information related to
incidents presents real limitations to effective intelligence analysis. Each step in the
evolution of policing has required a better understanding of why all-source information
and the development of intelligence related to crime incidents is important. All-source
information is based on the collection of data from as many sources as possible in order
to compensate for deficiencies related to single sources while benefitting from combined
information as a whole (Lowenthal, 2006). All-source information includes information
provided from confidential informants or from surveillance. Clark and Eck (2004) point
out that an important step in intelligence-led policing is to emphasize the distinction
between crime analysis (crime data) and intelligence analysis (all-source data).
At its current stage, intelligence-led policing is considered to be a managerial model
for policing intended to disrupt, reduce, and prevent offender activity by combining
criminal intelligence and crime analysis in order to direct resource decisions which are

focused on serious repeat offenders (Ratcliffe, 2008). This moves the focus and use of
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intelligence work from the realm of ad hoc case work to a larger field involving strategic
planning and resource allocation.

Table 1. Generalized characteristics of five policing models (Ratcliffe 2008 ppg 72-23)
The resources devoted to intelligence-led policing are focused on prolific offenders
and their criminal associations including affiliations, assets, and equipment employed in
criminal enterprises. The central precept of intelligence-led policing is to focus on and
incapacitate ‘criminal leaders’ who are initially identified by the fact that they have

extensive criminal records or occupy seats of authority in the hierarchy of gang

34

structures (Flood, 2004).
The Relation Between Intelligence and Information in Policing
The research involving the meaning and use of intelligence is considerable and is
growing (Odom, 2003; Johnson and Wirtz, 2004; Lowenthal, 2006, Masse, O’Neil, and
Rollins 2008; Ratcliffe, 2005, 2008). Since the events of 9/11, interest in developing an
understanding of the benefits of reliable intelligence has escalated. The goal of this
review is not to be exhaustive, but rather to point out critical themes studied scholars in
the context of intelligence and specifically intelligence-led policing.
The notion of ‘intelligence’ has always been within the police lexicon. The challenge
to today’s law enforcement environment is that the concept and use of intelligence in
policing has remained relatively unchanged since the inception of modern policing in
early 19th century London when the Scotland Yard constabulary were charged with the
primary responsibility of preventing crime (Mayne, 1829; Ratcliffe, 2008).
Existing practices regard intelligence in policing as a tactical instrument rather than
either a process or product. Intelligence as a concept is an abstract idea and is generally
defined by terms of usage, leading to predictable confusion as meaning is literally
transformed by an activity which allows for several interpretations. For example, too
often the word ‘intelligence’ is used interchangeably, and incorrectly, with the word
‘information.’ Information obtained from surveillance is commonly referred to as
‘intelligence’ because it is germane to an on-going investigation. Without the benefit of
analysis, it is difficult to determine if such information is relevant to other investigations.
It is possible, for example, that analysis of surveillance might reveal, as often happens,

that other law enforcement agencies are involved in the same investigation without
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any of the parties being aware of the other’s presence. Intelligence represents a special
case of information and knowledge that has been analytically refined into a product that
is operationally actionable in relation to an organization’s interests (Desouza and
Vanapalli, 2005). Table 2 provides examples of data derived from police records to
distinguish between information and intelligence. Erikson and Haggerty (2001) maintain
the police obsession for reporting data, as with information listed below, does little more
than drive internal audits and create redundancy, leaving little time for analysis.
Information (related to an incident)
• Criminal history or driving record
• Case Reports
• Informant statements
• Vehicle registration information
• Behavioral observations by an
investigator or surveillance team
• Financial transaction records
• Travel records

Intelligence
• Analyst report with conclusions
based on the diverse information
subjected to research methods
which can be articulated
• Analysis of trends with
conclusions based on variables
subjected to statistical methods
• Predictive analysis based on the
assessment of information using
regression on the elements of past
experience
• Estimates on income from a
criminal enterprise based on
market and trafficking analysis of
illegal commodities
Table 2. Carter, David L., (2004), Law Enforcement Intelligence, US Department of
Justice, Office of Community Policing, p.11
In order to develop information into intelligence analysis is always required. Methods
of analysis vary and the desired product, i.e., intelligence derived from analysis must be
defined before analysis begins. As Table 2 indicates, intelligence is obtained after the
analysis of information has been accomplished for a specific purpose. Predictive analysis,
for example, is accomplished through the process of linear regression to provide

intelligence that will infer the likelihood of future events based on past experience.
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This technique is useful in the analysis of crime related to burglaries patterns in specific
areas. Intelligence products used in policing include tactical and strategic intelligence.
Today’s technology has made it easier to gather and organize data which may be
synthesized into information. This step is necessary as data, per se, should always be
regarded as unbiased while information, to qualify as information, must be biased.
Information represents data which has been synthesized, manipulated, processed or
organized so as to present and contribute to specific, situational knowledge (Desouza and
Hensgen, 2004). Information is then collected as the currency that produces intelligence
(Carter, 2004).
The Chicago Police Department has effectively demonstrated the ability to collect
data which is then disseminated through a variety of channels. From an operational
perspective, some of this data is converted to information and presented by the
Deployment Operations Center (DOC) through Deployment Intelligence Bulletins (DIBs)
which recount calls for service or from the Detective Division’s Analysis Section as
Detective Alerts that focus on possibly related crime patterns. In its present state, each of
these products demonstrates that the dominant crime analytic activity is more a technique
involving counting crime and providing unfiltered offender information to field
operations personnel (Carter, 2004). This underscores a fundamental weakness in local
law enforcement when crime analysts are required to continue to "count” crime far more
often than they "analyze" it (O’Shea, 2003). Such practices represent the distinction
between the ‘push-pull’ strategies commonly referred to in business literature. Push
models are dependent on organizations getting the right resources to the right place at the

right time while pull models provide access to appropriate resources as needed
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(Hagel, 2005). In practice, law enforcement’s push-approach does not work well in
practice in part because officers are required to act on communicated information, rather
than intelligence, in response to dynamic or changing incidents (Higgins, 2004).
The Relation Between Analysis and Intelligence in Policing
The existing literature provides a number of ‘intelligence-cycle’ models intended to
outline the relation of information and intelligence which leads to policy decisions and
actionable knowledge (Odom, 2003; Johnson and Wirtz, 2004; Ratcliffe, 2008; Desouza
and Hensgen, 2004; Masse, O’Neil, Rollins, 2008). Intelligence-cycle models are
intended to demonstrate how empirical data received from a variety of sources is
qualitatively channeled to information. It is information that is then analyzed through the
lens of semantic (interpretive) and semiotic (contextual understanding) phases to
determine its value as intelligence.
Intelligence-led policing subscribes to a 3i concept model which focused on three
conditions and is intended to provide analysts and policy makers with an understanding
of the relation between the sectors of the criminal environment, crime intelligence
analyst, and the decision makers (Ratcliffe, 2008). The three conditions contributing to
the ILP model reflect on the importance to holistically interpret, influence, and impact all
sectors of the model in order to be successful. The New Jersey State Police adopted this
model as an integral part of its intelligence-led policing initiative started in 2006
(NJSP2006). The model’s sectors are intentionally non-specific in order to avoid
confusion as to the roles represented as they often vary. It is not uncommon for
investigations to conclude at one phase while being continued at another at which time

the roles of the decision makers, analysts, or targets may change. The model
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emphasizes the activities within intelligence-led policing must be in concert; the
elimination of impact (through action) despite interpretation through analysis or influence
on decision makers to devote resources as the result of intelligence defeats the intent of
intelligence-led policing.

Figure 1. The 3i model of ILP (Ratcliffe 2008 p 110)
Intelligence models, regardless of their format, are used to process data to
information, information to intelligence, intelligence to knowledge, and knowledge to
action. The heavy work related to the products of intelligence rest with the analyst who is
required to sort through data in search of information of use by a specific audience. An
analyst may be called on to provide incident specific intelligence for use in a tactical
mission, to prioritize concerns within a region for an operational mission, or to provide
intelligence assessments related to risks and resources requirements for large strategic
missions (Scott, 2003). Police analysts are traditionally called upon to provide “criminal
intelligence,” a product predicated on known data or information maintained in police
files and related to activities which have been recorded in incident reports or arrests.

Crime analysis may use the products of police intelligence but requires data from
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multiple agencies, often outside local or regional jurisdictions, in order to be effective
(Boba, 2005). Efficient crime analysis requires practitioners to have a wide range of
skills that include technical and theoretical expertise, be self-directed, have an
understanding of criminology and public administration, and insight into police
operations (O’Shea and Nicholls, 2003; Osborne, 2005; IICA, 2005). Because the
requirements for an efficient analyst are often found among personnel outside of law
enforcement, the most important skill for an analyst to manage is the understanding the
relationship between themselves and the decision makers (Nicholls, 2004).
The Chicago Police Organized Crime Division Perception of Intelligence
The Organized Crime Division (OCD) of the Chicago Police Department is
comprised of three sections Gangs, Narcotics, and Gang Enforcement. In 2009 the Gang
Enforcement section was created as the main tactical planning and operational arm of the
OCD while the Gang and Narcotic sections operate with teams assigned to specific areas
of the city. As such, Gang Enforcement oversees the activities of the three hundred
personnel that make up the OCD. Additionally, Gang Enforcement co-ordinates, with
local commanders, tactical operations involving an additional three hundred personnel
assigned to the five Area Gang Teams located throughout the city. Teams are comprised
of a set number of officers who are involved with incident investigations. For the Gangs
section, incident investigations entail activities surrounding street level violence e.g.,
recent shootings or homicides, in which known gang members are involved. Narcotics
section personnel focus on investigations involving street level narcotics trafficking. Both

sections rely on evidentiary materials obtained from surveillance techniques that are
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conducted physically or electronically.
In February of 2008, a new Superintendent was appointed for the Chicago Police
Department. The individual chosen to lead the Department is a former Supervising Agent
from the FBI who has suggested that among the new strategies he will adopt is one which
is focused on the notion of ‘intelligence-based policing.’ Prior to and during the city’s
budget hearings of 24 October 2009, the Superintendent referenced ‘intelligence-based
policing’ as the basis for solutions to existing crime problems:
We need to focus on intelligence-based policing. We are not in a time when we can
just throw more officers out throughout the city; we have to put officers on the right
spots, we have to make sure they are addressing the right gangs.
Shortly after assuming control of the Department, the new Superintendent ordered
OCD personnel to refrain from making non-essential arrests and to focus on collecting
‘intelligence’ related to the leadership among Chicago’s most active street gangs. Beyond
this directive, there were no specific provisions on what constitutes intelligence or how
materials or information collected by OCD personnel would be used, shared, or
distributed. What is known is between the spring and fall of 2008, organizational changes
intended to make the Department more effective have had no impact on homicides and
the rate at which street level violence has escalated compared to previous years. In
Chicago, whether the practices and products of intelligence-led policing can make a
difference on crime, especially violent crime, are unknown. It is important that changes
which will to occur under the new police administration be separated from problems
associated with inefficiencies that endure through an ineffective belief system, a cultural
problem which underscores the need for maintaining the status quo (Chakravorti, 2003).

Many of the critical factors associated with intelligence-led policing may provide a
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method which serves to impact existing crime conditions while steering the Department
away from traditional response driven belief systems.
The next chapter outlines the methodology used in this research while examining the
rationale behind the on-going dynamics related to current changes in the OCD. The data
provided from interviews will be categorized as the basis for reporting results. The
purpose of this research, as currently perceived, is to clarify the boundaries between the
phenomenon of intelligence use in police work and real-life context by accessing police
supervisor’s perception of the critical factors of Intelligence-led policing as a
management tool intended to enhance the effectiveness of tasks related to intelligence
processes used to address crime.

CHAPTER THREE
METHODOLOGY
This chapter describes the methodology to be used to conduct this research and is
outlined according to specific sections. The first section describes the research strategy
and rational for the methodology selected. Section two describes sampling used in
anticipation of interviews with participants in the study. Section three describes the
procedures related to data collection and is followed by the final section which provides
an overview of the research plan to be used in this study.
The research design for this project is based on case studies involving the use of
intelligence products and processes in policing by Chicago’s Organized Crime Division
(OCD).
In the extant police literature devoted to information gathering and sharing and the
use of intelligence products and processes, as a phenomenon, the notion of intelligenceled policing has generated considerable interest. The Chicago Police Department has
recently been restructured with particular attention and reorganization given to the
Organized Crime Division with the specific direction of the Department’s Superintendent
to employ ‘intelligence-driven’ police methods. The OCD is directly involved with the
investigation of gang crimes involving street level violence and with criminal narcotics
activities that fund on-going criminal enterprises. As a crucial part of the strategies and
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tactics used to address these issues, the OCD is dependent on current and accurate
intelligence products to enhance their operational effectiveness.
As currently perceived, the purpose of this research is to clarify the boundaries

between the phenomenon of intelligence use in police work and real-life context by
accessing police supervisor’s perception of the critical factors of Intelligence-led policing
as a management philosophy intended to enhance the effectiveness of tasks related to

intelligence processes used to address crime.
Intelligence is the product of information and analysis and has recently been
considered as the basic tool for a management model that directs policing strategies

rather than merely supporting policing tactics. This study investigates the contemporary
phenomenon of intelligence in police work from its real life context and explores critical
factors in the model of intelligence-led policing through an assessment of how these

factors are perceived by supervisors and decision makers of the Chicago Police

Department’s Organized Crime Division.
The Research Strategy
This research involves case studies which will be subjected to inductive qualitative
analysis and assessment on themes derived from semi-structured interviews and
observation of police supervisors involved in decision-making tasks that require the use
of intelligence products and processes. Interviews will be conducted with 12-17
supervisors, as content experts, on the use of intelligence processes, from the three
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unit sections of OCD (Gang Enforcement, Gang Investigations, and Narcotics). Critical
factors are derived from literature review and will be modified during the process of indepth interviews and comparative, inductive analysis.
The difficulty in this research centers on the meaning of intelligence (processes and
product An emphasis will be made to provide insight into the experiences and
motivations which drive intelligence related practices as well as to examine the perceived
measure of success attributed to these practices in police work and the activities which
result through the use of intelligence.
The researcher contends the intelligence related practices by which supervisors
develop and define their critical tasks contribute to the effectiveness of their missions and
ultimately to the understanding and perception of the use of intelligence in police work,
particularly in crime prevention. If supervisors understand and define intelligence related
activities in a manner which differs from those required for a predictive or proactive
response, emergent, rather than desired consequences are likely to impact their
effectiveness. The researcher intends to introduce insight on the practice of an
Intelligence-led Policing strategy for the purpose of investigating whether supervisors
perceive the critical factors of ILP as useful to current intelligence related police tasks.
This research will incorporate semi-structured interviews with supervisors of the OCD
and insight on the topic of Intelligence-led Policing drawn from the extant literature and
existing practices outside the CPD.
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Research Methods
This study is oriented in qualitative research. Qualitative research has been described
as a naturalistic study conducted through prolonged contact with ‘field’ situations which
typically reflect the everyday life and the explicit and implicit rules that govern that life
(Miles and Huberman, 1994). The approach in this research is through case studies that
represent the in-depth study of instances of a phenomenon in a natural context from the
perspective of participants involved in the phenomenon (Gall, Gall, and Borg, 2003). Yin
(1994) defines case studies as empirical (observable) inquiry that investigates a
phenomenon in a natural setting when the boundaries between the phenomenon and its
context are unclear. An overriding feature of qualitative case studies involves the flow of
events, observations, data collection which continue to emerge during the research (Miles
and Huberman, 1994). This research, which investigates the use of intelligence in police
work from within a Division of the Chicago Police Department, meets the criteria for
case studies. Case studies are considered ‘naturalistic’ when they represent naturally
occurring, ordinary events. In addition to the choice of method, a review of sociological
and anthropological literature related to research methods was conducted (Geertz, 1973;
Yin, 1994; Wenger, 1998; Gall et al 2003).
The primary method for data collection in this research involves semi-structured
interviews used to refine and develop an understanding of how respondents view the use
of intelligence in police work as well as to examine existing practices involving sources,
meanings, and analytics related to the use of intelligence used by police.
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Interview questions using this method are initially semi-structured but allow for openform questions to be added in order to obtain additional information (Gall et al, 2003).
This method is best suited for this research as more structured methods of interviews can
preclude the opportunity of probing for deeper understanding of the matter under
investigation (Miles and Huberman, 2004). The use of semi-structured interviews allow
for responses to be classified according to the focus of the interview while the aspect of
open-form provides for more sustained dialogue between the researcher and interview
participants which leads to more contextual information and the possibility for more
insight into the phenomenon being explored. Semi-structured interviews will be
conducted to collect data from key informants, i.e., supervisors, who have specialized
knowledge of how intelligence in police work is developed and used. The questions
developed for this interview are provided in Appendix III which represents an interview
guide for the interview sessions. Specifically, this research investigates whether the
model of Intelligence-led Policing will be perceived by OCD decision makers as an
effective strategy to combat crime related problems beyond those of the existing
practices. This research will focus on what, how, and when tasks related to the use of
intelligence, as a phenomenon, are managed by supervisors within the OCD. Descriptions
will be based on naturally occurring data provided through participant observation and
interview of what is routine and ordinary in police tasks requiring intelligence products.
The interconnectivity of subject categories and activities from this research will be drawn
to study how they are layered together and relate to the complexity of the phenomenon of
intelligence use in policing.

47
Gall et al (2003) emphasize the important requirement of entry to properly identified
sites and as well as the necessity to work with ‘gatekeepers’ who authorize permission to
allow research interviews to take place. The Chicago Police Department is a quasimilitary organization divided into bureaus. The Organized Crime Division (OCD) is a
subset of the Bureau of Investigative Services and is managed by a Chief, Deputy Chief,
and three commanders who oversee the Gang, Narcotics, and Intelligence units. During
the initial stages of this study, the researcher outlined the intention and requirements to
interview to each of these respective personnel within the Command Staff and was
encouraged to proceed. A series of Command changes took place following the granting
of required permission during which all of the key personnel of the Command Staff of
OCD was reassigned. The major Command changes effecting OCD occurred in October
and were repeated in November. Although this has been problematic, it represents the
challenge of readdressing the intention of this research to the new chain of command.
The notion of access in existing literature is often brief and skimmed over, in part
because it is presumed; it is mentioned here as part of the anticipatory phase of the
research development.
Sampling
The sampling for this research is purposeful and represents management-supervisory
personnel from within the Organized Crime Division (OCD) who have experience with
the use of current intelligence products and results related to those products. These
personnel are from three sections of the OCD; Gangs, Narcotics, and Gang Enforcement.
These personnel are directly impacted by any benefit derived from the use of intelligence
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products. The OCD is comprised approximately three hundred personnel who are
managed, at the decision making level, by seventeen (17) supervisors of the rank of
lieutenant or above. Optimally, the researcher expects to conduct between ten (10) and
fifteen (15) sets of interviews from this sample. When appropriate, the researcher may
interview sergeants from OCD management because they work closely with decision
makers in designing and implementing intelligence strategies. Sampling is based on
selecting a portion of the population that is representative of the entire population under
study and is comprised of individuals who represent the entire population in terms of
specific characteristics (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). Specifically, this research explores
the concept of the meaning and use of the intelligence phenomenon in police work by the
Organized Crime Division (OCD). The subjects for sampling in this study are purposive
and based on reputational case selection as selected personnel possess special insight into
how intelligence processes are managed within the specific setting of the OCD.
In this research, administrative, operational, and tactical supervisors of the
Department’s Organized Crime Division are interviewed. Supervisors include sworn
police personnel above the rank of sergeant who participate in administrative,
operational, and tactical tasks. Exempt rank members i.e., the Chief, the Deputy Chief,
and Commanders are involved in strategic decisions effecting the Division operations.
Personnel of this rank are selected on their respective experience and demonstrated
ability to lead in accordance with Department guidelines. The lieutenants and sergeants
are responsible for the tactical execution of operations in accordance with the Division’s
strategic vision. Personnel at this level of management succeed to their rank based on
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standardized Department promotional testing and are assigned to the Organized Crime
Division at the discretion of the exempt ranks. This sample provides a cross section of
police engaged in intelligence work from a variety of perspectives. Exempt rank
members, for example, have generally been involved in a number of positions throughout
their careers and have a good sense of Department protocols and how to manage within
the system while sergeants may have as little as five years on the Department, are less
articulate in their explanations of strategic decisions and are more focused on tactical
results. For this study, the subjects selected for interview are ‘observational choices.’
Observational choices contribute to theory in that the facts they present in interview are
used to analyze patterns and relationships associated with the concept under study (Miles
and Huberman, 1994). This sampling allows for a broad range of perspectives and rich
feedback about the use of intelligence by police.
Data Collection
Data collection represents an on-going process that commences during the
anticipatory design phase of quantitative research and continues beyond the initial
interview phase; it is emergent and developing as data collected at one point can be used
for other data activities (Gall, et al, 2003). Data used in this research is provided
from interviews with key personnel who have direct knowledge related to the use of
intelligence in policing. The knowledge contributed from these sources is founded in
their explicit and tacit experiences. Explicit experiences provide the general knowledge
base related to individual backgrounds and contribute to the ‘how’ interviewees
succeeded to their respective positions in the OCD. Tacit experiences are specific to the
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individual and provide personal perspectives, including subjective insight and intuition,
and contribute to the subject’s perception of meaning (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995). The
formative data collected from interviews on the use of intelligence in policing contribute
to thick descriptions, i.e. statements which recreate a situation (use of intelligence in
policing), as much of its context as possible, while providing meaning or intentions
inherent to the situation (Gall, et al, 2003; Miles and Huberman, 1994; Geertz, 1973).
Data collection will be conducted ‘on-site’ at the offices of the Organized Crime
Division. Authorization for interviews will be part of the anticipatory phase in data
collection and comes from the exempt rank personnel of the OCD. The physical site at
which interviews will be conducted is the police facility housing the OCD offices; a
multi-storied office building with secured access provided by on-duty officers and
biometric locks to which the researcher must obtain permission for entry. Interviews will
be conducted in meeting rooms or in supervisor’s offices; meeting rooms are preferable
as they provide fewer possibilities for distraction. The interview calendar will be
arranged according to supervisor schedules and take into account furloughs (vacation
periods) and watch assignments (days or afternoons).
In addition to interviews, secondary sources of information will be used in this study.
These sources include documents, direct observation, existing statistics, and physical
artifacts. Documents include open source material from newspaper articles related to
changes in Departmental organization and strategies and non-classified administrative
policy documents. Documents are useful in making inferences about events (Yin, 1994;
Stakes 1995). Direct observations provide first hand experience related to a working
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environment and exhibited behaviors. The inspection of existing physical artifacts,
including those of technology, used for the acquisition or development of intelligence
provides insight into organizational practices.
Interviews will be tape recorded. Prior to interview, the subjects will be provided
documentation related to issues of anonymity, confidentiality, and the manner in which
recordings are maintained, stored, and eventually discarded. These measures are
important and help to gain the confidence of the respondent in order to minimize any
possible undesirable effects of having the interview recorded (Gall et al, 2003). Potential
respondents will be provided with an informed consent document, a written outline
which summarizes the aims of this research, how interviews will be conducted, the
benefits and risks of participation, how results will be reported, and how confidentiality
of the information provided in interviews will be maintained. Confidentiality will be
maintained by using coded numbers rather than names for record identification.
Identifiable references to other persons during interviews will be masked in documents
produced from interviews. Because the decision to participate in this research is
voluntary, potential respondents will be advised they have the option to withdraw from
interview at any time.
Interview sessions are expected to last approximately forty minutes during which
time questions from the interview guide will be covered. Tape recording speeds the
interview process because it eliminates extensive note taking and may be studied in
greater depth as tapes provide a complete verbal record which can not practically be
obtained from note taking Gall et al, 2003). Tape recordings will subsequently be
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transcribed fully to facilitate data analysis. Based on the researcher’s work related
experience, the interviewer expects that forty minutes of recording will require
approximately four hours of transcription. The amount of data collected per case will
include that which is necessary to address questions raised in interview and sufficient
enough to exhaust source information or saturate categories which emerge.
Existing observational research literature discusses the relationship between the
observer and those observed and borrows the terms emic and etic from the field of
anthropological studies (Pike, 1967; Geertz, 1973; Galls et al, 2004; Miles and
Huberman, 1994). Each term relates to accounts of the researcher’s perspective and
descriptions of data related to an observed group with emic descriptions accounting for
actions, beliefs, or viewpoints of an individual group member (native) to whom an action
has meaning while etic descriptions accounting for the viewpoints and beliefs of an
outside observer who interprets meaning. In this study, the researcher enjoys a distinct
relation from both perspectives in that he has participated as an actor within the group
and has insight into the procedures and language used in the context of police culture.
Concurrently, the researcher’s educational experiences provides an opportunity to
observe the group as an ‘outsider’ with viewpoints and beliefs, based on an academic
review of the relevant literature, as a criteria, related to the use of intelligence in policing
which is applicable, in a more general sense, to the law enforcement community.
Data Analysis
The structure of the interviews in these case studies will provide the basis for coding
through the responses to each question as they indicate patterns in information. Patterns
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provided through interview assist in developing themes that are either manifest
(empirical) or latent, i.e., subject to later categorization related to the phenomenon of
intelligence use in police work Themes for coding will be developed as patterns are
uncovered, within and across data, which helps organize information and the
interpretation of the phenomenon under study Information will be coded as developing
themes are qualified by causal relationships. Consistency in judgment on the part of the
researcher will be the basis for of thematic reliability. Where useful, some statistical
analysis will be used to determine theme and coding validity
Data collected for this research will be analyzed using categorical protocols and
presented in accordance to their fit as various police intelligence components. The
essence of content analysis is the coding of documented evidence and nested messages
into categories (Gall et al, 2003). Interviews are used to improve the conceptualization of
police intelligence components by contributing to attribute lists and categories for each of
the components and these components are coded as criteria for data analysis. This
involves the organization of data into categories. A category is a construct which refers to
certain phenomenon present within the context of a study while a construct is inferred
from an observed phenomenon, e.g., co-operation (Gall et al, 2003). Categories are
unique but can be subdivided according to the properties and dimensions found during
analysis. Miles and Huberman (1994) use an analogy of categories to bins that contain
many discrete events or recorded behaviors. The interrelationship of these bins helps
construct a conceptual framework. Coding involves the analytical processes through
which data are fractured, conceptualized, and integrated to form theory (Strauss and
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Corbin, 1998). In this research, recorded responses to interviews will be analyzed
deductively to obtain discrete, key themes that are relevant and specific to individual
categories. The inspection and analysis of the content provided through interview will
reveal messages within the content itself. Thematic code analysis will be used to inspect
themes which emerge during analysis of interviews for the purpose of gauging the
frequency of themes and similarities between users in use of themes.
Data to be analyzed will be structured using a pre-defined coding template developed
in accordance with accepted guidelines (Miles and Huberman: 1994; Gall et al, 2004).
Codes will be constructed from definitions related to intelligence use by police, its
components, and critical factors or activities related to the components of the use of
intelligence in policing. Critical factors include, for example, the use of analysis
techniques associated with developing intelligence from information, sources of
information, and technologies used to refine information from data. Categories will
be determined deductively from expected responses of the police use of intelligence
before data is applied. Data collected from sources will then be examined inductively for
evidence in order to assign the data to categories. Accordingly, relevant information from
interviews or other sources, e.g., documents, will be allocated to a code. This process is
repeated for each category assigned to the data. One question representing a segment of
an interview might be coded as an instance involving multiple categories. For example, a
response to a question on the value of intelligence in policing might reveal that the
respondent is unclear on what constitutes intelligence, who administers intelligence
activities, and is content to accept data that is routinely provided as intelligence by the
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Department because she believes the cycle is unbreakable and has provided data that can
be coded in several categories such as meaning, information sources, and management
actions. Once data are coded they will be analyzed for properties or dimensions that
indicate patterns such as when specific or similar responses occur. Additionally, analysis
may indicate that the conclusion of one case can provide information which needs to be
replicated in other cases leading to literal replication to ‘fill-in the blanks’ that helps
explain the conditions under which a particular phenomenon is likely to be found. For
each individual case, the report should indicate how and why a particular behavior was,
or was not, demonstrated. Across cases, reports will indicate the extent to which this
replication logic was used and why, in such instances, case results could be predicted
(Yin 2003). The researcher will use a second coder for coding purposes during a review
of a sample pilot interview in order to check for consistency in interpretation and
analysis. It is expected that during this phase, additional categories may be uncovered
while others may be revised.
As multiple sources related to the police use of intelligence will be examined in this
study, data types may be compared for corroboration or ‘bracketing’ in the research
findings (Miles and Huberman, 1994). The result of multiple instances of the same or
very similar findings from different sources, especially while using different methods of
analysis, lends itself to reliability (though not validity) of the study. This is a function of
good data collection when it is verified and checked against other data. Miles and
Huberman (1994) state that corroborating methods are sometimes referred to as
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triangulation and explain that such results come from the practice of good analytical
induction.
Concerns for validity and reliability are addressed by methods used in data collection
and analysis. Validity related to the interview instrument will be accomplished by having
two police supervisors who are not involved in interviews review the document. Under
these conditions, validity means simply that data sought should represent what we expect
them to represent. Additionally, these supervisors may be asked to participate in pilot
studies in order to access timing expectations or to add to and refine the interview
instrument before it is administered. Construct validity will be obtained through cross
checking the multiple sources of data previously discussed and by having key
respondents review drafts of written findings. Explanations provided during data analysis
are expected to contribute to the content validity of this study.
Reliability issues are concerned with the accuracy and comprehensiveness of
collected data and relates to the expectation that anyone investigating the data provided
would find the same phenomenon existing in the same or similar settings. A study’s
internal reliability is strengthened by consistency in the administration of the research
protocol or methods and through robust documentation to support them (Yin, 1994).
In addition to the listed sources of data in this research, information from field notes
made during interviews will be added to the descriptions. This can uncover similarities in
phases, thematic relationships, isolated patterns of behavior and action, or generalization
which contribute to formalized knowledge on the use of intelligence in police work.

57
At the conclusion of the empirical phase of this dissertation, the concept of
intelligence in police work will be refined in accordance to the data collected and
analyzed from interviews and relevant documents. Additionally, data collected in
interview related to the construct on the critical factors of intelligence-led policing will be
examined.
Research Plan
Table 3, presented at the end of this chapter, represents an outline of the research plan
used in this study. This plan involves the interview of between eight and fourteen
supervisory personnel from within the Chicago Police Department’s Organized Crime
Division in order to provide exploratory support on the use the phenomenon of
intelligence use in policing as well as assessment data. Additionally, the critical practices
related to the use of intelligence in policing will be investigated. The selection of sample
is purposeful and in order to capture an array of interpretations, observations, and
practices in intelligence used by police while providing a degree of consistency for cross
interview analysis. The single criteria involved in the selection of this sample is that
supervisors have a minimum of three years experience in the use intelligence products
used for policing or five or more years experience is tasks related to the processes
associated with the use of intelligence in policing. Formal educational requirements for
this group will generally require a minimum if a bachelor’s degree, in any discipline,
because that stage of education is required for rank. Several of the prospective
respondents have attended advanced training sessions which cover an array of
administrative and tactical subjects related to police operations.
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How this Research will be Accomplished
The first requirement for the initiation of this project involves permission of the cooperating institution, i.e., the Chicago Police Department. Permission to conduct this
research is required for two principle reasons. First, it is a requirement of the Institutional
Review Board (IRB). Secondly, the Department, as an organization, requires a standard
of due diligence which, as a concept, involves the activities in this research so as to
comply with provisions for a certain standard of care, i.e., a degree of prudence to which
this research will be bound. In this instance, it is reasonable to expect the Department be
concerned with its own image as well as that of sworn personnel who may participate in
this study.
In January of 2009, the researcher met with the current Chief of Organized Crime to
present the concepts, as currently perceived, involved in this project as well as to discuss
the feasibility and interest of his section for the proposed research. The researcher learned
the OCD was particularly interested in developing their capacity for using intelligence
processes but operational responsibilities and considerations had precluded their ability to
pursue this interest in a timely manner. A brief description of this project was forwarded
to the Department’s legal affairs division and subsequently to the Department’s research
and development section. In March of 2009, the research and development section
requested a copy of the actual proposal as well as a copy of the IRB approval page.
This presents a minor dilemma or Catch-22 in the process as the IRB requires a letter
of co-operation from the Department which, in turn, requires a copy of IRB approval
prior to issuing a letter of co-operation. The researcher expects this problem to be
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resolved administratively after discussing the situation with his Committee Chair. This
issue is presented in this section as it illustrates a phase of the dissertation process which
is crucial and must be addressed before the intended methodologies of research may be
applied; it is a principle key to access for academic and the intended research population.
Silverman and Marvasti (2008), note that the point of qualitative research is to say a
lot about a little. Qualitative research begins with thorough descriptions; in this instance,
data that describe the use of intelligence process and products and their associative
behaviors from the perspective of OCD practitioners themselves. One key example is the
manner in which intelligence products are informally shared within an agency.
Qualitative studies have emphasized that informal sharing of information, rather than
information sharing through more formal structured channels, is a social behavior that
indicates a lack of faith or purpose in current information exchange systems. Descriptions
in qualitative research are intended to be ‘rich’ in detail and ‘thick’ in description to
provide insight into the social and physical settings in which the generation and use of
intelligence occurs as well to describe the social and individual factors which influence
behaviors.
The use of semi-structured questions provides an opportunity for respondents to
communicate, in their own words, and based on their own experience, answers to what,
when, and how, activities related to intelligence gathering and sharing occurs.
Prospective respondents will be told in advance the expected duration of the interview
sessions. A Pilot interview which lasted forty minutes indicated the session could be
completed within one hour. Interviewees will be given the opportunity to review a
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consent form which explains their participation is voluntary and confidential and that the
interview will be digitally recorded. Participants must sign-off on the consent form prior
to interview. The researcher will also maintain notes related to observations during the
interview.
Research Techniques
Completed interviews will be transferred to a secure computer under the exclusive
control of the researcher. Once the transfer is completed, the original recording will be
erased from the recording device. Each interview will be stored in a computer file
identified by a random code generated by a computer program. A copy of the codeidentified interview will then be digitally stripped of all information related to the to the
interviewee’s identity. This copy will be electronically sent to a transcribing service from
which the researcher has a confidentiality agreement.
The researcher will use Qualrus™ software to store, code, retrieve, and analyze
completed interviews. This software assists in organizing and identifying patterns within
the coded data and observations. Data is coded according for properties or dimensions
that indicate patterns or emergent themes. Information from secondary data sources, e.g.,
policy documents or existing statistics, will be combined with interview data and used
with this software in support of the focus and triangulate on data of this assessment study.
The research plan and observational guide illustrated in Figure 3 is intended as an
initial guide to this research for the purpose of proceeding in a structured fashion.
Observations produce background data related to the setting in which interviews will take
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place. The guide includes the goals and, as currently perceived, the expected results of
this study.
Table 3: Research Plan and Observational Guide
Aims and
1. To obtain a practitioner’s insight on the construct of
Objectives: (Note
intelligence use in policing tasks by members of a population
aims refer to the
representing supervisor/decision makers of the Chicago
overall results this
Police Department’s Organized Crime Division.
study intends to
2. Determine what the practitioners are trying to accomplish
achieve while
and how they are doing it.
objectives include
3. Elicit the attributes of the components of intelligence as they
specific activities
relate to and are used in police tasks.
use to achieve the
4. Explore the definition of intelligence in policing as a
aim.)
construct.
5. Examine the attributes of intelligence used in policing tasks
as defined through this study.
6. Explore the evidence presented through observation for
indicators or themes related meaning and behavior involving
intelligence related tasks in policing.
7. Assess how the critical factors of Intelligence-led Policing
are perceived by members of the Chicago Police
Department’s Organized Crime Division (OCD).
Unit of Analysis
Based at the organizational level; individuals involved in the
development and definition of the intelligence process employed
by the OCD.
Number of Cases
Eleven (11)
Type of Replication Literal: the same or similar results are expected from each
interview (Yin 1991)
Primary Data
Semi-structured interviews with supervisors of the OCD who are
Collection
experienced in the use of intelligence activities in policing.
Triangulation
Documents and data on intelligence practices of the OCD or in
relevant literature on the use of intelligence policing.
Connections
Observe the relationship between the setting and personnel
involved with intelligence work in policing to determine whether
change is likely to occur.
Expected Results
1. Examine the opportunity for refining the concept of
intelligence as it applies to police work.
2. Prepare a refined list of attributes for the components to be
used in policing.
3. Examine whether the critical factors of Intelligence-led
Policing, as perceived by supervisors of the OCD can
contribute to their objectives for strategic planning.

62
An overriding objective of this study is to provide a tool which serves as the basis
for continued research. The notion of intelligence in policing will be a critical concern for
future law enforcement agencies; it is not a question as to if or when steps towards a
robust and routinely used information management system, unique to police needs, and
dedicated towards the development of intelligence work will be as common as squad
cars.
Several companies are currently managing existing business software products to
conform to police needs, especially in the field of analysis. IBM®, for example, is in the
process of acquiring software companies whose products involve applications for
predictive modeling. Such software is useful in business but can be refined for police
uses in managing the huge amounts of data that law enforcement agencies collect.
In addition the private sector’s interest in developing analytic tools for police, several
universities are involved in developing curriculum and applications centered on the needs
for analysis and analytics in the public sector. Dr. Dave Carter of Michigan State has
designed a degree program for analytics for use in the public sector and been involved
with initiatives to promote the use of analysis in police work. Dr. Jerry Ratcliffe of
Temple was instrumental in assisting the New Jersey State Police move to an
intelligence-led approach for all their work while continuing to champion the business
model for Intelligence-led policing.
As fiscal restraints hinder hiring and contribute to lay-offs among police agencies,
law enforcement is compelled to work smarter. Intelligence-led policing may prove to be
a good place to start.

CHAPTER FOUR
RESEARCH
This chapter describes the research conducted and is organized in the following
sections: a description of and rationale for the interviews and questions used in this multicase study, the coding methods employed, and the analysis of additional questions
generated through the exploratory investigation involved in this research.
Qualitative research and analysis begins with descriptions (Patton, 1990, 2006; Yin,
2004). The initial phase of this section focuses on descriptions while interpretations of
these descriptions and observations appear later in this chapter.
This general case, supported by the case interviews, is provided with the general
public interest in mind. The extant literature on Intelligence-led Policing provides a
number of ‘how-to’ guides but does not address express viability as to whether the model
is generalizeable for agencies which may wish to learn of or adopt the model. From a
practical sense, this study has underlying national implications for police agencies as a
‘starting point’ i.e., for considerations which must be addressed prior to committing to the
changes that are required to adopt an Intelligence-led Policing model as a tool intended to
anticipate and prevent crime at any jurisdictional level. Since 2001, many agencies have
adopted variations of intelligence gathering-sharing models to augment the services
related to national security with the assumption that local law enforcement would benefit
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as a by-product of such endeavors. The issues related to such a notion will be addressed
in the subsequent chapter.
For this research, a computer assisted qualitative data analysis software (CAQDAS)
program was used to facilitate the use of qualitative data. After reviewing several
software applications available for this task, the researcher chose the Qualrus™ program
to assist in managing the unstructured data from interviews which required analysis. As a
qualitative research tool, the program falls into a category of products used for CAQDAS
such as ATLAS™ and NVivo™. Each of these programs allows the researcher to collect
and group qualitative data which may then be coded, categorized, linked, and tested for
relationships.
Qualrus™ employs case-based reasoning which is centered on the premise that the
coding of text segments can be facilitated by identifying comparable segments (those
similar to the segment being coded) in order to adjust codes of the comparable text
segments to indicate differences between them and the segment being coded. The
practice of case-based reasoning is similar to , for example, when lawyers employ case
law to apply reason about new cases based on similar cases from past court decisions.
The practice of coding a case study is an arduous task. Coding the data collected
through case study interviews is a technique that aids in the identification of the concepts
and will be discussed in greater detail in the Interview section of this chapter. Coding of
text segments requires the constant and repeated review of the all data collected from
each interview; it is a dynamic and fluid process. Case- based reasoning requires code
revisions so that codes are in agreement, i.e., so that they may be grouped in categories
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which relate to specific characteristics within coded text segments. This process is similar
to pattern matching.
Permission to conduct interviews was received from the Chicago Police Department’s
Legal Affairs Department on 29 October 2009. Upon receiving this authorization,
potential interviewees were contacted via an e-mail list provided by personnel of the
Department’s Organized Crime Division. Each respondent received the same solicitation
(Appendix B). In all, seventeen supervisory personnel, the majority of who were of the
rank of lieutenants and above (90%) were invited to participate in this study. In response
to this solicitation, eleven respondents committed to interview. Interviews were arranged
to accommodate the schedules of the respondents and were held at the respective offices
of each respondent during November 2009. Access to the secured location where the
interviews were to be held was pre-arranged between the respondents and the researcher.
Each interview began with the researcher providing potential respondents with
Consent to Participate forms (Appendix C) that outlined the purpose of the interview, the
steps which would be taken during interview, and informed each respondent that their
participation was voluntary and confidential. The researcher provided a copy of the
confidentiality agreement (Appendix D), signed by Superintendent Jody Weis,
authorizing this research project. As a condition of proceeding with the interview, each
respondent was required to sign and date the consent form given them. One hundred per
cent of the respondents complied with the conditions of the form and consented to be
interviewed for this research study.
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The Pilot Study and Interview Protocol Adaptation
Prior to conducting the formal interviews that provided the data used for this
project, the researcher conducted a Pilot Study with Organized Crime Division (OCD)
supervisory personnel who were not intended for inclusion in the actual study. The
formative aspect of the Pilot Study allowed the researcher to develop a focused, more
relevant line of questioning that assisted in the clarification of the project’s conceptual
design. For example, during the Pilot Study it became apparent that some of the
language used in the interview questions required clarification for a common
understanding between the respondent and the interviewer. When the interviewee was
asked for an explanation of the role of ‘criminal intelligence’ among practices within the
OCD, the response indicated the interviewee believed ‘criminal intelligence’ meant
intelligence activities conducted by criminals, a practice more generally referred to as
counter-intelligence.
During the Pilot Study, empirical observations demonstrated that terms such as
‘intelligence’ and ‘information’ were commonly used interchangeably without a
distinction while activities involving ‘analysis’ and ‘incident counting’ were perceived as
merely different descriptions of the same process. In order to avoid this type of confusion
during the actual interview sessions, the researcher modified the questioning protocol to
provide concept definitions of terms prior asking questions which would include any
specific term. These changes allowed the researcher to adapt the interview protocol to
better suit the requirements of the interviewees so that they would be more comfortable
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with the terms being discussed and less likely to feel they were being ‘tested’ on
terminology with which they were unfamiliar.
As a result of the Pilot Case, the researcher gained additional empirical insight as to
how the issues under study should be presented during the actual interview sessions. This
insight, coupled with the continued review of the pertinent extant literature, contributed
to the relevancy of interview protocol used in this study.
Interviews
Eight of the focused interviews were conducted at various locations within a century
old building that once served as a huge commercial office complex. The original
occupants had relocated and the property was acquired by City which, in turn, made the
property available for City agencies. The remaining interviews were conducted at other
police facilities from which the respondents conducted their respective duties.
The individual offices of the respondents at the main building were arranged at the
core of the building so that none of the offices had any windows. Throughout the
complex, walls were painted halfway up in an industrial light blue-grey color and then a
pale cream from where the grey ended up to the ceiling. The floors were tiled throughout
the office areas in a commercial grade light blue and off white vinyl composition tile
arranged in a checkerboard pattern. Offices were furnished with modular desks, metal file
cabinets in black, grey, or beige and a variety of mismatched desk chairs. It is apparent
that overall, most of the furnishings that populate the building and offices of the main
buildings where interviews were conducted are second-hand and worn; they were
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‘contributed’ from other City agencies or departments whose budgets had allowed for
new furnishings.
Offices were frequently ‘personalized’ by the respondents. In some cases, an
interviewee’s office contained a television tuned to a local news channels. Many offices
displayed artifacts from other police agencies; one popular collection with many of the
responding supervisors included headgear of both National and International police
agencies. Often, these were mementos from agencies with which the respondent had
worked or trained. Other trappings that adorned many of the offices included sports items
reflecting a respondent’s allegiance to local teams with northsiders favoring the Cubs and
southsiders favoring the Sox. Pictures on display in some of the offices were consistently
of two types; familial, showing kids and vacation shots or professional, showing
respondents, often at award presentations, with high ranking Department members from
the current or past administrations. While the majority of those interviewed held college
degrees and 23% of the respondents held graduate degrees, no diplomas were displayed
in any of the respondent’s offices.
The interview protocol (Appendix A) used for this research was based on a focused
interview approach during which a conversational manner is used while asking open
ended questions to corroborate the practices of the respondents who are engaged in the
use of intelligence to accomplish their respective police tasks. This research used a
question-and-answer format to report on the responses from this multiple-case study by
using the same question set to cover the case study from the perspective of individual
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respondents. This is done purposefully to fuse and integrate responses from all the
interviews and arrange them around the topics presented by the interview protocol.
This initial question served a number of purposes. Without qualifying what is meant
by the term ‘intelligence’ the respondents are open to provide insight on their perspective
of the importance and, if applicable, the use of ‘intelligence’ in accomplishing police
tasks. The interviewee’s perception is an important element of the interview as perception
directs the respondent’s response.
The researcher contends the intelligence related practices by which supervisors
develop and define their critical tasks contribute to the effectiveness of their missions and
ultimately to the understanding and perception of the use of intelligence in police work,
particularly in crime prevention. If supervisors understand and define intelligence related
activities in a manner which differs from their peers or those required for a predictive or
proactive response, emergent, rather than desired consequences are likely to impact their
effectiveness. Emergent consequences included those which were not anticipated.
Responses to the first question provided broad insight into how the supervisors
interpret the concept of intelligence in police work. The term ‘intelligence’ can refer to
either a process or a product and, in either instance, involves the management of
information. For example, the development of intelligence through analysis is an
important part of the Intelligence-led Policing model. The responses to the first question
provide the starting point for an interpretation on whether the supervisors are comfortable
with the use of the term ‘intelligence’ being used in conjunction with police work.
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The excerpts from interviews below state the main theme of individual responses to
the interview protocol questions and are intentionally provided in this format for this
section. This format allows the reader to make immediate cross-comparisons for each
question posed. A complete set of respondent answers is provided in Appendix E.
Responses to the questions below are followed by a brief analysis of the response. An
interrater reliability analysis using the Cohen’s Kappa statistic was performed to
determine consistency among codes and appears in Appendix F.
Data Corpus
One issue of qualitative research which is a source of discussion concerns how much
data should be coded (Saldana, 2009). One approach is to code everything, all recorded
fieldwork, so as not to miss some nuance which may contribute to a better understanding
and insight into the social meaning of the phenomenon under study. Others contend that
only the most salient sections of the data require coding. This research will endeavor to
code portions of the data which are of necessary and sufficient quality to address the
research questions.
The first set of questions is explanatory and uses an analytical technique to establish
pattern matches among the responses in order to build an explanation about the case. A
concept is an idea which develops from, and is applied to, a specific set of circumstances.
The idea that intelligence can be used in policing may be established through interviews
that directly address whether the term ‘intelligence’ is part of the police lexicon. The
interviews provide empirical, experiential facts which represent phenomenon. Explaining
the phenomenon of ‘intelligence in police work,’ requires the development of causal links
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about what is happening (Yin 2009). These links will provide the basis for
recommendations in the next chapter. Pertinent responses will be grouped as themes
identified throughout the interviews. Themes are developed from the context of the
responses and can be identified by a use of common word repetition, comparative
contrasts among and between statements which relate to common experience, elements of
social control (hierarchies) and work related conditions, or through missing information
that is lacking and which might otherwise provide more meaning to a response. All
responses are provided in Appendix E.
Intelligence as a Concept in Policing: Developed Themes
Respondents were asked about the role of intelligence in police work. Theme 1
developed from respondents who inferred intelligence is part of what they did.
I think police work is intelligence, I think if you're out there and you got to figure
out who did what or you're investigating a crime, you got to base it on
intelligence. I mean even stopping a car is going to take a certain level of
intelligence whether that comes from your training or whether it comes from what
you did that night or who you talked to earlier, who you stopped earlier, I think
police work and intelligence are one and the same.
Source: 11062184
Intelligence is used by us, here in gangs to set up to go after the gang members
in the hierarchy of the gangs and go after what we perceived to be the number
one priority in the city of Chicago, homicides and shootings. Intelligence is
what we gather off the street, it's what we gather from analysis, it's what we
gather from informants, it's what we gather everything put together we discuss it
and we come up with an action plan after that.
Source: 11042566
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The above responses provide insight into an important issue which impacts the
development of intelligence in police work; the perception that all police work, including
data or information gathering, equates to intelligence. The data collected through cases of
reported crime or through confidential sources, including surveillance, can contribute to
‘information’ if it fits the specific interest of the individual doing the collection;
otherwise it remains data which will not be used. Until information is analyzed, it
remains information, not intelligence.
In order to illustrate this notion, let us assume you are going to see a movie but are
undecided as to which movie to see. You open a Web browser which links you to a
number of sites including finance, sports, news, and entertainment. Likely, you will select
and click-on ‘entertainment.’ The other links are intentionally ignored at this time and
represent data in which you have no interest at this time. The ‘entertainment’ link takes
you to a variety of other links which provide information on movie reviews, locations,
and times. Because this data is useful to you, it has become information. Nothing in this
process, thus far, has involved or produced an intelligence product which would influence
you to act upon which movie you may eventually choose as additional steps are required
to complete that process.
Similarly, in Organized Crime, separate reported incidents of homicides would have to
be filtered so that incidents involving domestic violence, which would be handled by a
unit from the Detective Division, are separated from those involving gang related street
violence that would represent data of ‘informational interest’ to the OCD.
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Theme 2 developed from respondents who inferred a better use of intelligence could
only benefit the OCD, down the line…
I perceive it for the future to be something that is going to be necessary.
Generally, right now, intelligence is maybe more put to the side and the oldfashioned style of police work is more prevalent.
Source: 11028961
Intelligence trickles down from the person who has the information to the people
that need to get the information. And it could be as basic as a roll call. If you
want to pass the information to the troops in the field and then they will have
knowledge of what's going on…
Source: 11058231
The function of intelligence should be the mainstay of--on investigations task to the
Organized Crime Division. I believe the collection of raw intelligence and the
ability to turn it into actionable intelligence in police work is lacking at this time.
Source: 11105904
Gathering information and analyzing it and then trying to come to some sort of an
agreement between individuals as to what may be occurring or what may be the
reality of what's occurring and then getting that. Once you get that intelligence,
just making sure that it's sent back out to the people that helped, you know, you
collect it and analyze it all.
Source: 12257484
The respondents recognize a need for intelligence to assist in their tasks but there is
the perception that the present ability to use and develop intelligence in the OCD is not
fully developed or possibly lacking. Each of the respondents indicate they are aware
that the development of intelligence is a process which generates a product that might
‘trickle down’ to users and that as part of the process it would be beneficial to take
something ‘raw’ and convert it to something ‘actionable.’ The comment that
‘intelligence is maybe more put to the side and the old-fashioned style of police work
is more prevalent’ may infer that accepted practices in police work serve to inhibit the
adoption of new approaches intended to develop an intelligence mechanism. This is
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not to say that accepted practices serve as inherent inhibitors to new approaches, rather
the fundamental principles of andragogy, i.e., adult learning, suggest adults are more
comfortable with the initial way they learn tasks and must be motivated to learn new
ways of doing old tasks in a manner which provides near-immediate results.
Theme 3 developed from respondents who inferred conceptually, intelligence as a
function has value but where that value fits in the overall scheme of police work is
currently unclear.
You see the function of intelligence is to more efficiently focus the resources on the
problem--in a problem--individuals and problem areas that would most benefit from
the use of the resources.
Source: 11087163
I believe that the function of intelligence in police work is critical. I see it as a
method to prevent and to solve crimes. I also see it as a method of keeping the
community and officers safe from any type of harm. So, the function of
intelligence in being able to gather it and what is raw intelligence that you need to
put out there to the extreme of analyzing it and producing it into an analytical
form is critical in police work.
Source: 11129230
Intelligence in police work is a valuable assets, in order to continue to combat the
different crimes that occurred within the city of Chicago within any municipality
you want to need to continually gather intelligence and then follow up to ensure
that you keep the crime level down.
Source: 11148753
Intelligence enables investigators and even patrol officers to develop relationships
in obtaining information which can lead us to make significant arrests, to develop
informants, to be more effective in their performance to their duties especially
within police relationships lead investigators to get information they normally
wouldn't be able to obtain by normal patrol activities, i.e. driving around,
responding to calls, and keeping the public at a distance rather than utilizing their
eyes and ears in the street are much more effective than the police officers.
Source: 11234773
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The responses in theme three tend to be circular in that the expressions presented
can only be supported by repeating themselves in different forms. Responses that
explain ‘intelligence in police work’ by providing examples rather than defining the
terms indicates circular responses. Lack of a clear definition of the function of
intelligence serves to confound an understanding of how the concept works in police
tasks. The responses do provide insight as to why a functioning intelligence process
may be important to police work.
Each of these responses identifies the benefit of an intelligence function as
something to focus resources and develop methods for exchanging information. One
comment infers OCD investigators can become ‘much more effective’ through the use
of intelligence because they lack the ability to interact with the public in the same
manner as patrolmen from whom information may be obtained. This statement avoids
the function of intelligence in police work and speaks to separate roles on the
Department.
The Qualrus application gauges reliability using Cohen’s Kappa coefficient to
establish a measure of association and per cent of agreement between two or more codes
on the same individual objects (responses). Codes used in the first question include ‘Intel
Defined,’ ‘Intel Function,’ and ‘Intel Use;’ Kappa (κ) = 0.53, 84% indicating moderate
agreement and high degree of association among the three terms and the question.
Theme 4 developed from respondents who inferred intelligence is used and applied as
part of their regular work.
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It's actually used effectively. There are different types of intelligence that we use
for different types of investigations. I think we have the tools and the resources to
use the intelligence that we have and I think that helps to successfully complete
investigations.
Source: 11028961
Intelligence is that information that stirs you in a way to handle the problem,
whether that's analysis is same last year at this time because it's a holiday; Latin
Kings always shoot somebody, that is intelligence. Intelligence can also be what
we found out from a guy we did a search warrant on last night that they're going to

do today, so could it be applied in the Organized Crime Division? Absolutely!
And that's how it's done here now and it can be applied. I was in the Detective
Division, we used intelligence there, maybe not as much as you do here, but
intelligence there was interviews; where as here it's a combination of a lot of things.
Source: 11042566
Intelligence is probably used in the Organized Crime Division more effectively than
in the rest of the department. We get intelligence and information from confidential
clients that we disseminate immediately or used for individual attacks on problem
area where that intelligence could be used specifically. As opposed to patrol, that
information doesn't get out as quickly. We're kind of setup to disseminate
information and intelligence based on gangs, everything from hierarchy to
anniversary dates where violence is to be possibly perpetrated as a result of
retaliation…
Source: 11087163
From my experience, information is obtained based on that information; different
steps have taken to follow up on that information in order to reach a desired end. If
it's information on a drug location, it's getting that information, following up on that
information and then tried to take down that drug location. If it's a gang offender,
the information comes in and follows up on that information in order to remove that
gang offender from the street. So, it's applied on a regular basis--intelligence has
always been applied on a regular basis.
Source: 1148753
One is that it helps direct our investigations. We also use intelligence to identify
who our investigations will be directed against. We don't randomly start
investigations at whoever comes along. We use intelligence to find out who is the
core of certain problems, who is running certain locations with criminal activity,
you know, who runs the dope area, who's the boss. In the Organized Crime
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Division, we tend mostly to go after the higher level criminals, gang bangers,
narcotics dealers, as well as the most violent once. That's who we focus on. You
need intelligence to give you that information. To A: Know who to go after and B:
How's your best way to start investigation to actually get into these people so you
can arrest them.
Source: 11247602
Each of the above responses in theme four indicates the respondent believes
intelligence activities are important to their work and each provides an example of the use
of intelligence. Each example is unique which infers there is no standardized practice for
developing or classifying intelligence. Intelligence is referred to as ‘everything from
(gang) hierarchies to anniversary dates’ or ‘interviews’ which serve as the basis for broad
informational items. In the most basic form, intelligence is not developed until varied
information sources can be associated. Throughout these responses, intelligence and
information are used interchangeably.
Theme 5 developed from respondents who inferred a need for an intelligence process
is recognized but it has not been fully implemented.
It's one of the biggest tools that we, that our units drives up. I mean, we work on
and of intelligence, we work of information, intelligence, and then we try to
prioritize from the intelligence that we gathered which would be consistent in
particular cases that we're working. And then if that particular intelligence or
information that we have doesn't pertain to the case that we're working on, we
can't work because we don't have the manpower to prioritize then we'll get the
intelligence or information onto the patrol and other units here.
Source: 11058231
Generally, it's been my experience that raw intelligence is disseminated and it's
done timely and it's not in a good fashion to respond to impending acts of
violence. However, this raw intelligence is not collated or indexed.
Source: 11105904
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I believe that it's not only the collection of information from various sources,
whether they be confidential informants, looking at past case reports, speaking to
regular beat officer or tactical officers that work in that--in a certain area.
Gathering information (and) analyzing it and then trying to come (up with some)
sort of an agreement between individuals as to what may be occurring or what
may be the reality of what's occurring and then getting that. Once you get that
intelligence, just making sure that it's sent back out to the people that helped, you
know, you collect it and analyze it all.
Source: 11257484
Respondents recognize that steps towards developing intelligence are in use within the
OCD but also indicate additional steps may be required to develop the intelligence that is
required from information sources. Each of these respondents refers to the dissemination
of intelligence and is concerned with developing a useful intelligence product. The
inference is the OCD lacks a suitable process for developing uniform intelligence which
could be distributed according to standard practices.
Theme 6 developed from respondents who inferred a need for an intelligence process
is necessary but is currently lacking.
I think it's imperative--I mean everybody uses intelligence especially when they're
thinking about organized crime. If you're looking into longer term investigations,
we're looking at better targets, we have to use intelligence.
Source: 11062184
We won't be able to effectively operate unless we're able to speak to people, to
develop information, to develop relationships with informants because informants
can go on locations and see things and do things that police officers cannot do.
Specifically, going to residences, going to businesses, you know, sampling
narcotics, doing all the things, buying narcotics, all the things that, you know, an
undercover police officer wouldn't be able to do.
Source: 11234773

79
These responses emphasize the need for an intelligence process as an aid to
investigation without trying to define how an intelligence process works in their units.
This tenor in these responses infers a very real need for an intelligence process in OCD
which is currently lacking. There is an emphasis on the types of investigations in which
the OCD is involved, i.e., ‘longer term investigations’ and work which involves going
‘undercover’ which underscore the need for developed intelligence for specialized work.
Codes used in the above question include ‘Intel Defined,’ ‘Intel Applied,’ and
‘Practice;’ Kappa (κ) = 0.46, 92% indicating moderate agreement and a high degree of
association among the three terms and the question.
Themes 7 through 9 were developed from respondent’s perception as to whether or
not there was a Department definition of intelligence in police work.
There is a definition. However, I think there are several definitions. One of that is
employed by the Deployment Operations Center, which is actually classified
under, I believe its 28 CFR Part 23. There were some training bulletins issued.
However like, do I think that there's one standardized definition that everyone
follows right now, the answer is no.
Source: 11105904
I know there's a general order that mentioned intelligence in them, but I think,
basically, we use the term intelligence as like the common definition.
Source: 11247602
Is there a formal definition? I believe there is. I'm not actually aware of it, but I
think, I believe there is.
Source: 11234113
The above respondents believe there is a Department definition of ‘intelligence’ but
are specifically uncertain of what it might be. This infers the respondents have not been
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provided a standardized working definition for ‘intelligence.’ The respondents are
correct in indicating the word intelligence is used in a number of Department policy
documents but, in fact, the word is never defined. This can be problematic when
addressing issues related to intelligence in policing. By contrast, if an officer believes he
has probable cause to affect an arrest, he can refer to a codified set of definitions or
statutes in support of an action. One response references 28CFR23 (Code of Federal
Regulations) which provides federal guidelines to police engaged in intelligence
collection. Many OCD supervisors know of intelligence processes and applications
because of prior military experience with specialized units.
I am not of aware of definition by the Department of intelligence. The people that
know what they're doing on this department know what the hell intelligence
means. Other people think intelligence is sheet that they get to make their exams
look better. Intelligence to us is what's going to help us stop the things what we're
working on. So, yes, I think we all have our own opinion about what it is, but it's
basically what it is.
Source: 11042566
If there is, I'm not aware of it.
Source: 11062184
There's no formal definition.
Source: 11087163
These respondents know of no Department definition of ‘intelligence.’ One of the
unique qualities of successful officers and supervisors within the OCD is their ability to
function within parameters that defy strict definitions. In contrast, academicians must rely
on a common set of strict definitions as are part of the language to prove concepts. In this
sense, an acceptable definition for ‘intelligence’ is important to assist to develop
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processes which have real situational applications. Similarly, a Department definition of
intelligence would likely prove useful.
There is a definition, I really don't know it. I think when people think intelligence
I think they also think like technology. They kind of go hand-in-hand; I don't
know if there is a specific definition and I don't think the Department has ever
used it.
Source: 11028961
That word is thrown on a lot--intelligence, you know, my definition of it is
intelligence, you know, if you get the information through intelligence it's going
to lead to activity because smarter police officers that are out there are more
focused that have knowledge on what's going on. Knowledge gives you power,
it's going to give you the ability to--if you put knowledge and intelligence
together, it's going to lead to activity--quality activity. It's not going to be, you
know, to go out locked up every mope on the street. That's just great. That's
good, the definition.
Source: 11058231
Okay, my recollection is that there may exist a document, a department policy for
one unit and that's the Deployment Operations Center which the document spelled
out the responsibility of being the central depository for intelligence. And in that
document, it defined intelligent and what it meant. So, it was specific for that unit
in a--whether or not everybody in the whole department was trained on that
concept to carry that as a broad definition is another subject.
Source: 11129230
I don't know the Department's definition, and if there is one, to be perfectly
honest.
Source: 11257484
It's always a part of the job, but it's just was not describe or carried out in that
manner.
Source: 11148753
The majority of respondents remained uncertain as to whether a Department
definition of ‘intelligence’ existed. Several of the respondents infer that if such a
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definition exists, it was never emphasized. The inference is that while these responses are
less emphatic than the ‘No,’ a formalized Department definition of the term intelligence
is not employed by members of the OCD. This suggests an intelligence process is
lacking. Because ‘intelligence’ is regarded as ‘part of the job’ some variation in an
approach to the use of intelligence exists but none is standardized.
Seventy two (72) percent of the respondents to the above question were either
uncertain or denied there is a Department definition for the term intelligence. Codes used
in the above question include ‘Intel Defined,’ ‘Dept Defined,’ and ‘Governance;’ Kappa
(κ) = 0.94, 97% indicating almost perfect agreement and a high degree of association
among the three terms and the responses to the question.
Theme 10 developed from respondent’s perception of what contributes to intelligence
in policing.
My experience is you can never ever get more intelligence than you get from the
actual people on the street, that are going to be the ones doing it, seen it, no words
can be done. Interviews and human beings are the best intelligence in the world.
I wish we could have the satellites… which I would push forward these little
cameras in the sky that they use in the military. But I think that some of the
mistakes we've done is rely too much on that.
Source: 11042566
Just good old fashioned police work you stop the guys, just talking to guys, it's
being out there on the street. There's a certain level of computer work or we can
look at stuff out on our other needs and figuring stuff out but I think most--the
most powerful intelligence you're gonna get is the stuff you want out on street
Source: 11062184
...it's information that was obtained by the officers-in-charge and everybody and,
generally, from CI, from self investigation and then narrowing that information
down and then acting upon it.
Source: 11148753
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Going out there and interact with the community, talking to people, speaking to
other officers, maybe from the tactical teams or from patrol division, developing
informants. When an arrest is made, every time an arrest is made, there's an
opportunity to gather more intelligence to possibly develop an informant or
possibly just to gather more information on a certain occasion or a certain target.
Source 11234773
Basically, our intelligence is obtained for the most part by human intelligence. It
always has been, but actually, in recent years, there's been a big push for officers
and investigators assigned to the Organized Crime Division to develop more and
more human intelligence sources. A, you get more; you get information in
intelligence faster. B, you get, you could get it off of different people if you had
multiple sources.
Source: 11247602
The reference to ‘human intelligence’ or information from sources such as informants
is used throughout these responses. It is worth noting the military has specialized units
within their Intelligence Section which work on developing intelligence from multiple
sources, e.g. SIGINT is intelligence derived from signal interception, OSINT from open
source, and HUMINT from human intelligence are examples. ‘Human intelligence’ is a
type of information which must be vetted before it develops into intelligence.
Practitioners in OCD are very experienced in the routine of collecting, vetting, and
employing information collected on the street. This represents the first stages in
developing an intelligence process.
Theme 11 developed from respondent’s perception that the use of specialized
equipment contributes to intelligence tasks.
Again, we have equipment technology that we use to further our investigations. I
would say that's how we contribute to intelligence for OCD.
Source: 11028961
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The respondent infers technical equipment contributes to generating intelligence
products within the OCD. Technologies employed in the intelligence process are tools
which serve to facilitate the development of intelligence through a process. The use of
technology as a practice to expedite in the collection of information can be useful but
should not regarded as crucial to developing an intelligence product.
Theme 12 developed from respondent’s perception that training and development of
investigative techniques used by personnel contributes to intelligence tasks.
We have trained and we have increased officers awareness in conducting
debriefings of offenders as to what their knowledge in is and also historical
information possessed by offenders or witnesses, whereby before that wasn't
normally done. The other thing that we are doing in Gang Enforcement Unit,
we're trying to close an intelligence gap and one of the ways we did that, and this
isn't direct correlation, just youth violence committed upon or by high school
members that are affected by street gangs. We have started weekly and daily
tactic with school resource officers to determine what is occurring inside the
school.
Source: 11105904
…smarter police officers that are out there are more focused that have knowledge
on what's going on. Knowledge gives you power, it's going to give you the ability
to--if you put knowledge and intelligence together, it's going to lead to activity-quality activity.
Source: 11058231
Well, I think there's a lot of practices. First of all, we definitely develop cases,
especially drug cases, and we--out of those cases we develop information whether
it's through wire-taps or traditional street conspiracy cases or whether it's through
search warrants. So there's information that are particular to each case that's
being developed because you're actually targeting different gangs so you're
targeting different intelligence for each different gang. But, I think one of the
practices that I think is critical is the debriefing of individuals when they're
arrested. I mean, the raw intelligence that we can gather from one individual and
then, obviously, apply it through analysis and collaborated through other
information is critical.
Source: 11129230
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Well me, myself, my detective, and a lot of my section, I kind of look for the
strongest people from each district, here, and the Gang Enforcement Section. I
talk to them, probably, on a day-to-day basis and then I also, I have some key
individuals, like strong individuals within the districts that I reach out to,
regularly. I try to weekly, but it's, because it's--Area 2's so vast in the amount of
gang and the violence that occurs throughout the city. It's just, it's virtually
impossible, you know, to stay on top of a lot of stuff, but I, but I do have key
people in each of the districts that I can, you know, count on as far as providing
accurate information.
Source: 11257484
The respondents above indicate experience and training are critical practices required
to contribute to intelligence used by the OCD. The respondents also recognize that it is
important to have ‘smarter police’ and ‘strong individuals’ who are likely selfmotivated by the interest to develop intelligence through a variety of techniques. The
processes required for developing intelligence, including analysis, triangulation of
sources used in debriefings, and abstract thinking are techniques more easily taught to
those who want to learn them.
The majority of the responses to Question 4 involve direct officer contact with
potential sources of information and techniques used in gathering information. There are
no specifics regarding the storage and dissemination of such information. Codes used in
the above question include ‘Intel Development,’ ‘Intel Defined,’ and ‘Practice;’ Kappa
(κ) = 0.83, 95% indicating almost perfect agreement and a high degree of association
among the three terms and the responses to the question.
Theme 13 developed from respondent’s perception of the Superintendent’s statement
that the Department needed to focus on ‘intelligence-driven policing.’
Well, I think it's crucial, I mean, to be perfectly honest, I mean, in especially now
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with resources and not only physical and personnel resources seem to be
dwindling.
Source: 11257484
I think he's realizing that, you know, that we do have a shortage of manpower and
we have to work smarter. We just can't, you know, and he said this before, that
arrests are going to mark the crime down. It's going to be arresting the right
people.
Source: 11058231
If I was the Superintendent, I would say the same thing. You better be using
intelligence-led policing because first of all, you can't go back to the old ways,
where it's heavy handed. And have people fear you, I mean, at some ways that
would be nice, but intelligence will help you get around bad corners, so I believe
that statement in intelligence-driven policing is because that's the wave of today
and the future.
Source: 11042566
Where the intelligence is used on specifically to attack the, the biggest problems
that the department has with the limited resources and to get that intelligence out
and to be acted on effectively. So, in the past that hasn't really been the way the
Department operated.
Source: 11087163
The respondents interpret the Superintendent’s comments in two ways both related to
change; better use of resources and a need to be forward thinking and openness to new
approaches. Each response is a reflection on the status of the conditions in the policing
environment. The Chicago Police Department has reduced manpower levels from over
12,000 to under 10,000 during the past few years. As the same number of officers is
required to man routine patrol positions, fewer are available to be placed in specialized
units like the OCD. Specialized units are required to make more efficient use of the
resources they have as well as to seek innovative alternatives in policing in order to
maintain their effectiveness.
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Theme 14 developed from respondent’s perception that while the statement was the right
thing to say the Department needs a concerted, realistic effort to move forward in the use
of intelligence in policing.
I think that's the statement for the future. I think it's something that
needs to be put into place now amongst recruits that start; that can work your way
through. I think it's going to be important because our numbers are dwindling and
if we don't have enough bodies out there, we are going to need other resources or
ways to be more efficient to get what we need to get upon investigations.
Source: 11028961
My interpretation is that we need to use more technology in developing
our tactical strategies and operations for areas that are experiencing some high
rates of violence or gang violence, or drug activity that leads to gang violence and
shootings.
Source: 11129230
Well, I believe it speaks for itself that officers have to be smarter. They have to
have contacts within the community because that information can be acted on a
timely fashion, much more so than being reactive. An officer can be proactive
rather than taking a report about a person doing a robbery or selling drugs. An
officer, if he has intelligence and he's developed informants and they're in contact
with the community and say, “Well, this guy is going to sell drugs or this guy's
going to do a robbery”, that officer can act before that action takes place.
Source: 11234773
Yeah, I think it's a correct statement. I think the Department does focus on
intelligence-led policing. I think it has for a few years, but it could always be
pushed up to higher and higher levels and become more and more efficient. I
mean under Phil Cline, they started the Deployment Operations Center which is
basically the first step in intelligence-led policing where it was the information
gathering section for the Department and then it spit out an analyzed and vetted
intelligence report, so, but I think we can always ramp it up and with this time of
less police officers, than we've had in the past, you have to do everything you can
to make the Department more efficient.
Source: 11247602
Responses that speak of the ‘future,’ ‘more technology,’ ‘if he has…,’ and ‘ramp it
up’ infer the respondents have some notion of an ‘intelligence-driven policing’ but
perceive more support is required to advance the concept. Each of these respondents
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provides an interpretation of what is needed which indicates that ‘intelligence-driven
policing,’ as a practice, has not been formally presented to them as supervisors.
Theme 15 developed from respondent’s perception the Superintendent’s statement is
mere rhetoric; there’s no substance to it. .
I would agree with it but it sounds like a catch phrase and sounds like a
buzzword more than he believes in anything, you know.
Source: 11062184
The biggest aspect of--I'm talking about intelligence-driven policing--is it says
that information has to be exchange back and forth and I'm not saying that
happened in the manner that would show. So, sometimes it seems a little
hollow.
Source: 11148753
The respondents regard the use of the term ‘intelligence-driven police’ in a statement
by the Superintendent as positional rather than substantive. Positional statements reflect
on opinion as much as they do policy. A statement by a Chief Executive that the
organization needs to focus on a particular path may mean that the organization has not
begun on that path.
Codes used in the above question include ‘Intel Defined,’ ‘Weis Statement,’ and
‘Perception;’ Kappa (κ) = 0.81, 96% indicating almost perfect agreement and a high
degree of association among the three terms and the responses to the question.
Theme 16 developed from respondent’s perception on whether intelligence or
information was more important in their decision making in police work.
I'm going to say it's a combination of both maybe leaning a little more towards
information and how we derive that information. However, at anytime you're going
to act that information, you want to back it up with some type of tangible
intelligence; meaning, you know, say for instance if you look at some of the utility
checks, maybe some law enforcement databases that will help you assist in the

89
finding of that under. So I think it would lean a little more towards information but
intelligence is definitely important as well.
Source: 11028961
I believe it's at both. I got to say information is probably, you know, that's
primarily what we work of because information is something that my people are on
the street getting right now. They call me they say X, Y and Z's are going to
happen. I don't care what some reports some guy ran on of the computer says, at
that point, I know it's going to happen. If it gets enhanced by what the computer
says or the computer will spit out that you know last year when I used that thing
earlier the Latin Kings always shoot somebody on this date. Well, geez! If
somebody told me last night that they're going to shoot somebody today and I see a
raw dated intelligence that we have in the last 5 years that happens on that day,
yeah. It enhances it.
Source: 11042566
I think a combination of both. Some recent information that comes in that's coupled
with the intelligence that you already have, I mean, now you get some validity to
the information that you got and the intelligence that you have and then you can--it
can pitch a hole in those structure to what you're doing in your particular
investigations.
Source: 11058231
I think both. Sometimes I'll get some information and it might be, it's raw, well I'll
call that raw intelligence without it being analyzed or collaborated. So I think I
kind of, depending on the situation, my reaction in decision making would be
contingent on the situation. Obviously, you know, timing--if you're under time
constraints, you need to make a decision on it and the more time, the more
obviously, you can analyze and collaborate. In my experience, you know, it's just,
based on your time and rotation of what you can do with it, whether if it's just raw
information, then you go with it. If it's, you've got time to analyze it and explain it
and come out with an intelligence report on it, I mean, that's the way to go.
Source: 11129230
Some of them are both, it starts off as information and you start acting on it and as
you start acting on that information, that's your analysis and now it becomes
intelligence and you move all along with that phase that it goes. So, it's a little both,
like it start up the information and it will form an analysis and then that analysis
becomes intelligence.
Source: 11148753
Well, I mean it's probably 50-50 at the supervisory level. Very often, we are tasked
with going to a location based on information from the community groups,
politicians, different commanders, Hey, I have information they're selling drugs
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here,” are political, they're not really intelligence-led. Intelligence-led would be
more appropriately defined as where someone from the street level tells us, “Hey,
they're selling drugs here. This is the guy who's doing it. This is how he does it.
This is where he lives; this is the kind of car he drives. These are the hours of
operation, something along those lines.
Source: 11234773
The above question begins with a simple definition of intelligence as information that
has been subjected to analysis. The definition allows the respondents to distinguish
between these words which are commonly and erroneously interchanged as meaning the
same thing.
Well over half of the responses immediately replied that information and intelligence
contributed, in combination, to the answers they required for decisions. The majority of
these responses continued their answers by providing varied descriptions on how
information contributed to their decisions without providing specifics as to analysis. One
response explained that time constraints require information to be used more often than
intelligence; this infers consideration of the fact that the analysis process takes time. The
use of a functional intelligence process mechanism, such as ILP, within the OCD would
allow for intelligence and information to be used concurrently. Only one response,
‘information…coupled with intelligence that you already have,’ suggests that existing
intelligence may be used in conjunction with ‘recent information’ to provide answers for
decision making.
Theme 17 developed from respondent’s perception that decisions they make are
driven by intelligence.
Intelligence without a doubt because like you said you can get the best information.
You got to CI (confidential informant) that tells you, “I got 57 kilos in the garage
and it's over here.” You got to analyze, “Why the fuck would this guy know where
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57 kilos are?” You know what I mean. So, yeah, you got to use--you got to
analyze your own information. I'm sorry.
Source: 11062184
The respondent provides an example of ad hoc analysis of provided information in
order to develop an intelligence product. The question ‘why’ begins the analytical
process to introduce a number of variables related to the information on the location of an
unusually large amount of contraband.
Theme 18 developed from respondent’s perception that decisions they make are
driven by information.
On a daily basis on information comes into play for immediate acts from street level
informants, but the intelligence drives more our unit on, as a investigative unit for
long term investigations to get to the top players in the gang, or for narcotics the top
distributors of narcotics that are responsible for the bigger picture. But that would
be a more long term. But that intelligence is extremely useful to get to the top.
Source: 11087163
My decisions and tactical decisions on where to deploy officers in relation to a gang
conflict mostly comes from information. The reason that we have to, most of it is
based upon information is because we've got newer climate where it is sort of like a
doctor that practices defense medicine. The fear of being chastised for not

following up on information, as ridiculous as it may be, did likelihood of you being
chastised for not following up on it is great. However the life, as far as launching
investigations, complex investigations, that is usually based on intelligence and not
a mere single piece of information.
Source: 11105904
Well I think that the formula, information plus analysis equals intelligence, I think
that makes sense because you could take all the information in the world, and I get a
lot of information that's just not, has not been corroborated or even looked into
when it's just garbage information. So, if I were just, you know, cc that information
as all my bosses do, they'd send me something and then they send it out to
everybody in the world, and then we're supposed to believe that as gospel.
Source: 11257484
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Information represents data that has been captured by a user because it is of interest to
them. The respondents are specific on why information is important for answers to their
decisions; they are similarly specific in assessing that information provides the basis for
building intelligence. Two of the respondents indicate that ‘daily basis’ work and
‘tactical’ decisions initiate the process of developing intelligence.
Codes used in the above question include ‘Decisions,’ ‘Value,’ and ‘Intelligence
Use;’ Kappa (κ) = 0.62, 90% indicating substantial agreement and a high degree of
association among the three terms and the responses to the question.
Theme 19 developed from respondent’s perception that analysis in the OCD is limited
and underused. Respondents were provided with a definition of analysis as a method for
reducing complex information to simpler terms. Crime analysis was defined as a method
of joining disparate information through association and relations.
I really don't think there's a high level of emphasis that's put on crime analysis
within Organized Crime Division. I think we're probably the closest thing there is
to like the crime analysis but I--you know, we have specific information and outlets
that we get that information from but crime analysis is not a high priority. At least
that's how I see it the Organized Crime Division.
Source: 11028961
I mean it's useful. It's kind of taken in context. You can't streamline--you can't
always streamline the intelligence that you get. You can't look at every dope dealer
with the red shoes and [0:03:26 incomprehensible] on a Tuesday and say, We got a
trend here. You know what I mean? There's definitely--into the DOC [0:03:34
incomprehensible] that's quite often where they just streamline it and they'd say,
"Well, there's three different gang deals here. You should loss me this gang cop."
Wait a minute, you forgot that this gang is fighting each other for the same dope
spot and Hooky here is fighting with Beau and he just grabbed her sister's ass and
shot it. You know what I mean, so you lose a lot if by streamlining it, you know.
Source: 11062184
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Crime analysis is extremely important but the problem is on a, on a lot quick level
the analysis is slow coming in and a lot of times we have to put, put pins on the
problems without correct analysis of what caused the problem.
Source: 11087163
Well, in the Organized Crime Division, we don't have per se our own intelligence, I
mean I'm sorry, analysis group such as the DOC, but each team and each officer
that's assigned to investigations in the Organized Crime Division does analyze their
information as it pertains to their investigation in their cases. That information and
analysis does go to the bigger cause of the whole department at some point and also
depending on the urgency of it. If it's urgent, we do what's called an IBDR
(Intelligence Based Deployment Recommendation).
Source: 11247602
The respondents use analysis to a degree but the process is described as incremental
rather than flowing and is called for when situations warrant the use of analysis.
Respondents indicate that without analysis, the wrong or incomplete decisions are can
occur. Urgency related to some particular instance is mentioned as a reason to gather and
begin the analysis of information because the OCD lack “per se our own intelligence.”
Theme 20 developed from the respondent’s perception that the ability to use more
analytics would be beneficial.
Well, sure crime analysis will make it easier for us. It would--we most certainly
have to know being an organized crime where the next shooting is going to take
place, where the next big dope deal might take place, where the next K meeting is
going to take place. That's all stuff that we need to know, so when you say complex
information, I don't know what that means exactly but what I'm thinking, what
you're saying complex information is a bunch of different information brought into
the middle and deciphered. So, yeah, I'm sure complex, little things add up as big
things later on.
Source: 11042566
Analysis will be the most useful, I mean you can get a better picture of what you
have in the past and then sort of get what you might need to do. An example would
be you have an area and it's something historical about that every year, something
comes off at the same time, so if you're looking back it past trends and you looking
million things, the pressure building in this area, okay and it's building to this
around the same time, okay that's analysis that you've already done, you know.
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That might be a potential area that we need to focus on in order to prevent
something can happening. And to elaborate a little bit further about the crime
count, we look at the total number as they come in, but the total number sometimes
may not be the overall big picture of it, it maybe a high number but of that total
high number if only a small percentage are gang related, that's what we are looking
at, what's gang related, what's going to cause more problems down the line. If we
have a high number of homicides and where large percentage are domestics those
are sometimes hard to prevent. We have our domestic aspect and then we deal with
it, but the ones we're really focus on are the ones that is going to cause more
problem, those gang-related incidents.
Source: 11148753
Both respondents agree that the use of an analytic feature would be beneficial to the
OCD; the inference is this feature is currently lacking. The analytic portion of ILP is a
key feature of the model which contributes how information is managed and used and is
intended to supplement, not replace, existing practices.
Theme 21 developed from the respondent’s perception that they employ analysis
regularly in our work and tasks they perform.
I think it's--we get a tremendous amount of analysts of what's going on, in
particular, this information on what's going on and we've got to prioritize on how
we deal with the analyzed information that we get. You know, we've got to-because we don't have--we got our own guys. I got 76 guys on the street.
Understand, we've got to prioritize what the intelligence that we're getting them and
we got intelligence from patrol, we got intelligence from the back, from Leo's guys,
we got informal meetings that we have and that's information shared. We shared
electronically. We try to do better job of--if it's a high priority where it's not going
to compromise any of our investigation and has to do with public safety. We're
going to electronically get that out immediately to the districts into the back and
Deputy [00:05:48 Incomprehensible] when he was--because we were doing it, we
weren't tracking it.
Source: 11058231
The function of crime analysis in organized crime or at least in my, in our position
it is to--is a valuable tool to determine what the unlawful specified activity, albeit
gang is involved in so that we can develop a strategy to combat it. Some gangs may
be involved in just trafficking narcotics. Some are involved in burglary, some are
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involved in robbery. That is why we use crime analysis in that area to determine
what they do.
Source: 11105904
Well I think, I'll give you an example of how I'll use crime analysis. If we see an
area with a lot of shootings and we need to go and take a deeper look into it, we will
start analyzing the crime in using all the, what I would call the indicators that may
exist out there that can be the red flags you get--number of our narcotics arrest over
a 30-day period, number of calls for service. Other residual crimes involving
narcotics, it can be after specific person caught, okay? Man with a gun caught. All
the other information will give you a crime analysis. That based on intelligence
working those two together will give you an idea of what type of narcotics
operation is set in that location, geographically.
Source: 11129230
A lot of these guys, even if there's nothing promised to them, you know, whether be
a profit or something along those lines, they're still willing to talk about certain
things. Just because, “Hey, you know, I'm tired, you got me, what do you need to
know?” And they--they fill in a lot of blanks and a lot of those blanks we had heard
about in the past. So now, we have like two or three independent sources that are-we're gathering this information and now it's strengthening, you know, of the
intelligence and the crime analysis aspect of this stuff.
Source: 11257484
Crime analysis is a key component of what we do, specifically, we are--one of our
many tasks is to reduce violence, it's one of our primary tasks, to reduce violence.
Mostly, gang members or people involved in violence, the percentages speak for
themselves, are involved in other illicit activity. Although, they're--they may not
shoot somebody everyday, they sell dope everyday because that's their source of
revenue and often--quite often times, the conflicts, which is the heart of the
violence, you know, revolves around narcotics. Therefore, we often focus our
investigations in areas in an effort to reduce the violence. It will take out some of
the higher ranking drug dealers, and then conflict is eliminated.
Source: 11234773
The above respondents provide examples of how analysis is used by detailing tasks
and then relating separate individual processes that involve information exchanges.
Information exchanges are critical to the analysis (reducing complex information to
simpler terms) leading to intelligence but ‘crime analysis’ involves the ‘dot-connection’
phase of developing intelligence. Two responses refer to either ‘red flags’ or

96
corroboration of information through different sources as techniques useful to their crime
analysis. These techniques are useful in testing the validity of information which may be
used in conjunction with crime analysis to further the development of intelligence.
Codes used in the above question include ‘Analysis,’ ‘Crime Analysis Function,’ and
‘Perception;’ Kappa (κ) = 0.79, 95% indicating substantial agreement and a high degree
of association among the three terms and the responses to the question.

Theme 22 through 24 were developed from the respondent’s perception on whether
there tasks are driven in response to ‘counting crime,’ using analysis to determine trends
or patterns, or some combination of both.
I use both. I'll tell to you that crime counting, the reason why that is always
important because numbers don't lie. If you are going to show me a sheet with 20
people shot at a 3-block radius, there's 20 people shot there. Now, I go into the
next statement, “Why did that happen?” Counting is just a way to help you get an
analysis, to me that's spotting the problem, now what do we do to find out what's
causing it. So, crime counting is always going to be used because that's what they
hold you accountable for. If you are commander of a district and they count that
your numbers are up, well, they're going to hold that against you; so you are going
to analyze what those numbers really mean and then figure it out why it's having
another attack.
Source: 11042566
Well, you know, I think I just mentioned all the various factors and I think they
all--I think the relationships between all of them would mean more to me when I
look at, you know, reporting the facts and the analysis of what's going on. So, I
think that I will look at the relationship between arrest, calls for service,
shootings, looking at the time they're happening, the day they're happening, so I
think it would be important to relate them all and how they, what's causing what
to happen. So there's a relational analysis that's being done.
Source: 11129230
Yeah, obviously, the--we don't really rely too much on crime counting. I think,
you know, the bosses are very concerned with that. We're not too concerned with
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that too much. What we're more concerned with as I've--several questions
earlier like, "Hey, what's linking perhaps a spike in violence to a certain area?”"
The lately certain commercial, you know, we had a several homicides recently in
the last couple of weeks right on the same corner that what's happening and while
we're finding out it's several different Latin gangs. Both the victims were Latin
Kings but one was a Latin Dragon and one was a Cobra it seems that. But we
know that a lot of these boundaries are, you know, intersecting over there, we're
trying to get to the root cause as to, you know, what may have spurned that. So
you know, although our numbers, you know, we are always concerned with
numbers in trying to keep the numbers down, we're--we're concerned with trying
to look at a certain area, analyzing that area, see what the spike may be, seeing
who the principal individuals that are involved with the whole thing and then
trying to create some sort of a strategy to, you know, related to what's going on.
Source: 11257484
Each of these respondents uses crime counting, to some degree, as an indicator of
where analysis may be required. Crime counting relates to all reported crime that can be
classified under Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) standards; codes provided for
particular crime categories. The above respondents provide examples of how they might
use analysis in relation to counted crime; each response is slightly different which infers
there is no standard analytic procedure.
Theme 23 was developed from the respondent’s perception that analysis is more
useful for determining associated crime trends than merely crime counting.
I would say analysis would probably more useful, patterns, relationship or trends
that exist because that--if you have that specific information, you could put
yourself in a position to--to get in front of things. Meaning, say you have a
burglary pattern and you know--you know the pattern, maybe some of the
relationship to some of the offenders and what time they are predictably heading,
now you can put your surveillance teams or, you know, whatever together to be in
those areas to try to work that area with that information in order to--to make an
arrest so you can potentially clear the pattern. You know, numbers--raw numbers
related to events--numbers are just numbers. If you're talking analysis, that would
be more important.
Source: 11028961
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I think the analysis to raw numbers, you can look at in particular areas but you
got to analyze that with the intelligence that you have in those particular conflicts
in those particular areas. Now, say like you send in officers [00:08:11
Incomprehensible]. I mean, you can see that there's a lot of shootings going on in
that particular area right now. But, you know, that's our frame, but now you got
to double a little further into who are the culprits that are causing it and you got to
know the players from both sides and then disseminate that information because it
might be a domestic.
Source: 11058231
Analysis is the most useful without a doubt. Unfortunately, the Department often
uses the raw numbers in particular from a weekend deployment based on the
following week is from raw numbers and not from real analysis.
Source: 11087163
Analysis will be the most useful, I mean you can get a better picture of what you
have in the past and then sort of get what you might need to do. An example
would be you have an area and it's something historical about that every year,
something comes off at the same time, so if you're looking back it past trends and
you looking million things, the pressure building in this area, okay and it's
building to this around the same time, okay that's analysis that you've already
done, you know. That might be a potential area that we need to focus on in order
to prevent something can happening. And to elaborate a little bit further about the
crime count, we look at the total number as they come in, but the total number
sometimes may not be the overall big picture of it, it maybe a high number but of
that total high number if only a small percentage are gang related, that's what we
are looking at, what's gang related, what's going to cause more problems down the
line. If we have a high number of homicides and where large percentages are
domestics those are sometimes hard to prevent. We have our domestic aspect and
then we deal with it, but the ones we're really focused on the ones that are going
to cause more problem, those gang-related incidents.
Source: 11148753
I would say the analysis portion when it comes out, is more important to us
because there's a lot of crimes that are committed that are not directly involved or
not directly related to the mission of the Organized Crime Division. You know, if
it's a domestic related murder or something along that line, it's not something that
we generally are involved in. We're involved with gang and organized criminal
activity and the murders and violence that stems from that type of activity. So we
would need the analyzed version so that we would know what caused the murder
and also, what, where, and also if there's a propensity for more violence to follow
because our job is stop that additional violence as fast as we can.
Source: 11247602
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The above respondents have an understanding of why the analysis of raw numbers
is important to decision making. The terms ‘patterns, relationships, or trends’ ‘applied to
raw numbers’ describes the products developed through analysis and demonstrates an
appreciation for the value of analysis. The expression ‘raw numbers’ is used repeatedly
in these responses to describe the items on which the Department focuses as well as to
contrast the need of the OCD for an analysis process.
Theme 24 was developed from the respondent’s perception that crime counting is
important because it shows where the crime is occurring without analysis.
Yeah, you know what, I guess it would--before they would find the most useful
is the all time pin boards. It sounds crazy but it still could matter. I know all they
may have it on the DOC thing, too, but to see it on the wall with a little pin that
says, “There's armed robbery here. There's an armed robbery here that he uses
color-coded with this is night time, this is day time.” You know what I mean and
that's probably more counting than analysis but that just visually.
Source: 11062184
Crime counting, in my eyes, is you always measure what you get. If you measure
something, you're going to get that result. Crime counting, as far as how we
apply our resources, is not a basis that we use all the time. We do use analysis
because that's the only effective way to understand what's happening. To be told
that there's a hundred armed robberies that means nothing unless it's the same
modus operandi, same description of offenders, same types of property that was
taken, maybe even different associations. That's what you need it to use.
Source: 11105904
First, like calls for service is a resource that we use. In many calls for a specific
area, they are selling drugs, selling drugs, we have a crack hotline that people can
call in anonymously, and that information is also collected. Like homicides, if
every batteries, we look at those numbers that determine if the root cause of that
spiking violence are those numbers, is from a narcotics problem, like a conflict.
We can assign investigators to go out to that location to try to initiate narcotics
investigation.
Source: 11234773

100
Each of the above respondents refers to crime counting as useful as an indicator
which may indicate trends. A major concern with crime counting is ‘unreported crime,’
i.e., criminal incidents which occur and are not reported to the police for a variety of
reasons. Crime reporting is closely tied to ‘calls for service’ which represent calls made
to the police for service. Often police initiatives are predicated on circumstances in which
clusters of reported crime appear to be congregated in one vicinity or ‘hot spot.’
Resources committed to ‘hot spots’ often result in the elimination or reduction of crime in
a designated area. Most often, this does not mean that crime has been eliminated but
rather that it has been moved to another location. Without the ability to analyze crime that
has merely been counted, the practice of responding to ‘hot spots’ is reactive rather than
preventive. A principle feature of ILP is it is intentionally designed to prevent crime.
Codes used in the above question include ‘Counting vs. Analysis,’ ‘Source,’ and ‘Intel
Development;’ Kappa (κ) = 0.91, 98% indicating almost perfect agreement and a high
degree of association among the three terms and the responses to the question. The high

κ in this instance reflects on the fact the responses to Question 8 infer the practice of
‘counting’ is accepted as a base standard for focusing in types of crime clusters but
analysis is important for the type of tasks conducted in the OCD.
Theme 25 was developed from the respondent’s perception that criminal intelligence
is used all the time in the OCD. Respondents were informed that criminal intelligence is
developed from a variety of information sources.

Alright, how criminal intelligence--criminal intelligence is what we live off of
everyday that is what our job is in gangs. Gangs are using intelligence gathered
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from gang members, search warrants, arrests, anything we can, what we see in
cameras, if we had cameras, whatever we can to gather intelligence for the
Organized Crime Division, where we can say, "Okay, everyday this gang deals a
lot of dope on this corner and/or having shootings around there, obviously,
someone is trying to move in on their dope dealing." So, we know by the numbers
of arrest in that area and by analyzing that, that's what probably is causing the
problem and then we got to get on physical intelligence from people to say that,
"Yeah, so and so just got out of the joint and he wants his spot back." That's how
we use it here. That's only one way of many.
Source: 11042566
Criminal intelligence in the Organized Crime Division is used very effectively
because as the information often has the chance to be vetted before someone acts
on it. It can often be a more long term or someone can develop a plan to use that
information and then to verify that information as opposed to tactical street level
analysis of information.
Source: 11087163
Concerning criminal intelligence as a product, this unit and even though it's only
around a year, has started to develop a number of different products. Concerning
the enforcement, just stop the proliferation of street gangs. Some of these
products that we developed are description of gang membership, rosters and
hierarchies of which are then made and distributed to the district commanders.
And other product that we developed is a Weekly School Report. And that's
based upon our interviews with all the high schools within an area and
information is collated, not necessarily analyzed its raw information that is put
forth, so everyone understands what is happening within the schools. We also
generate what is called the Weekly Gang Conflict Report, which is a report that's
developed through multiple sources, not only through crime reporting. Abstracts
from different investigations that analyze motive but also street sources and
information coming from confidential informants and what has spiked a gang
conflict into the use of violence or if it's just a historical conflict with another
street gang.
Source: 11105904
Yeah, absolutely. I mean, constantly it's a--of things are evaluated. We do, our
Commander has implemented that we do a weekly report pertaining to our top 10s
to keep people, somewhat focused. Because a lot of times, we're being pulled in
many different directions but it keep us focused, you know, on our top 10s
because that is a priority for us. Now, not saying we're the only ones who are
keeping files on it. I mean, obviously, there are some certain individuals in some
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of these areas where there is some high amounts of violence occurring that we
also gather, you know, intelligence on also.
Source: 11257484
Well, in the Organized Crime Division, we use it in 2 different ways. We have
various units in the Organized Crime Division. Some are investigative units that
conduct investigations more of a long-term nature and that would be units such as
the gang investigations section and narcotics section. But we also have another
unit, the gang enforcement section which is more of a street level enforcement
type unit directed at gang activity. So, and that's actually, by design, because in
my opinion, to effectively combat violence and combat gang and narcotics but
you have to hit it at multiple levels. You can't just focus on the top guys. You
can't just focus at the bottom guys. You've got to focus on all. We use the
analyzed intelligence to help us direct maybe where a long-term investigation
might take place. But we also use the shorter version information sources where
to direct the Gang Enforcement Section because they respond to immediate
threats and they do very short term missions in areas that have high propensity for
gang related or narcotics related violence.
Source: 11247602
It's of use because it tells you, given within the file, it's who, it's where, it's when
and it provides the link from the past to the future, so that as people come along
they can see, they can follow along somebody that might be out there, what is
their modus operandi? What do they do? How they are doing it? So you have to
build it and you have to maintain it, but you also have to make sure everybody's
looking at it, to be aware what's there, so you can follow along as you go along.
It's information--because you want to make sure you don't loss information, it was
just--if all the intelligence is just with one person and that person moves on then
anybody coming along behind they got to do now, start from scratch in order to
rebuild that intelligence.
Source: 11148753
Much of what is described in the above responses relates to types of files on
information maintained at various locations which may be disseminated depending on
various conditions. There are ‘Weekly School Report(s),’ ‘Weekly Gang Conflict
Report(s),’ or ‘description(s) of gang membership, rosters and hierarchies’ which are
shared. Such examples of ‘criminal intelligence’ are based on an interpretation of the unit
preparing the information and represent broad examples of accepted information. The
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information described has a shelf-life and can be dated as changes to that type of
information occur frequently. Information sources are generally represented as vetted
documents which may be referenced.
Theme 26 was developed from the respondent’s perception that Criminal intelligence,
developed from information, is used on a limited basis in our work
I think there is a bit of it. I don't think it's a huge emphasis but I think that it's on
a case-by-case basis with each supervisor with each team as well. So, my point
being is that, you know, when I talked about like the burglary pattern and stuff
like that--that's analytical information that you want to put together. Criminal
intelligence, you know, that's--I really wouldn't say that we use a lot of it but I
mean I think analysis is probably more--more appropriate.
Source: 11028961
We got many sources of information. We got to keep a confidential informant
files down at the District. I mean, we've got paid informants as well as unpaid
informants. I mean, we've got information from witness interviews, from
offender interviews. And it’s just where they're stored. Unfortunately, a lot of the
information--the best information is stored in, you know, kept in one of these
guys which stay in the back of their head. It's from an interview with somebody
in the back seat of the car. Those are the guys that are going to provide the most
information. You know and again, you got to weed it out because some of it is
self-serving, like they're giving you information to benefit themselves but others
are more truthful. You've got to check the validity of it.
Source: 11058231
Well, the way I would perceive it to be used is drug intelligence reports, for
example. How certain groups are, you know, they're trafficking, you know, their
drugs at certain methods. The numerous trends, like one of the things that I saw
developing over time was the use of, you know, we won't have street corner
conspiracy cases so now the drug dealers had to change their operations. So,
some of the drug dealer's starting to do phone services; you call them and they
will drive up and say meet me at this corner and I'll deliver it. So we need it to,
you know, that intelligent would be good because when people talk about it, then
we can get out that information on how that operation exist and how it works. So
you get different type in which you've seen is also trends. Now, here might be a
trend is people going back to the old system of selling dope out of their houses or
at the garages instead of standing on the corner and selling dope. So you know,
drug intelligence reports are good. Gang methods like I talked about what gangs
do. They torch cars for initiations. They might be torching police vehicles or
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policemen’s (personal) cars (depending) on their initiation or conducting
shootings, or whatever it is. But that information's important to get out there not
only because it tells you something about the gang and what a certain gang trend
is in terms of initiation but it also gives an officer safety flavor to it, report to it.
Source: 11129230
If an officer gets information that a target, John Smith, is selling drugs, he doesn't
go off within the floor and ask every officer in the narcotics unit, [00:09:25 John's
this,] or John Smith's selling drugs. That information is developed by him as he
about--as he, you know, he may do his own investigation, do surveillance. He
may say, “Okay, John Smith is a very high level drug dealer.” That information
could be passed on to a team that works that type of level of drug dealer as
opposed to a street guy. But the very import--it's best that we have to look at
clearing house for information that comes in off the street, no we're not?
Source: 11234773:
Many of these respondents indicate that the best criminal intelligence resides with the
officers involved in cases. This is the argument for maintaining a process for developing
intelligence from sources that can be available to a wider audience. In its current state, as
criminal intelligence resides with individuals, if they are promoted, resign, are transferred
or otherwise unavailable, the intelligence may be difficult to retrieve. ILP provides the
process for analyzing and storing criminal intelligence products which are received on a
current basis so others can determine if the products are useful to them in a timely
fashion. Codes used in the above question include ‘Value,’ ‘Criminal Intelligence,’ and
‘Perception;’ Kappa (κ) = 0.82, 97% indicating almost perfect agreement and a high
degree of association among the three terms and the responses to the question. Most
respondents perceive the product of criminal intelligence developed from sources as
something that is archived for distribution while others perceive information sources for
developing current criminal intelligence on a more fluid, current, and changing basis.
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Theme 27 was developed from the respondent’s perception on how information
sources are ultimately tied to the product of criminal intelligence.
Very important. Lot of the cases that we do work which, you know, are long-term
investigations are derived from these specific things and, you know, putting
together, going after the worst of the worst, the most violent and use the
surveillance, informants, debriefings and all of that towards--working towards an
investigation. So, within the Organized Crime Division it's a--it's probably
critical.
Source: 11028961
Well, that's easy. Informants give us information, we check and see if it's by
debriefing other people, if it's perfect or real information, with most certainly, if
they tell us this is going to happen and this car is going by you. We can survey
the area and see. Get all works together, it's hand in hand you can't have
intelligence, unless you put all that stuff together.
Source: 11042566
The information sources are often used long term and often used very effectively
to--can also be a sharing with other jurisdictions. The information source can be
as such that we can actually start an operation as long as we can vet it.
Source: 11087163
Somehow, it's instrumental and you know, there's a lot of--where there's
intelligence and, for instance, what's going on with the task force over at
[location] We learned from prisons that our guy just got released from jail. So,
therefore, I mean, there's--we know because he's got a history and we got
intelligence on him. We know that there's going to be a spike in crime because
prior to his incarceration, he was responsible for eight to ten murders. So, I mean
that intelligence derived from The analyst and when you look at the map, you see
a spike and had you not get the intelligence from The analyst or some of the guys
here that track that person, particular person or target, you would not know why
spike is there because he just got released.
Source: 11105904
Everything we do is based on informants and surveillance, whether it be human or
electronic surveillance such as wire taps and hand registers which is the tracking
of phone calls or who people are calling, that's all intelligence, really when you
break it down. And that is what we use to build cases against people and also, we
use it to make our decisions on what the step in our investigations are. And then
again, on a gang enforcement section which is more of a street level mission
driven unit, we use information sources also so we know where to direct that
manpower and where they can go to effectively stem violence. We also use the
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information sources in all the units to conduct search warrants and other
activity of that nature.
Source: 11247602
Information sources are varied and information may be obtained from case reports,
interviews, surveillance, or exchanges between individuals working the same case.
Each of the respondents describes the importance of connecting information sources to
investigations but a process for connecting source information to an overall criminal
intelligence file is not described.
The term ‘long term investigation’ is used to describe complex cases which may take
a year or more to resolve. Most often these types of cases involved other agencies and
most often those agencies are federal. It is not uncommon for federal partners to maintain
criminal intelligence processes as they draw information from OCD officers. For
example, the FBI uses a ‘Pin-Point’ data base which tracks informant handlers by area. If
information is required, an agent can locate the handler who will contact his informant to
possibly verify current information. A broader ILP system could allow for this type
feature to be available to specialized CPD units.
Theme 28 was developed from the respondent’s perception that they currently lack a
uniform intelligence process that can be applied to all cases on which they work.
They are completely unrelated without the information sources. We would not be
able to develop criminal intelligence work for the unit. As an example though,
information that comes in the unit based upon an activity by a gang is usually
verified by a confidential informant or other sources and then it provides a basis
for generating intelligence products.
Source: 11058231
I'd say that's what drives your activity. You know, confidential informants also
know where the hot cars are gonna get dropped off or who's selling dope over
here or who committed the murder. Surveillance, even you follow that murderer
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around and you forgot where he's going and he's gonna do it again and case
works maybe, well, you can use some of the reports almost like the pin board or
yes, say, “These guys are shooting back and forth. I know these guys and then we
better go and check out that corner.”
Source: 11062184
…case by case analysis. I mean, if information developed by a team through the
course of investigation they get information that, it could lead to suburban drug
deal or it could lead to a see a target outside, operating outside the United States.

The supervisor, his duty is to then develop either an information report or put in a
supplementary report. That information is reported to our analyst here. She
would--she reviews all those reports and determines, "Oh, a target of interest was
picked up on this investigation." That target was also of interest to a DA group,
that information, we will now be forwarded.
Source: 11234773
Each respondent identifies the use of information sources and relates how, under
certain circumstances, that information may be tied to criminal intelligence, depending on
the case. Confidential informants are mentioned as one information source which can be
tied to others. One respondent refers to an analyst who reviews case and supplementary
reports from a variety of sources to develop intelligence that is shared in specific
instances.
Theme 29 was developed from the respondent’s perception that they require more
experience and training in the use of associating information with criminal intelligence.
Well, you know, it varies to you know, again, it comes down to the experience
and the supervision that each of the gang teams or narcotic scenes or the
lieutenant who supervises them has, because you definitely need to connect the
surveillance activity with the confidential information you have in debriefings to
fit in all the pieces of the puzzle of any type of criminal activity or any
intelligence that you want to put together. So, I see them as pieces of the puzzle.
You've got to put them together. You've got to analyze if it's right. I'll give you a
very good example. You know, years ago, I was part of the old intelligence
section where we had an analytical group and all we did was analyze reports
coming in from all the different intelligence squads, alright? All the different
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intelligence squads did not know what everybody was working on except the
analytical group. We were to sort out all the information and run numbers and do
background checks on people and so forth. And then we would sit down with the
supervisor and tell him what we're seeing based on his surveillance and his case.
And then if we see a connection with another case, we would tell him talk to this
sergeant about your guy because there's a connection with his case and your case,
alright? So, it's more like a centralized analytical group, but I guess you've got to
have somebody that has the experience to do that. So trainings are really
important to do that so I think that's probably work. There's a lack of training to
make that. So you rely on experience, okay?
Source: 11129230
Update--is a good word--that information, it goes back to what the definition of
your intelligence source of information. It's all information put together is
intelligence, it's what's going to keep you going now and in the future and so there
is a direct link between all the information that's gathered and the all information
that's filed and stored for all the work that this unit does. To know what [00:11:51
Jay-jay] did last year and the time that Jay-jay has gotten what area did they did
frequent, it is all there so someone might come along, they're going to seek some
during the time on the street but they also have a source of information. A source
of intelligence that they can go back and look that's going to help them to know
that Jay-jay, he make frequent this area all the time but a lot of times, he goes on
here for a certain times. So, it's there, there is a direct link and they're connect.
Source: 11148753
We can't keep a very running file around them. We chart though, any kind of
stuffs with contact cards, C.I. information, several that we've taken down. That's-some of the individuals have gotten into that individual source. It's always kind
of like girlfriends, cars, properties…I mean, constantly it's a--of things are
evaluated. We do, the Commander has implemented that we do a weekly report
pertaining to our top 10s to keep people, somewhat focused. Because a lot of
times, we're being pulled in many different directions but it keep us focused, you
know, on our top 10s because that is a priority for us. Now, not saying we're the
only ones who are keeping files on it. I mean, obviously, there are some certain
individuals in some of these areas where there is some high amounts of violence
occurring that we also gather, you know, intelligence on also.
Source: 11257484
The respondents emphasize work done to maintain and review information for
associations between sources which should be tied to criminal intelligence files. One of
the respondents emphasizes experience while another suggests training might be an
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appropriate way to teach the development of criminal intelligence based on source
information. Each respondent indicates they the basis for understanding how criminal
intelligence might be developed. One response infers it is likely that several groups keep
the same or similar information. An ILP process would collect all source information
from those groups for analysis and development of intelligence which could be shared by
all. Codes used in the above question include ‘Information Source,’ ‘Criminal
Intelligence,’ and ‘Practice;’ Kappa (κ) = 0.40, 92% indicating fair agreement and a high
degree of association among the three terms and the responses to the question. Fair
agreement is indicated based on the variety of ways information sources are handled by
these respondents.
The above question addressed whether information sources were tied to criminal
intelligence files in the OCD. The following question asks if there is a mechanism in
place to draw associations or relations between the information collected through
analysis. Associations may include, for example, people, vehicles, cell phones, or
financial records related to a particular person of interest.
Theme 30 was developed from the respondent’s perception that personnel are in place
to handle work related to the analysis of intelligence used to derive associations.
You know, like (an Officer) called me, a week and a half or two weeks ago, he
said that there was a guy that was arrested, [00:11:49 name deleted] for two
bombs over at 13th and Keeler that's supposed to be, you know, the bars bail was
over there looking for him because he had some items with both before he was
incarcerated and he wanted them to bail him out. And if he wasn't there, then he
told them to, told the people that we're there to make a phone call and get him out
in 5 minutes. He didn't show up so ten minutes later there's two people who were
shot. I had (our analyst) check on this person they got caught [00:12:15
Incomprehensible] over there on a car chase with the police, you know, where is
he at, what's going on with the guy. She found out, you know, give me a file on

110
him and with all the information, the particulars, where he was currently at in the
county. I got that information and passed it to (an officer who is at) Area 4 and I
said, “Whoever this guy--this guy may have some information on this conflict.
So, that information goes back and forth and I might asked her to do things where
I'm learning say at the meeting, or I'm learning at--from say some of our contacts
in the federal government, DEA, from the DEA informers who say, “Looks like
there's something going on over here because of A, B, or C” and then I'll go to the
analyst and say, "Hey, is there any validity or can you work up on these people?"
And she'll work up the people and it would be disseminated to the appropriate
area--the team that works on it.
Source: 11058231
Okay, let's do it one at a time. Who does it? I have five gang detectives working
in five areas, okay. They should be working on intelligence. They do intelligence
reports to me weekly. There's a gang intelligence report for each area done by the
gang detective, weekly. It goes on all the shootings and homicides of anything in
narcotics, big whacks (shootings), anything like that. Intel that was brought off
the street and he does report, so we have a weekly report no matter what.
Source: 11042566
Okay, there is one person that I know of that does double duty between both
sections, between 189 and 193. That person reports it. The intelligence-based for
incidents just causes when a policeman is shot at or incidents like that. They are
just causes that come across. Usually I could get it by email and it's pretty much
shared throughout the Organized Crime Division but there's only one person that
actually does that.
Source: 11028961
Our analyst here is [name deleted], she's very--she has contacts with almost every
law enforcement agency operating in Illinois and actually with the federal
agencies. She is pretty much our clearing house. We are--I'm not saying we
operate an island because no one does. We do share information with our outside
agencies, but a lot and often times that information is kept close to the vest
because of sensitivity. You can't just forward it. It's not like around robbery
crew. Narcotics is its own separate--because the information is so sensitive, you
have the informants' identities, you have, you know, officers, infiltrating groups.
That information can't really be shared.
Source: 11234773
The respondents indicate analysis used to draw associations between individuals and
information tying them other information which may yield intelligence is handled in at
least two ways. In the first instance, several individuals, sometime involved with other
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agencies, pool their collective information for possible associations. In the second, more
prevalent instance, one person has the responsibilities for collecting information from
divergent sources and analyzing it for possible associations. Both examples illustrate the
use of analytics for a tactical purpose where answers are required quickly. In a broader
strategic arrangement, criminal intelligence developed through ILP could provide ready
access to associations already established as an on-going process.
Theme 31 was developed from the respondent’s perception that task of analysis is
assigned to different personnel as needed.
I think every member of organized crime is responsible for at least a little bit of
that. We have the IBDRs, those Intelligence-based Deployment
Recommendations and I give every single one of my guys do one those. So, they
get information like that this guy is gonna go shoot this guy or these guys are at
war with this guy. If it's hot information, it's e-mailed right away and it's
disseminated right away to the districts and usually that decisions either by (our)
Lieutenants or the Commander and if--and when anybody can call one of those,
anybody from the lowest senior police officer can say, "I got good information.
There's gonna be a shooting and let's disseminate it to everybody."
Source: 11062184
It's done by each individual area by the team that connects to the area. The
storing is a problem where it's often not retrievable. Sometimes that information
is there but its old or it hasn't, there's no quick way to get your hands on it. Our
analyst does a great job of connecting the dots on the overall picture by using
databases that the officers started using or don't have the access to and sometimes
putting everything together from another unit making an arrest that they are not
aware of. Connecting aliases where an individual doesn't have the time to make
that kind of analysis or an analyst can bring it all together and analyze it often
more effectively than the officers themselves.
Source: 11087163
Right now from what I see, each individual officer does analysis and if they draw
some part of analysis, they do and then from there they do a paper work which is
forwarded up that chain of the unit looking, see if questions are asked if there's
something else--it's seems something might be missed and from there, then it's
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filed in a--by one of the administrative staff where it could be access by mostly
everybody.
Source: 11148753
The above responses indicate that groups of individuals are tasked with determining
which associations exist based on available information. Importantly, each of the
respondents demonstrates a reliance on someone to do analysis which underscores the
need for analysis in the work being done. There is some indication that at least one
analyst has access to database information which may not be available to investigators.
Theme 32 was developed from the respondent’s perception that they lack the capacity
for in depth crime analysis.
I could comment on this--the Organized Crime Division lacks a central
intelligence unit that would take all the difference intelligence products from
narcotics, organized crime, gang enforcement, and even the vice division. And
since there's no central location or an intelligence collection manager to review
the added information, our use of criminal intelligence is lacking.
Source: 11105904
Well, I see a continuous room for great improvement. Again, you know, strategic
direction of department is based on planning, in budget, and where do you want
your money to be put at in terms of its function and tactical operations. So, to
reduce violence, we were more committed to making arrests, not gathering
intelligence. I think there's got to be a major shift in moving towards investing in
people that can analyze, investing in technology that can make the collection of
information a lot more easier and a lot easier to collect from everyone instead of
just a few people. You can collect it from--if you got one squad working on
gangs you might get some reports. But if you get a hundred people out in the
same area working, you have the chances of collecting a hundred pieces of
information but you have the right technology in place.
Source: 11129230
Well, I'm--I oversee it I guess. I'm pretty much, I don't--I don't have the luxury of
having like analysts, quite frankly. Of my gang detectives and myself, and I
would say some of my stronger sergeants, we're the ones that are primarily
involved with this whole thing.
Source: 11257484
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Yeah, we do a lot of that with the associations and connections. We do various
data bases we have like with Penlink and there's also units that HIDTA helps us a
lot in our investigations when we start, we do the things I mentioned earlier like
Pen registers or getting phone numbers where we identified people and we could
give them the information and they'll do the link analysis and show us how people
are related and they'll come up with a spider web type graph and you could see
who's related to who via who they're calling or who might have joined real estate
ventures together, things like that that's off of an internet based sources and
anything that they could throw in there to develop those connections. As far as
in-house, most of our stuff, unfortunately, it's stored on paper still in the Gang
Investigations Section. We've been striving, and I can get into it more later, but
we've been striving to try to get a Gang Investigations Section database done
where all of our gang investigation reports go into and it could be later data mined
and mined for any kind of information on persons of interest. On the other hand,
we do send most of our GIS supplementary reports which are trying to do.
Source: 11247602
Most respondents are optimistic about their future ability to use more analysis to
develop the associations between existing criminal intelligence and information.
Respondents indicate paper based reports are common while use of digital applications
capable of linking information is restricted to specific software, e.g., Penlink, which is a
law enforcement tool used to track phone records. One respondent uses another agency,
HIDTA (High Intensity Drug Traffic Areas) to help with developing associations
between persons of interest and other information.
Overall, the respondents are keenly aware of the value of associations which can be
drawn by tying information sources and developing intelligence. As a tool, ILP make use
of vetted criminal intelligence that can be used to develop associative links with persons,
places, and things. Codes used in the above question include ‘Analysis,’ ‘Source
Evaluation,’ and ‘Cohesion;’ Kappa (κ) = 0.79, 95% indicating substantial agreement
and a high degree of association among the three terms and the responses to the question.
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The next section specifically addresses the notion of Intelligence-led Policing (ILP).
Prior to presenting the questions in this section to the respondents, each was provided
with a definition of Intelligence-led Policing as provided by Jerry Ratcliffe, a professor
from Temple University who has done extensive world-wide research on police practices
and is the author of the text Intelligence-led Policing (Appendix G)
The Notion of Intelligence-led Policing used by the OCD: Developed Themes
Theme 33 was developed from the respondent’s perception that the concept of ILP
would be useful; we use parts of it now, and it could save us on resources.
Yeah, I believe that it could be useful. You know, obviously, the people that do
the work still got to go out there and, you know, do the old-fashioned police work
and do what needs to be done for investigation-wise. But being able to pinpoint
direct and to focus on major offenders and to give a little more direction for the
activities and associations by--come out with that information is--it could be quite
a bit of a shortcut to you having to do that information and research yourself.
Source: 11028961
Well, in one word, absolutely. We do it now. That is what we do. We do
intelligence-led policing. We do not have the luxury to have unlimited resources
manpower. As you all know, you looked on TV. So we have got to be smarter
and more effective. We got to surgically take people out, take areas out and the
gangs out. That's what we do, we have been doing it. Reading this, obviously the
person who wrote it has done it himself or he wouldn't be able to write this or he's
a good person of seeing at work but that is exactly what we do on organized
crime. That's how we do it; we couldn't do it any other way.
Source: 11042566
Yes, and actually, I think that the department, as I said earlier, does do some of
this already... We also have, in a federal level, with mostly the Organized Crime
Division, a main 21 list. Main 21 are the main 21 worst people in the city; gang
bangers, drug dealers, it's usually based along either a high-managerial position in
a gang or narcotics organization or if not of a high-managerial position, an
extremely vital character. Okay, we also have a system called the Trap System
which is Targeted Repeat Offender Apprehension and Prosecution System. And
that's basically a joint venture with the state's attorneys office where our top 11
districts for public violence submit names of their 10 worst subjects, much along
like the lines of the top 10 or top 21. And what that does is when no subjects' are
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arrested, they notify states attorney and the state's attorney is assigned to that
case and stays with it. And that state's attorney is assigned to that area to make
sure that that subject doesn't slip through the cracks on a minor offense. He gets
taken, he's prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law. But in short though, yes, I
mean I believe the concept is useful to any Police Department. You can't random-in this day in age and with limited resources, you cannot randomly just do
random preventive patrols and hope to come across something to prevent crime.
You have to have at least a good portion of your police department directed at
known targets and known conflicts.
Source: 11247602
Absolutely; I mean, this is basically targeting to the right people. I mean, one of
the great reductions of crime strategy is getting the right people off the street. I
mean, you go back historically in this unit, I mean, we tried to attack the right
people, you know, they have to [00:14:56 watch] and trigger town up in the 5th
District. I mean, they got the right people and, you know, hence, crime reduced.
Now, they're reduced and probably prevented a number of crimes and then you
got the new breed [00:15:11 Incomprehensible] based conflict but you know the
mark in them. I mean, you target the right people. You take the right people out
of the equation. You've got to prevent crime, you've got to prevent future crimes
because, I mean, you know, they're just basically the urban serial killers.
Source: 11058231
Absolutely; I think that the analysts are the key to pulling the data together in
connecting crime intelligence and coming out with a report that would leverage
all our human resources and we talked about the analysts using technology in
using information, leveraging our human resources to be more strategically
focused and obviously more efficient and obviously putting our officers at the
right place at the right time at the right spot.
Source: 11129230
Yeah, I think there's some place for that. You know, I think everybody's, you
know, set business model on-- the civil service type thing, everybody gets a little
hinkty about that. But I think there's something to be said for, it's like, you know,
let's get some information, let's get some viable targets, you know, and let's see
what we could do to take these people out and thus, you know, create a better
atmosphere, better community. And like I said, we've had some success, I think
recently this year. A lot of it wasn't really, you know, by GES, but a lot of it was
through like let narcotics know this is what we got…
Source: 11257484

116
Importantly, each of the respondents interprets some value in the tenets of ILP as an
aid to supplement their existing work. Most infer ILP would be most important in
identifying the ‘right people’ or targets on which to focus the attention of an
investigation. The largest gangs in Chicago, the Latin Kings and Gangster Disciples, are
comprised of tens of thousands of members; because of scarce resources available to the
OCD, focusing on the right individuals for investigations is critical.
Theme 34 was developed from the respondent’s perception that an analytical
approach can not provide the types of answers required for the OCD on any type of
regular basis.
Again, I think it should be everybody. I think it should be the beat cop should be
able to use it and should be able to come up--I mean, I know some great guys who
never got out of the blue uniform who would pull you over and say, "Hey, I got a
guy that is saying this is going on or that's going on," or "I just saw somebody
doing this over here. You might wanna keep an eye on it." And it should go all
the way up and really it should be about the information sharing is important as
just the intelligence gathering. You know, did you read the book "Moneyball?”
It's about Billy Beane and the Athletics and it's basically he's the first baseball
manager that starts to use all these stats and he's first to come up with the on-base
percentage within the status sessions and he took a team that they didn't think was
getting anywhere, all the way, you know, just short of the World Series but what
you can't account for is the heart of the policeman, the guy that's out there. You
can put all the stats in. You can put all the--you can flood them with intelligence
but the guy is not gonna stop somebody. The guy is not gonna talk to somebody.
It's not gonna make a difference.
Source: 11062184
I think that some of these crime analysis theories (are) the flavor of the day. The
bottom line is you still have to have officers out on the street interacting with
people. I've never seen anyone sitting in their office and making arrests.
Obviously, it's trendy and it's a way to justify people's positions. It's just a way to
justify the planning for research. What I mean, I'm a little bit old school, I still
believe in the fact, I mean a combination of the theory is more effective than the
total embracing of, you know, everything has been researched down to the last.
The bottom line is you still have to go out there in police cars and stop cars, stop
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people, interact with people, and that information's going to come from the
street.
Source: 11234773
These respondents feel the best information and intelligence is developed from what is
learned on the street rather than from new concepts or policing models. In absolute terms,
this observation is not without merit and should continue to be observed. An important
point to emphasis is ILP, by definition, is not intended to replace anything that in use that
currently works; it is intended to supplement existing practices. In this sense, ILP is
different from other policing models such as Community Oriented Policing which is
intended to permeate all aspects of policing and become ingrained in the culture of the
department involved with the program.
Theme 35 was developed from the respondent’s perception that the concept of ILP
should be applied on a Departmental scale rather than just among top decisions makers as
a method to prevent, not merely react to crime.
Oh, heartily. As noted by Ratcliffe, we do not have strategic management of
information within. It's whoever has that information, they do pass it on.
However, it does not provide a coordinated approach to the problem. Each time I
send information help, if it goes to the district commander, there may be a gang
conflict, they respond that information by putting resources and thereby trying to
stop it, not eliminate it, as an example.
Source: 11105904
I believe it is in terms of that issue over the Department and to this unit. This is a
more formalized description of what is already done and then moving towards a
more formalized description it will actually probably find and ease some of the
processes that are already in existence. From what I know about detective--I
think it would be useful not only for Detective Division but also for the patrol
also. So it would be used, I think, it would be used for the Department as a
whole.
Source: 11148753
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Overall, the respondents perceive the definition and concept of Intelligence-led
Policing as something that would be beneficial to their work. Of interest among the
respondents is the notion of using analysis to a greater extent and having a central archive
on criminal intelligence which might be used by everyone. Respondent who were
concerned about the effectiveness of the ILP model as a practical tool perceived it as a
passing fad or would rather continue to work using traditional methods. Codes used in
this question include ‘ILP,’ ‘Concept Use,’ and ‘Practice;’ Kappa (κ) = 0.52, 95%
indicating moderate agreement and a high degree of association among the three terms
and the responses to the question.
Theme 36 was developed from the respondent’s perception as to who decides both
strategic and tactical objectives for the unit and whether supervisors have any discretion
in the process.
Well, if I'm going to use like a case as an example, I've been fortunate enough to
be a decision maker in strategic objectives because I've had some experience
doing that before. However, you know, it still goes up to process. I mean, you
still have the lieutenant, you still have the commander, you still have to run
everything by them. However, I've been fortunate enough where I've been able to
be the decision maker and determine of strategic objectives on different things.
Source: 11028961
I'll give them the message of what I want done and how to do it. They, on a daily
basis as we just with this last phone call, are going to make decisions on how to
actually get it done. I'll give them the objectives then they're going to do their
strategic objectives on how to get it.
Source: 11042566
As far as our unit--as far as our investigations go, the sergeants ultimately are
controlling the investigation. They're making the decisions. Once a month we
have a meeting with the sergeants and lieutenants and we tackle all the particular
cases. We got a particular case to work it out or there's particular conflict that

119
we're working on and I like to have a meeting because they're feeding what
they're doing and they're proposing their strategies.
Source: 11058231
(Decision makers) got to be careful about over information, you can't throw
everything at the lawn and see what's gonna stick and then like DOC giving you a
30-page report and half of it is about neighbors. Now, I don't even do give a
(expletive deleted) about that. Where is this guy? What kind of--what gang is he
in, who he shot at before and you never get anything. I know all you get is
an Accurant report that says he applied for a credit card in 1972, you know.
Source: 11062184
So, I think the decision makers, even though I say it starts with the supervisors,
but I think if you take a look at it really, the officers that are working in these
cases, the intelligence officers, that's why they're called intelligence out there
they're gathering their intelligence in the street level. Fundamentally, really key
into developing all these tactical intelligence which then allows the upper level
person to look at it strategically plan what the goals, the overall goals of going
after a particular gang.
Source: 11129230
It'd be the Command Staff. I mean it would be the Chief, myself as the Deputy
Chief, and then, you know, Commanders and staff. But as a department,
obviously, it'll be the Superintendent and then his executive staff, which will be
the deputy superintendents and the assistant superintendents.
Source: 11247602
Because the structure of the Chicago Police Department is quasi-military it is not
unusual that the responses to this questions are expressed in terms of span of control as
determined by rank. The above respondents infer they have latitude in both strategic and
tactical decisions but this latitude is clearly subject to approval along the chain of
command which relies on subordinates to provide workable intelligence and information.
Theme 37 was developed from the respondent’s perception that decisions on strategic
objectives are made by the highest ranking member involved with the case.
Right now the deputy superintendents are the decision makers on allowing each
unit to have some latitude and there is still some tactical latitude but often the
areas of deployment even for our unit are focused on what was initially put down
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by deputy superintendent and it can be actually multiple deputy,
superintendents and they're trying to protect the most critical areas of the city.
Source: 11087163
The decision makers for establishing policies is the Senior Command Staff that
has to determine the strategic objectives. The Senior Command Staff, which
would guide us and I'm going to use the term management-based objectives.
Once we know their objectives, then we as mid-level supervisors could establish
the goals to meet those objectives. The tactical decisions will solely rely at this
level on.
Source: 11105904
The overall decision makers right now for the most part, it sets at the commander
level and above; that's the formal decision makers. Well, it's actually the
Captain, the watch commanders and in some units you actually have sergeants,
who are actually--that are--they has some aspect of being the decision maker also.
Source: 11148753
I could make recommendations, you know, and whether or not they want it, they
listen to those recommendations. That's fine, you know, in most cases, they do,
quite frankly 'cause they rely on people that are, you know, like I rely on people
that are on the loose ground type of thing. They are the ones that are closest to
the stuff they can taste it and feel it, you know. And so, I mean, I'm providing,
you know, targets to like interviews in trying to along those lines and then, you
know, gather enough information to people who are subordinates and stuff and
filter this to other the people and say like, "Hey, this might be a little bit bigger
than what we can do, but this is what we got, this is what phone numbers we have,
this girlfriend's cars we got, here you go," you know, and we hear from them
periodically back and forth from working...
Source: 11257484
The above respondents specifically cite the chain of command structure within the
Department as the basis for decision making. These responses indicate the presence of a
strong organizational structure that is responsible for decision making. There is the
inference that many of the respondents believe their input contributes to a formal decision
making process but ultimately strategic decisions are determined by higher ranking
officers.
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Theme 38 was developed from the respondent’s perception that strategic,
sometimes tactical, decisions are influenced and indeed made by sources outside of the
unit.
If at tactical level it's the Deputy Superintendent (or) the Chief of the OCD.
Source: 11234773
This respondent inferred that tactical decisions are made at the highest levels of the
OCD. This response is an exception to the other responses provided which infer decision
making is based on the information or intelligence available to high ranking supervisors.
Codes used in the above question include ‘Coupling,’ ‘Decisions,’ and ‘ILP;’ Kappa
(κ) = 0.85, 95% indicating almost perfect agreement and a high degree of association
among the three terms and the responses to the question.
Theme 39 was developed from the respondent’s perception that decision makers
would benefit from the tenets described in ILP.
Seventy-five (75) percent of the respondents answered ‘yes’ or ‘absolutely’ to this
question inferring the use of an ILP model would be of use to the decision makers who
they had previously identified. Their complete responses may be found in Appendix E.
Theme 40 was developed from the respondent’s perception that already Intelligenceled Policing is already being conducted by members of the OCD.
I think we already have some work done. We have the top 21 meeting. We have,
I mean we have written a number of avenues to share information. Oh, we have
about different avenues to share information which is really, dramatically changed
in the last--I have been here in the past 19 years, so it's been, it's changed
dramatically as far as exchanging of information between agencies; but then,
within our own agencies, within shared agencies, within the federal agencies,
county, law enforcements.
Source: 11234773
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We do it now. Like most certainly benefit, they do it now that is how they do
their job. That is why they're better than most.
Source: 11042566
Absolutely, I think that's what this--we do this all the time.
Source: 11058231
Each of the respondents recognize the values of the tenets described in the definition
of ILP and each infers they employ at least some of the characteristics of ILP in their
present work. These responses allude to information sharing which is critical to police
work but shared information implies some lack of ownership in the exchange. The
products developed from ILP are ‘owned’ by those who develop information into
intelligence for decision makers to construct specific strategies.
Codes used in the above question include ‘ILP,’ ‘Concept Use,’ and ‘Practice;’ Kappa
(κ) = 0.57, 88% indicating moderate agreement and a strong degree of association among
the three terms and the responses to the question.
Theme 41 was developed from the respondent’s perception that the use of the critical
activities outlined in the definition of ILP such as the increased use of analytics and a
focus on prolific offenders to direct strategies are important in decision making that direct
strategies.
Eighty-three (83) percent of the respondents were in agreement that the critical
factors as outlined in the definitions of ILP would benefit strategic direction and
subsequent decisions. The previous question asked whether the tenets of ILP would
benefit decision makers while this question addresses the use of ILP in forming directed
strategies.
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Theme 42 was developed from the respondent’s perception that the critical activities
presented by ILP should be used at all levels of the Department for aiding in decisions
and not restricted to the exclusive use by high level decision makers to direct strategic
objectives.
I think our objectives are really stated in a general form that we are given a
certain task. We are some--we're given still some leeway, you know, to develop
strategies because somebody downtown can't tell me, “You have to have to get
undercover buy in to this guy.” They can't tell us that because they don't, you
know, unless they're going to put some shit on it, go out there and try to do it
because it's not going to work.
Source: 11234773
I think it should be intended for the use by decision makers as well as operational
people because it depends on, you know, I mean, decision makers, I think it
should be expanded a little bit 'cause when you're going a little bit lower than the
guys who aren't making the big decisions, there's still people that are doing the
investigations or missions on a little bit of a lower level, but they still need to
know the intelligence and the information that make their missions or
investigations successful as opposed to just like I read this to mean by decision
makers, the people are going to decide where manpower's directed and things like
that, where once the manpower's directed to a place, they should have more
access to all that intelligence also.
Source: 11247602
The ILP is specifically presented as a management tool to assist high level decision
makers in forming effective strategic plans. The respondents above believe ILP could
benefit decision makers at the operational level for tactical use.
Codes used for the above question include ‘ILP,’ ‘Concept Use,’ and ‘Resources;’
Kappa (κ) = 0.64, 88% indicating substantial agreement and a strong degree of
association among the three terms and the responses to the question.
The following questions are intended to solicit responses about the organizational
culture of the Department and how it impacts the Organized Crime Division.
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Organizational behavior can determine whether the Department is willing to buy-in to
innovational changes such as ILP or are content to remain with the status quo. This
section investigates the respondent’s use of data management technology as well as the
organizational support of technology intended to promote efficiency. Additionally,
methods of information exchanges, formal and informal networking, suggestions for
improving on existing information systems, and the roles of individuals involved in the
process of developing intelligence are discussed.
Organizational Intelligence Practices in the OCD; Developed Themes
Theme 43 was developed from the respondent’s perception that OCD members have
or share a lot of useful technology.
We have a lot of technology solutions. We have a lot of technology. You know,
Excel, Microsoft, you know, law enforcement databases such as Accurint,
LexisNexis but I don't really have access to it anymore, LEADS 2000 I had access
to, FinCEN (Financial Information--Financial Information Network) . So, yeah,
organized crime as opposed to the Patrol Division or whatever, yeah, we have far
superior access to it.
Source: 11028961
I-CLEAR system, Crystal Reports, Accurint; I mean, we utilized a number of-right now, we're in the process of--and a lot of this is, you know, the Crystal
(Reports) is the tracker activity, which I don't judge a team by their activity, I
judge a team by their investigations. I mean the quality of it.
Source: 11042566
I've got to speak at this level. I can't to the level of the Deployment Operation
Center (DOC) that receives some of our intelligence products. But currently,
right now, aside from data mining certain databases, to determine information, the
information that we have or the tools that we have are usually used to prepare
reports for transmittal later on. Some officers use commercially available
products such as Microsoft Excel, PowerPoint to get briefings. However, there is
no central database to input or index intelligence data for later retrieval, which is
important when it comes to feeding that information. Is it a single source or is it
coming from multiple sources.
Source: 11058231
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I think I-CLEAR is used. We use a lot of state and federal databases. We use our
task forces that are in access to databases in their particular agency, whether it's
DEA or the FBI or if it's IRS. So they've got databases that we can use. The only
caveat I would make is sometimes that their confidential on ongoing cases, we
cannot produce any intelligence often to cases are actually terminated. We use
also our Department's CPIC (Crime Prevention Information Center).
Source: 11129230
There are references to a number of technologies in these responses which infers
there is no universal process in the OCD for managing data through the use of
technology. Using a variety of applications to manipulate common data can result in
difficulties when the data must be retrieved by others who may not have the privilege
required to access the same application. Some of the software mentioned in the
respondents is for presentations or reports, not specifically for data management; Crystal
Reports© is a page assembler which requires accessing data fields from a database for
reporting purposes. Both LEADS 2000 and I-CLEAR are law enforcement data marts
which allow end users to retrieve ‘flat file’ data, which is data on a particular individual
or event without any analysis. There are features in I-CLEAR that allow a user to connect
a subject of interest with related files recorded under the same record number so if an
individual is arrested with a second person, that person’s name can be retrieved within
the same file. Other applications mentioned by these respondents are used to retrieve a
subject’s financial or phone record information. Intelligence work would begin after this
type of information had been retrieved. Use of other agency databases or files, including
those which may be available from CPIC, places the user in a subordinate role which can
restrict access to the information required because the date, information, or intelligence
sought belongs to another group.
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Theme 44 was developed from the respondent’s perception that there is a need for
more ‘useable’ technology at our level.
Now we do send a lot of those reports up the chains who DOC, who want--they
are keeping it somewhere, God knows where. But when some of the gang
members stop them, they get dead and the girl who does see the stuff on the
narcotics side. We send her all sorts of stuff but really it'd been--it's almost a
problem of too much information. Yeah, you can have every single GD on the
computer but you got to know if they're in the California Jackson GDs or New
Orleans, right.
Source: 11062184
I've got to speak at this level. I can't to the level of the Deployment Operation
Center that receives some of our intelligence products. But currently, right now,
aside from data mining certain databases, to determine information, the
information that we have or the tools that we have are usually used to prepare
reports for transmittal later on. Some officers use commercially available
products such as Microsoft Excel, PowerPoint to get briefings. However, there is
no central database to input or index intelligence data for later retrieval, which is
important when it comes to feeding that information. Is it a single source or is it
coming from multiple sources.
Source: 11105094
Storing and receiving. Well, email is used for a lot of transmitting but the storage
and pulling out the information from information that has already been archived is
the most difficult part because the technology is lacking. There was good
intelligence that was put in last year that is no longer in our fingertips.
Source: 11087163
The question addresses technology but the first two responses above infer that the
Deployment Operations Center (DOC) manage the intelligence processes, including the
technology, to provide intelligence products to the OCD. This can be problematic as the
first respondent indicates concerns on whether the products provided through the OCD
address OCD concerns as well as whether the amount of data received from the DOC
results in ‘information overload.’ In either case, there is an apparent disconnect between
the types of intelligence products required by the OCD and those delivered by the DOC.
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The second and third response infer the lack of technology that could make data
collection, information indexing, and a broad form for dissemination of intelligence more
efficient. The analytic phases of ILP are provides one method that could assist with these
concerns.
Theme 45 was developed from the respondent’s perception that despite available
technology, most work in accomplished in the form of paper reporting on status rather
than on analytical summaries.
Right now, it's still a manual review, a manual store and a manual transfer of
information. The information comes in and it's reviewed on paper, it's transmitted
on paper and stored on paper. So, that's what we are--I think that's what we are
right now. And this is probably more true while on the follow up question, I know
we are in the process of looking at a technology-based system, that is one where
we allow for a good review--to be able to review any information on a
technological-based system and then also storing that information.
Source: 11148753
I have a district gang book that I started as soon as I like, two years ago because
when I took over as the gang Lieutenant from Area 2, there was nothing really-the annual gang book when my predecessor, I'm like, “Let me see your gang
book” and then there was nothing. And I'm like, “Hey, you have got to be
kidding me.” And me, I'm like old school or something like that when I used to
grab the old graph inside our section to get pictures and put stuff together, but
I've, you know, you got to have at least something and it has to be modified. You
know, I would say quarterly, so that, that I started. We just finished that now. All
my guys have a copy for every district in the area. We basically just have them in
the Word Perfect.
Source: 1125784
The responses above infer that despite available technology, files used for collection
and review of data related to information is done through manual processes. Codes used
in the above question include ‘Intel Use,’ ‘Technology,’ and ‘Data management;’ Kappa
(κ) = 0.57, 81% indicating moderate agreement with a strong degree of association
among the three terms and the responses to the question. This indicates the respondents
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understand the benefit of technology in data management but commonly use different,
unrelated methods or approaches to achieve their results. The strength of an ILP model
would assist to focus OCD members on the same methods for the collection, retrieval,
and dissemination of intelligence products.
Theme 46 was developed from the respondent’s perception that there are specific
technical applications which are of more benefit for required tasks.
I think Accurint®. I think they use--I mean they use because they try to track
people. So, they're tracking people and they're tracking their associates. You
know, these I-CLEAR tracking targets, tracking associates. I mean, the key is,
you know, whatever database that we have that we can track targets and their
associates and then try to make connections and you might not be able to get
target A, but in order to get target A, you might have to go down to one of its
other wings, you get target B because he's going to give you target A. So, you've
got to look at the big picture that, you know, builds on the case, working up the
chain to get the ultimate target that you want.
Source: 11058231
Technologies, we web mapping we can use that it shows again I talk to you
earlier--I'm lucky that that is usually run for me and given to me but we can not
forego the fact that if I had to do in my own I'd come in, I get on a computer I'd
do the web mapping and see where all the shootings were. I'd looked at last
night's DOC analysis report of where all the homicides happened, where all the
shootings happened and when I see certain area I know what gang is in that area
because we had already met all the gangs on the computer. We use all that and
I'll say, “Wow! These all happened in the GD area of the 7th District” and what
factions in the GDs then I can say, Wow! These were the guys that were fighting
last week. They must got back with each other and finished it off.
Source: 11042566
The tech--I mean, information-wise, I mean, Accurint® is something that we use
that's now very important. You know, I use a lot of the phone stuff I-CLEAR
obviously has probably used that on a daily basis for just about everything, Mug
shots, you name it, calls for service, you know, suspects searches, arrest photos,
arrest identifiers, associates, gang associates from arrest, multiple--multiple. It's
basically our hub for what we do.
Source: 11028961
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We use I-CLEAR Data Warehouse and because we're homicide and violent crime
driven, almost everything is on the CLEAR system for all reports. We do just ton
stuff from all reports, you know.
Source: 11062184
We use I-CLEAR for most of my quick information but I use the spreadsheets
Excel, in particular, cause I can show a quick analysis, gangs, violent incidence in
an easy readable formats that somebody wants it right away immediately.
Source: 11087163
Word Perfect; Word just boom all are in there--it's the dude's name, nickname,
last known address and IR number. But, it's pretty extensive and it's done by, you
know, gang and by what area which they operate. Absolutely, to get any kind of
further information, Accurint, graphs You may use Accurint every so often, our
gang detective has access to that and then I have a couple of my sergeants who
have the LEADS 2000. They utilize that a little bit too.
Source: 11257484
The respondents cite more than one half dozen different software applications used to
access or manage data source information. Several respondents mention the use of ICLEAR (Illinois Citizen and Law Enforcement Analysis and Reporting System) which is
a system that integrated an Illinois State Police design with Chicago Police records in
1994 (http://www.isp.state.il.us/media/pressdetails.cfm?ID=165). Because the system has
been in existence for nearly twenty years, it is understandable that supervisors who were
exposed to it early in their careers would still want to use it. It is of some interest to this
researcher that only one respondent mentions the use of spatial GIS (Graphic Information
Systems) technology as a data management tool as mapping is often a critical factor in
seeking solutions to crime problems associated with specific areas. Accurint® is third
party software used to track individuals through public records and requires a licensing
fee. Because respondents indicate they use different technologies for various reasons,
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there is the inference that not all captured information is shared with other interested or
authorized parties. The ILP model employs analysis personnel who may use any or all of
the applications mentioned to produce intelligence products that would be available for
wider consumption in the OCD.
Theme 47 was developed from the respondent’s perception that the OCD often relies
on the technology of other agencies to accomplish our intelligence tasks.
One of the best things we have, actually, when you go back to intelligence and
sources, is we have a system that basically, I think the Feds started it but we have
it now, called, I believe it's called Pinpoint.
Source: 11247602
Something that, I mean, at that level, Upper level investigators have resources like
pen registers, tracing, or wire taps. They're handled here or at the Federal level.
Source: 11234773
I don't find any one particular thing more beneficial because as I come across
with, as I find out about I try to utilize it more. I used I-CLEAR quite a bit.
LEADS I used some but not as often. When I come across the spreadsheets or
database, I like to see what's there to see and got to utilize it, see what's going to
be beneficial, in the format that it is in. Because one aspect of my training on
databases like Access, Excel it's not a formal training it's more self learned. So, I
like to see how can I utilize that information: one, to store it; two, to transmit it
and to review it and transmit it.
Source: 11148753
The a--do I find any particular form of data or information management
technology more beneficial? No. You need example, I-CLEAR is data mining,
which can give you information spread over a period of time. However, it does
not provide any linking ability that I'm aware of. LEADS 2000 is strictly a data
mining process. The desktop tools that we use spreadsheets or any other
databases are used for the development of an intelligence product to share, not
necessarily for analytical needs.
Source: 11105904
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Two respondents mention the use of applications which are supported at the federal
level for their work. This occurs in long term investigations when OCD works with
federal partners who have analysts and/or applications not generally available to the
OCD. This infers these tools or skills are not currently available for the OCD’s exclusive
use. Later responses admit no formalized technology exists for managing data and they
are required to explore the use of desktop programs in order to fashion applications for
their immediate needs.
Codes used in this question include ‘Intel Use,’ ‘Technology,’ and ‘Data management;’
Kappa (κ) = 0.57, 81% indicating moderate agreement with a strong degree of
association among the three terms and the responses to the question.
Theme 48 was developed from the respondent’s perception that the OCD uses
information management technologies mostly for report generation.
For report generation by far…
Source: 11028961
All of my staff use them for report generation, to regurgitate, you know, reports
that they're calling from up above. I read every report that comes through and I
make notes on it and I got a file in my computer and all the information that
comes in, I try to keep track of it, sure.
Source: 11058231
Report generation… The analysis part probably comes from--we would use it
more for the analyzing when you're actually going into the investigation and you
need to put a definition on what's happening here, what's happening in there and
all of that it's just report generation.
Source: 11062184
Unfortunately, we’re using more for report generation (than) for actual analysis
because the analysis links aren't there. They're giving me who, what, when and
where and not a why.
Source: 11087163
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I could pretty much say that they are used only for report generation. Unless an
officer is directed to providing the analysis or snapshot or synopsis of
information, then that is usually generated for report, too.
Source: 11105904
Right now, more so for report generation as things are develop as we go along
there will be just as usual for both aspect but right now, it's more so for report
generation.
Source: 11148753
Right now, the stuff we have is better for report generation. Not as good for
analysis.
Source: 11247602
Sixty-four (64) percent of the respondents maintain the existing data management tools
they use are intended for report generation and not analytics. This suggests the analytic
phase of an ILP model is not available to them. The need for reporting is an essential part
of the information exchange process but the products delivered through reporting,
without the benefit of analytic scrutiny, are often quite generalized. A central function of
ILP is to use analytics to reduce complex information to a simpler form.
Theme 49 was developed from the respondent’s perception that the OCD uses
available technologies for both report generation and analysis.
I use it for analysis more so than anything else.
Source: 11234773
I used it for analysis but some people use it for report generation I mean, there's
report generation going up to the chain of command so they know what's going on
but we're the ones who put the soldiers on the street, we put the cops on the dots,
we analyze it and use it that way. It's used for both.
Source: 11042566
I think both. I mean, I think it will work both ways.
Source: 11257484
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I think it's more for analysis, quite frankly. Well, I don't know. I think there's an
equal benefit here. I mean we're putting stuff together but we're also utilizing it
for analysis, both so--I--we utilize in both…
Source: 11257484
Respondents who interpret existing data management as more useful for analysis or
some hybrid which incorporates analysis and report generation are less emphatic in their
responses than the group included in the previous theme (47). There is an inference that
based on generated reports; analysis may be conducted at another level within the
Department.
Codes used in the above question include ‘Info Use,’ ‘Data management,’ and
‘Concept Use.’ Kappa (κ) = 0.67, 85% indicating substantial agreement with a strong
degree of association among the three terms and the responses to the question. The
strength in agreement among the responses is indicated by responses in both themes (81
%) which refer to reporting.
Theme 50 was developed from the respondent’s perception as to who decides whether
new or available technology would benefit the OCD to facilitate their tasks.
The Chief; but it's not widely, not every team has it, right. I think, every team
needs to have actually the same type of resources. You know, it's like anything
that cost money and-- You know it's just like Accurint cost money.
Source: 11234773
It varies. The bottom line is most things fall to the final decision, especially if it's
going to cost money, to the chief in the Organized Crime Division. In his
absence, it will be the Deputy Chief. But some things like ECSO training and
things like that, we could just approve when they go through. But for instance,
the gang intelligence database that we would like completed, you know, that had
to go all the way to the Chief and signed off by him 'cause it, you know, it has to
be funded. So, he's the funding source.
Source: 11247602
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That would come out of our front office, more than likely. If I wanted somebody
specifically trained, I would go through the front office to find out who the
contact person would be. But more than likely that stuff that, you know, we
would get maybe a memo or, you know, we have five openings for LEADS 2000,
submit a name and, you know, we'll put a name in there and see if they can go
through. If I wanted somebody for something specific, like for ECSO, Electronic
Covert Surveillance Officer training, which is the work on wire taps and we are
working on that type of investigation, those classes only come up twice a year, I
would try to get my guys into it right away because a lot of our cases are driven
towards that type of--type of investigations.
Source: 11028961
The respondents focus is on training for existing technical applications, e.g. ESCO or
LEADS 2000 which are task specific and may contribute to any existing data
management system. These responses do not refer to new or available technology, for
example, mapping solutions that might facilitate some of the OCD tasks. There is the
inference that these respondents are familiar with processes requiring requests for
training on existing technologies but less familiar with requests for new technology
which might facilitate their work.
Theme 51 was developed from the respondent’s perception that in order to get what is
needed in the way of technology often requires recourse rather than a direct approach or
process.
Budget; it’s all about money. That's why we don't have--that's why we have
Accurint® which is good for some things but we lost Reference USA® which is
better for like phones and stuff. We'd love to have both of them but it's, you
know, money.
Source: 11062184
I should decide that. I should decide what my people need to get their job done
and I'm saying that in a way it's not to pick on anybody in our Department but
some people might have a reason that somebody can get out on something or
might be a financial reason but if you're telling me to get the job done, I should be
able to tell which one you should use. And that should my ability and maybe I
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should have a budget for that, and I could decide which way should I go rather
than have somebody sticking something down my throat that we can't use; Gang
sites were restricted. It took a letter through the chain of command to the
superintendent where a phone call to superintendent himself, to make it happen.
Source: 11042566
The above respondents infer there may be a need for new or available technology to
facilitate their tasks but organizational internal inhibitors make direct requests
complicated. The first response indicates a key technology was lost because of budget
restraints. Managers should always expect budget implications may be tied to any request
for resources. Exploring grant or other funding options should be considered before
making resource requests of the organization. The second response infers there may be
times when interdepartmental groups provide technology solutions which are of little or
no value to the end users in OCD. The reference to ‘restricted gang sites’ involves OCD
computers being blocked from You Tube and other social networking Internet sites which
are commonly used by gangs to communicate information. Requests to correct this
condition were commonly turned down but the Information Services Division of the
Department until the Superintendent intervened. The ILP model presents an independent
analytics group which would have more flexibility in the choices and uses of new and
available technology intended to facilitate the types of tasks required by the OCD.
Theme 52 was developed from the respondent’s perception that the OCD must rely
on approval for technology requirements they require from outside unit.
Unfortunately, we can request new or available technology but because of the
bureaucracy at the department usually just one unit, the Informational Services
Unit, seems to have a control of the actual acquisition of those--of those analysis
tools.
Source: 11087163

136
That is through, I believe, Research for Development Information and Services
Division that decides what technology can be available to us. However, I will say
that very seldom is the end user consulted on what they need in order to develop
an intelligent product.
Source: 11105904
Well, some of the technology would be at my level approving it, ECSO training
usually. Some of the other one I would have to go to another, from my bureau to
another bureau like the Bureau of Administrative Services, which by department
policy oversees all our technology. Obviously, certain technology that they
maybe confidential that they will not have control over which can be in-house,
and what I would basically do is hire their consultants to conduct, you know, who
would scope out the requirements of our database and then we'll have a consulted
through Information and Services come over and build that database for us.
Source: 11129230
Right now, that decision is probably more so of the Deputy Chief level. As things
become available, it he (who) contacts our Commander and lets him know this is
available that we need this--by certain people, but I think that is--that the decision
or the search and everything is up to Deputy Chief (or the) Deputy Chief level on
the DOC.
Source: 11148753
Each of the above respondents (36%) infer that requests for new or existing
technology which may facilitate the tasks of the OCD must be approved by other groups
outside the OCD. ILP could flatten this organizational dependency by providing tools
required and shared for analysis as well as for the development of an accepted data
management system.
Overall, approximately 20% of all responses to question 13d infer that budget, rather
than need, is the overriding consideration as to whether new or available technology
would be made available to facilitate the tasks of the OCD.
Codes used in this question include ‘Training Development,’ ‘Data Management,’
and ‘Coupling.’ Coupling refers to the relation of control when two or more groups work
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together. Kappa (κ) = 0.57, 93% indicating moderate agreement with a strong degree of
association among the three terms and the responses to the question.
Theme 53 was developed from the respondent’s perception that requests for
intelligence products are most effectively handled through formal channels.
I know from the Patrol Division, at least, when they're looking for information or
they need to request from us, they do that IDSSR, which is the Interdepartmental
Support Service Request Form that we'll do--that they will send. They will come
to us. We take an action on it and then, you know, we send it back or whatever
our action is.
Source: 11028961
Well, the formal stuff, the CPIC stuff that comes over, the BlackBerry which is
what they give you every single shooting in real time. Interviewer: CPIC that
stands for... Respondent: I don't really know.
Source: 11062184
Respondents provide examples of their interpretation of formal methods for handling
requests regarding intelligence products. Both examples are specific either in response to
requests of the OCD from the Patrol Division or incident driven in response to an event
provided through the Crime Prevention Information Center (CPIC).
Theme 54 was developed from the respondent’s perception that the process for
requesting intelligence products is most effectively handled through informal channels.
We can give out 75 percent and sometimes it can help everybody working on it or
some people would think you can give out nothing just because you're not
supposed to.
Source: 11042566
It's informally we called it the round table and basically we go, we discuss the
current conflicts from each particular area. It's a short meeting and it's not--you
got either [00:28:08 Incomprehensible] or you did oversee it but then it's in put
where I bring, you know, I try to tell my people to bring something to the table to
share in a particular conflicts that are going on with the most particular areas and
then bring targets that won't compromise any of our investigations and share that
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information so we can get out. And the Mobile Strike Force, they put together for
their roll calls, they put together, you know, from this and from other information,
you know, for their troops, they put together a quick PowerPoint that will show
them the list of main targets and what's going on. Those are--I think we get the
best information and leaders got area meetings, there are maybe 21 meetings, you
know, the DOC, just to be perfectly honest, I think that's one least productive
meetings because as you sit you're trying to--I think it's a waste.
Source: 11058231
Often informal; sometimes just as informal as a phone call where my unit can, in
myself or a supervisor sergeant, can access it or possibly just give them the
information that they have right at their fingertips. Informal request or formal
requests are often slow and not, the dissemination through a formal chain of
information is not...usually as not as efficient. Often our informal network is
probably the most used.
Source: 11087163
Most of the processes are informal and they are developed through the
relationship of officers working because of the sensitivity of the information.
However, in the leadership level, or a level where one is responsible or held
responsible for the combating gang crime, there is no computerized network that I
can go to and pull up additional intelligence from either gang investigations,
narcotics, or even sometimes the 9th District Tactical Officers, unless I call over
there and verbally ask them, "What do you have on this?" And even that, you get
a verbal report you don't get any written reports.
Source: 11105904
For me, as far as gathering information, I find I like the informal. We have
((coughs)) excuse me, the monthly gang strategy meeting. Which is, you know, I
try to get people advanced notes on it. Sometimes, the better officers, sergeants,
or lieutenants are able to attend but, you know, we have our own lives and stuff
so, you know, I try to make like avail myself to or my gang detective or some of
our sergeants to their schedules you know, so let's plan on your schedule, I'll get a
cup of coffee and I'm here if you're nearing stuff up, so I can pick their brains if
you will. Now as far as getting information out there, I can do that on like you
know, Thursday night, Friday morning I'm sending up my weekly gang report.
Quarterly, I'm sending out to my newly revised, you know, gang books per each
areas. I send them electronically, you know, and if I found out that's not I don't
throw out stuff there to people.
Source: 11257484
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Although much of what is developed through a data management system related to
intelligence may be considered restricted, informal exchanges seem to be an effective
method to exchange information and the most current data in a timely fashion, according
to the respondents. Informal networks of communication are generally built on trust and
experience among those who share and this notion is reinforced throughout these
responses. It is unlikely that use of the ILP model would displace the importance of
informal networking but it could provide a common and reliable method to strengthen
informal exchanges as the same information would be available to authorized personnel
through a standardized system.
Theme 55 was developed from the respondent’s perception that the process for
requesting intelligence products is most effectively handled using both formal and
informal processes.
Mostly, the formal function of it would just come through the chain of command.
That does happen periodically. We'll get a request from, be it the Superintendent
or Deputy Superintendent or other divisions or units in a Police Department
asking for intelligence on a certain issue, about what we have on it, what's causing
rash of shootings, and there's some informal requests also. A Commander from a
district might call the Commander of gang investigations or might call the
Commander of gang enforcement and ask him for what they know about a certain
incident or what's going on in a certain area. So it's both.
Source: 11247602
They're both, they both have their own, you know. Informal is obviously based
on personal relationships where a specific District Commander who maybe a
friend of mine or have friends here to hand me some help here. We just try--we
can definitely kind of--obviously you can go through official department
channels. It knows problems will be addressed. However, sometimes, you could
do it in a more timely fashion.
Source: 11234773
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Formal, you have both processes. Formal is that--every report that's generated
is passed up to chain requesting this information or whatever from whatever unit.
The informal process act having some time on the job, you need to know different
people and you know people in certain units. You can call and said, “Hey, I need
this and can you send it to me? And that can work just as well.
Source: 11148753
The respondents infer both informal and formal networks are used to manage requests
for intelligence products but place the emphasis in their answers on informal exchanges.
Codes used in the above question include ‘Human Processes,’ ‘Information
Exchange,’ and ‘Data Management.’ Kappa (κ) = 0.66, 84% indicating substantial
agreement with a strong degree of association among the three terms and the responses to
the question.
Theme 56 was developed from the respondent’s perception as to whether formal or
informal networking is most effective in getting access to information or intelligence
products which may be necessary to accomplish their tasks.
I'd say informal. Yeah. I guess it would depend more or less in what you're
looking for. I mean, what you're trying to get. Formal, I mean, yeah, it gets done
but, you know, it's easier informally, I think.
Source: 11028961
Informal networks are more useful to me. Formal are nice. Formal I need it if you
don't formal--you got to remember not everybody (who) scores twenty points gets
ten rebounds per game. You know what I mean? Informal stuff we can pass on to
each other, you know what I mean. The formal stuff there is some people I get
three points a game from and I don't get a rebound. They need to know everyday
the formal process. And if I'm away for a few days or something, thank God
there is formal process because I'm picking up the report of what happened the
last three days. So you mostly certainly need a formal process and the better you
make that, the stronger everybody is but the informal is the one that's going to
take the guy from getting a B to an A.
Source: 11042566
To be honest, informal…
Source: 11058231
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Informal without a doubt…
Source: 11062184
Unfortunately, I have to say informal…
Source: 11087163
Yeah, I mean like I can make a phone call you know, and perhaps that's
something happen for me. I like informal.
Source: 11257484
Fifty-five (55) percent of the respondents state informal channels for communicating
information are most useful. In the previous question, several respondents eluded their
preference for informal methods of exchange on intelligence products because informal
channels were based on experience and trust in those with whom the exchanges occurred.
There is the inference no standardized, accepted method for the exchange of intelligence
products exists and a reliance on trusted associations through an informal network is
reasonable to expect.
Theme 57 was developed from the respondent’s perception that incident timing
determines which type of channel, formal or informal, is pursued.
I think informal networks are most useful when you need real-time information
immediately. I believe formal networks are more beneficial as if when you are
developing long-term goals or strategies to combat, like gang crime.
Source: 11105904
Well, it depends. You know, if I have a lot of time, I go formally and most cases
that I get involved and if somebody wants something from me, I've got to do it
informally.
Source: 11129230
I will have to say informal because you can get something right away without
having go through all the red tape. When you have to go through that formality it
could be a week to a couple of month.
Source: 11148753
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Well, probably both. I mean the formal function of it gets out to more people.
I mean if you use the formal, if you consider that we send our intelligence and
information to the DOC, which is a formal process, and then the DOC then sends
it out to the whole Department, then it's very useful. But the informal has its
place also. I mean for faster, quicker results a lot of times.
Source: 11247602
These responses stress the need for timeliness to requests for information or
intelligence products. In the dynamic police environment, timing in response to a request
for information or intelligence can be critical.
Codes used in the above question include ‘Human Processes,’ ‘Networking,’ and
‘Practice.’ Kappa (κ) = 0.52, 94% indicating moderate agreement with a strong degree of
association among the three terms and the responses to the question. Overall, responses to
this question fell into two themes and were nearly evenly split between. Questions in the
preceding section asked whether the respondent felt informal or formal channels of
communication were useful to them and the responses included either ‘informal’ or some
hybrid of formal and informal. None of the respondents replied formal channels were
important to their information exchanges. This infers the respondents have no universally
structured process for uniform formal information exchanges which the ILP model could
provide as an information management process.
Themes 58 through 60 were developed from the respondent’s perception that
organizational dependencies determine which tasks will be accomplished first.
Yeah, yeah, I think it does. Yeah, it would--what we do, obviously, is a little
different in OCD or at least in gangs is--is that, you know, we can direct our and
pick and choose our own investigations. However, directives come down all the
time that, you know, we need to adhere to this. We need to do this. We need to
do this and you're basically ordered to do that.
Source: 11028961
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I've got the flexibility but we're focus on getting violent targets that are
causing the crime and trying to prevent them for doing further crimes by
incarcerating them. And also, by getting information from the information we're
deriving, you know, if we stray from that, you know, if I see a team or
somebody's going out making ten bag dope arrest in the corners, you know, is it
for or are we doing it to get court time, for overtime or are we're doing it because
we're trying to listen that information because it is happening in that particular. I
think we've all got to realize our roles that, you know, the superintendent has
tasked us with each, you know, job.
Source: 11058231
As far as tactical decisions, I probably exercise almost all flexibility as in the
deployment of forces to stop crime. There are some organizational dependencies
within the department and when I say that, if I'm speaking of, we do coordinate
with the Mobile Strike Force and Tactical Response Unit and what areas we will
be in. However, we have different missions once we are in that area. You know,
mobile strike force does aerial and we continue to focus on the members of these
street gangs. I would say it's probably 50 percent reactive and then 50 percent
proactive. We deploy our forces almost daily and intelligence product, you know,
there is a gang, you know these guys were fighting the night we've put our cars in
that area as a proactive measure or if there is a string of shootings, we then go in
there as a reactive measure to stop any retaliatory shootings.
Source: 11105904
Well, I think that's a strategic planning of the Department focusing on gangs and
drugs. It really lays out our strategic plan, okay? And so the tactical decision
making is pushed down to Control Division level of the commanders and the Area
Deputy Chief [00:36:56 incomprehensible] and then we connect to what they
need. If they have a problem on a certain corner that's related to violence and
drugs, then we will then work with them to develop our plans, our tactical
operation with DOC. So we are in constant collaboration with the Patrol Division
in supporting what they need because they're ultimately facing these problems
without the resource they really need to have to build cases towards these gang
members.
Source: 11129230
Yeah, there is some--we're getting a lot of stuff, I mean in Area 2, you know.
And I don't know if it's just me, great. But we're responsible for the watch to
school dismissals everyday of the week Interviewer: School dismissals?
Respondent: Two of them. Interviewer: Okay. Respondent: I have to tie up
two teams Monday through Friday to watch that. They have to be part of an Area
2 initiative in the direction of [0:36:46 west Jackson] to make sure officers are
working in certain areas with [00:36:50 Incomprehensible] primarily, the north
end of the 4th District, 3rd District and the 6th District to generate activity there.
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I have to be part of the surgical strike force mission on Friday nights and
Saturday afternoons and Saturday nights where a designated team work in a
District from a certain time frame to be part of a patrol unit force that generates
activity in those certain areas. I have to designate guys to work in the burglary
mission recently. Four of my guys to work at burglary mission in the 4th District.
So I mean, I'm getting a lot of patrol that is dictating our course of action.
Source: 11257484
The above respondents clearly have tactical responsibilities for the tasks to which
they are assigned but these tasks are often provided to them by an outside authority and
‘incident driven’ without regard to any larger perspective. ILP focuses on prolific
offenders but can be tailored to focus on ‘incident causes’ with an intention to expand the
situational awareness of a particular problem in order to prevent, rather than merely react,
to conditions.
Theme 59 was developed from the respondent’s perception that OCD’s only
dependencies are focused on their mission to curb street level violent crime and murders.
Okay. Well here. Let's be realistic here, this is the real answer. Real answer is,
what is the city of Chicago trying to cut down on? Burglaries? Stolen cars?
Narcotics? Violent crime! Homicides and shooting, and if you want to be more
succinct, homicides, so I know that. I've been told that, I know what I need to do
with my people. If I get homicides down, that is going to be the answer. So, what
is sent by our leader is to get homicides down and do everything we can to do
that. That's what we'll do. If they change it, then we'll change how we do it. But
give me what you want done, what do you want done? You want homicides
down. Good. Thank you. We're going to step back and we'll make that happen.
Source: 11042566
At the tactical level, we have almost, not that autonomy, but to an extent, we
determine on how we do our job. They tell us, very often time, where to go or
who to target. But how we do that, unless someone wanted to put their name on
affidavit and search warrant, you know, that's not going to happen. I mean,
having had the [00:29:05 incomprehensible] come and say, "Yeah, I'll serve the
warrant." You know, if he let us to say, you know--they'll based on the--they're-they want all the time is they don't want to tell me how to build the car. As far as,
yeah, because it's undercover work and people, especially outside the Organized
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Crime Division, they're not quite sure how that works and what the legalities
and the process, the tactical decisions had to be made, they pretty much leave that
up to us.
Source: 11234773
These respondents infer that despite the rhetoric or authority driving their
assignments, they have a solid grasp on what can or should be done, they represent the
content experts upon whom others rely to get the job done, and their core competencies
and skill sets afford them the best opportunity to complete what is required. The notion of
ILP, in addition to other available resources, would complement this type of responses
provided above by including an analysis of the reasons why certain activities take place
so strategies to prevent those activities might be implemented as a preventative measure.
Theme 60 was developed from the respondent’s perception that the OCD has general
autonomy in deciding their own tasks.
No. I think we're different since because we're self-generating--you come up
with your own work product and as long as you're producing, that's what your
bosses want to see. I mean I call the shots on my team but it's because I have
good bosses, too, and they're happy with the work we do
Source: 11062184
Who calls all the shots, that's actually the Commander but he is trusting enough
that--if I make a decision and say, “We're going to go this way,” it's going to be a
major issue because he knows the fact that I made the decision, but most of the it I
keep him informed, let him know this is what we got, this is what I'm having them
do and it will go from there.
Source: 11148753
Well, its, at my position now, I have a pretty lot of flexibility 'cause I would be a
little bit higher up on, you know, the higher up you go, you sure can make more
decisions, and the lower you go sometimes you've got to get your decisions
approved. I mean operationally, I would say, you know, the Chief sometimes has
some say, directs us for certain things.
Source: 11247602
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Our deputy superintendent does call the shots but in organized crime, because
of the long term investigations and often the quick--the quick violence acts that
we might have to act on based on intelligence or information confidential
informants our midlevel--midlevel supervisors can make the call. Often, the
lieutenant will make the call and it will be reported to later. We're probably the
most flexible in the department probably--probably nowhere in the Department is
any body is flexible as an organized crime.
Source: 11087163
Each of the above answers demonstrate the respondent’s conviction that their
decisions and actions are in line with what their supervisors expect and they, in turn, rely
heavily on the support of their subordinates on who they place a high degree of trust.
Despite the described autonomy of these supervisors in handling the tactical aspects of
their assignment, there is the inference their overall missions are directed to them by a
higher authority. The higher authority decision makers would benefit from the ILP model
which focuses on prolific offenders whose contribution to street level crime often
provides the force driving behind a number of tasks in which members of the OCD are
involved. ILP assists greatly in providing answers to ‘why’ certain criminal activities
occur.
Codes used in the above question include ‘Data Management,’ ‘Human Processes,’
and ‘Decisions.’ Kappa (κ) = 0.72, 90% indicating substantial agreement with a strong
degree of association among the three terms and the responses to the question
Theme 61 was developed from the respondent’s perception as to who is responsible
for ensuring intelligence work is being accomplished.
Good question; probably my administrative sergeants, for here in the office, my
administrative sergeant. Out in the areas would be the lieutenants would be
ultimately responsible to make sure it's put on that way and then their sergeants
would make sure what the lieutenants wanted done which is what I like done get
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done. Just say the chain of command.
Source: 11042566
The lieutenants and sergeants are mainly the frontline supervisors. I mean,
they're--you don't have to oversee, look over the shoulder because they know
what's expected and they do a great job and have the knowledge of what was
going on a particular area and they're focused on what they have to do.
Source: 11058231
I would have to (say), for me in our level; I would go to the Commander of each
of the sections.
Source: 11129230
The supervisors and probably most of the commanders of each unit; you know,
and that heads down to their lieutenants, usually the lieutenants and their
commanders.
Source: 11247602
The above responses infer no consistent chain or procedure for maintaining an
intelligence process throughout the OCD. Members of different ranks who participated in
this study often rely on subordinates to monitor intelligence processes as they relate to
specific cases. This also indicates no formal method for developing or monitoring
intelligence tasks is recognized by those interviewed.
Theme 62 was developed from the respondent’s perception that there are internal
checks and balances in place to ensure that intelligence tasks are being done.
I think everybody got to be responsible. If you're not responsible for doing your
work especially in a unit like this then you shouldn't be here.
Source: 11062184
Because the--when I go to access a particular area or a gang that a particular unit-or a particular team might be responsible for the most recent intelligence and if
that intelligence isn't lacking or there are no reports filed, then I would know that
the supervisor in that particular area is lacking and make sure…
Source: 11087163
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Unfortunately, the person responsible would be the first line supervisor and
then it would go all the way up to the lieutenant and ultimately to the commander
and up through to the Department. However, since the Department has not
formalized any program or standardized any reports on intelligence or make many
strict definitions on what they will accept or what they won't accept, or even
decide the difference between information, it normally falls on the individual
officer who's out there doing the interviews. He takes it as far as he wants or he
ends it immediately.
Source: 11105904
I think we all are, from each Officer in a unit, making sure that something is being
done, all up to the commander. I think everybody is part of the unit, is part of
that.
Source: 11148753
I guess, me from here, you know. I kind of like try to pull it off together the best I
can, you know. And like I said, I couldn't do without some of my sergeants-something they're the ones that do the yeoman's work, at least get the guys out
there and engaged, keeping them focused. You know, and the, they've been very
helpful.
Source: 11257484
Yeah, one guy handles here that helps out with the entire division, but primarily
for of gangs and narcotics. And they also have an analyst to , you know. And
(one guy) is, actually he's working with the violence side of it and the gang--the
gang hierarchies. However, often times they hold information because their
source around here is always narcotics, even the ones that are, the murders out
there, the high level gang leaders that they also dope.
Source: 11234773
The above responses infer a system based on self reporting in that one or more
individuals, including some of the supervisors interviewed, provides information related
to intelligence which may be pooled for consensus before it is vetted and considered
useful. This type of process may be used as needed but would be centered on specific
cases and teams and the products developed would be restricted for their exclusive use.
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Codes used in this question include ‘Task,’ ‘Oversight,’ and ‘Practice.’ Kappa (κ) =
0.64, 97% indicating substantial agreement with a strong degree of association among the
three terms and the responses to the question.
Theme 63 was developed from the respondent’s input as to whether they had
suggestions to improve on current intelligence practices within the OCD.
One of the things that always seems to happen, at least for us, is there's always the
last-minute report that needs to be done, that needs to be done yesterday. I don't
know if there's any type of scheduling that they can put together by dates where
you'd be able to meet those reports, but it just seems to me that a lot of the reports
that you have to complete are always a reaction to something that either happened
out on the street or a question that was post to maybe the higher-ranking officer
that couldn't be answered because he didn't have all the information. Now it
levels, it comes down to your level and you have to put all that together.
Source: 11028961
Well, I think perhaps maybe some sort of database, you know, cataloguing a lot of
stuff, you know, where we can--where things could be permanently stored, you
know, by district, whether be our--like maybe done on a daily basis, whatever
GES report was done in that district for that day could be stored there and then
maybe somehow cross-referenced to like location within that district. I think that
would be helpful.
Source: 11257484
The biggest issue and the biggest item I think that would be a boon to this
organization in this division as well as probably other departments to get the gang
intelligence database up and running and functional.
Source: 11247602
Each of the above respondents interprets a need for a central repository which may be
kept current and accurate and from which information is readily available. These
responses infer that such a system does not currently exist.
Theme 64 was developed from the respondent’s perception that more analysis should
be integrated with regular tasks on a more regular basis to be better informed.
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Yeah and to do it better…Yeah, and scout ourselves and do better because the
more you throw out the guys, “Okay, let's do this mission. Let's do this mission
because it's going to prevent this crime. Well, let's analyze as a team, as the
managers, what's working and let's do it better as, you know, what could we do to
do it better.
Source: 11058231
Theme 66 was developed from the respondent’s perception that more training and the
use of more or better technology should be encouraged for use in OCD work.
We can always use additional resources, technological and otherwise. We're
always running around for, you know, we can't even get any YouTube or
MySpace when you're talking about murder. Yeah, we could always use--what's
the Coplink® you're talking about, we don't have that. Right, and we use
Reference USA®, yeah. We can use that again and a more accessible LEADS
2000 would be nice and we have two guys that are qualified because it's such a
pain the ass.
Source: 11062184
That's definitely additional training, resources, and technology all three would be
a benefit. The technology is lacking with the retrieving the information and that's
probably biggest glitch and our resource--our current resources are sometimes our
informational services has provided us with are outdated and not easy to use on a
level for the police officers. We're definitely lacking the analytical end.
Source: 11087163
There's a lot of suggestions and recommendations. One of this refers to training
of individual officers. They'll do what you ask them to do but however, they need
to be trained on historical debriefings with gang members as opposed to just
what's happening now and then and documenting that. The paradox to that
though is that once it's documented, it usually goes into a file and showed among
those team members unless it's something that warrants bringing facts to the
Deployment Operations Center. The practices, there needs to be a database where
the information is standardized to go into, and when I say standardized, specific
fields that need to be addressed because garbage in is garbage out.
Source: 11105904
Yeah, I, you know, when I look at, I think there's got to be more strategic
planning for intelligence, in general, for the whole division. I mean more of the
plans, strategic plans and it starts with where do we, what are we, what's our goals
as a Division and how does each section play a part and what are the
commonalities in terms of developing technology. So, I think developing a
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formal organizational function of intelligence team or unit that are build behind
having the technology and the training as analyst, I think that's really critical that
the Organized Crime Division can share all these information through all the three
sections internally. And if necessary, share it externally when needed, you know?
But I think it's got to be done strategically and it's got to be done with some
planning because in order for that to happen, we have to, you know, remember
that we need to develop, you know, policy, look at it legally and look at some of
the legal issues and some of the technology that has to be developed and has to be
funded to be developed, too.
Source: 11129230
Training is always a benefit, as much training as we could possible get that's
possible to send somebody to. I think it should always be there. And it's going to
move to next question, we have deal our technological capabilities as we go along
also. I think we are somewhat--we're fortunate enough to have our own computer
support here in this unit, that sometimes we don't have to depend on Information
Services because they are slow in responding to certain things, but I think we are
also--misfortune that we are still limited in our technology capabilities by the
location on which we are. The capabilities of the equipment that they placed here,
there is still a limitation on some of what the equipment can do. And part of that
comes with my--there are aspects that the financial need can be meet but the
overall financial need is one that have to come from a bigger source.
Source: 11148753
Training resources and (making) technology available in the field rather than
(just) in the office; that to me is--is key.
Source: 11234773
The above respondents emphasize the need for training on existing or new
technologies which could help them with their tasks. Many of the respondents also
emphasize the need for structured means of information collection, maintenance, and
access which would make their duties more efficient. There is an inference in some of the
responses that OCD would rather be less dependent on outside units which provide or
direct their information and intelligence processes.
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Codes used in this question include ‘Improvement,’ ‘Concept Use,’ and ‘Tasks.’
Kappa (κ) = 1.00, 100% indicating perfect agreement with an extremely high degree of
association among the three terms and the responses to the question. The exceptionally
high degree of agreement and association may be related to the fact that each of the
respondents has ideas on how tasks can be managed more efficiently and each is more
than willing to discuss their ideas. This researcher sees valid and important information in
the respondent’s suggestions to question 13i and will infer this may the first time these
respondent’s have been asked for this type of input.
Theme 67 was developed from the respondent’s perception as to whether they knew
of any Department plans to improve the management of intelligence processes within the
OCD.
No, I'm not aware of anything.
Source: 11028961
I'm not.
Source: 11062184
No…
Source: 11105904
The responses to the above question were brief and self explanatory.
Theme 68 was developed from the respondent’s perception as to whether requests to
improve the management of intelligence processes have met with any success.
Well, (the Commander) wants our computer people to put together a program that
would put all of organize crime on the same page and what we've done, what we
are getting done and to keep track of what we've done and what we're going to get
done. They want it all and all of organized crime; every unit that is in organized
crime (should be able) to be able to do it.
Source: 11042566
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We are constantly requesting new and improved tools as just as where Accurint®
is one of our basic tools that we need to improve tools because they're lacking.
Sometimes the information is old, faulty.
Source: 11087163
I know one thing we've worked on recently in the Department, as a whole, we're
working on is trying to get a, is getting the Clear system available to the
Blackberries. There are a lot of supervisors and people on the street have in both
the Organized Crime Divisions as well as the Patrol Divisions so you could
actually maximize the ability to run names and get information on the street. We
have a lot of trouble with PDTs (Personal Data Terminals) over the years.
Source: 11247602
Personal Data Terminals (PDTs) are in-car computers which, more accurately, serve
as modems and should eventually be replaced with actual in car wireless computers. The
value of data received via any mobile device is useful for preliminary field inquiries and
may serve as information that can contribute to intelligence based system. Two of the
respondents infer existing or promised tools which contribute to data management and
criminal intelligence are lacking or promised as forthcoming. There is the inference that a
standardized model for data collection, analysis, retention, and access is lacking and
despite requests for assistance in such matters from other units within the Department,
positive responses are either slow or non existent.
Theme 69 was developed from the respondent’s perception that they often try and
develop the products we need for intelligence work by ourselves; sometimes based on
what we hear is available or know is used by others.
There's a computer technology that's out there, as a matter of fact, we have
officers that are working to build it and get it set up that it be able to utilize by the
whole unit. Filemaker®, it's storing... It's for storage, for review and for
transmitting. Office information will be able to be placed on it and within this
system that there will be able to view a little more easily than what it is now.
Source: 11148753
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I mean--I rather base our request for, you know, updated technology, training,
they're building an investigator to be able to handle the entire investigation
himself rather than having one too much outside resources. So, I mean, training's
first, specifically, the technology, definitely. I mean, the Deputy is a very strong
advocate for us as far as getting training equipments the best we can. We
probably have the best within the department we had probably, the best since we
pay for ourselves.
Source: 11234773
Well, we were developing some databases for gang intelligence and collecting
information from gang members. We felt that that model can then apply to
narcotics as well as the vice control section and can be, you know, general
intelligence report and not only gangs, but narcotics and also organized crime
activities such as gambling, prostitution, and stuff like that. So, we were in the
process of developing that.
Source: 11129230
Two of these respondents infer the development or current or existing technologies
may assist them in their tasks. Filemaker® is an inexpensive simplified database product,
developed by Apple™ which manages fundamental data management without requiring
the user to be familiar with any programming languages. It is likely the Department
would benefit from a database system that is more robust although such systems might
require specific training. Properly trained analysts employed with ILP know the best tools
to use and how to best deploy them so they benefit the organization and not just a few
users.
Codes used in this question include ‘Data Management,’ ‘Improvement,’ and ‘ILP.’
Kappa (κ) = 0.95, 99% indicating near perfect agreement with a strong degree of
association among the three terms and the responses to the question. The question posed
by13j involved knowledge of any proposed plans to benefit the management of
intelligence products within the OCD. While several ‘experiments’ are mentioned, no
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single standardized method has been embraced by the OCD; alternative solutions will
continue to be investigated.
Theme 70 was developed from the respondent’s perception as to whether the critical
factors of ILP could contribute to the effectiveness of the OCD beyond the degree of
effectiveness currently achieved from existing practices.
We already employ intelligence work in what we do but if ILP provides a
better method, it is probably something we could consider. Like I said earlier, and
we are doing an intelligence-led policing but I have learn one thing on this job
you can always do it better if there's a better outline or better way to do it. I most
certainly know that everyday you can do things better. I believe that we will
continually get better doing intelligence-led policing whether be in the analysis
way or ways of gathering information.
Source: 11042566
Yeah, generally, I would say that if we had more intelligence-led policing,
meaning we have more analytical discussions then we have more people that were
looking at things analytically for us, would it be more effective to our section?
Yeah, I definitely think it would be. Sometimes, you know, that type of direction
is a shortcut to, you know, sitting people down for a week trying to come up with
an address or a location or whatever. If you had somebody that have those--that
information, those skills that can look for those types of things and somebody you
can connect with, I think yeah, it would definitely--it would definitely be more
effective.
Source: 11028961
Yeah, there's always a room for improvement.
Source: 11058231
Yeah, I guess it would help but I think it would help more just to explain and
define what it is the coppers that are going to work for me. Just that they're doing
it all right. These guys are already doing it. They're already intelligence-based
police work which I kind of said before. That's just good police work. Sure, it
would be fine to say, “All right, well, take this column and this column and see
how they match.” But like I said, you got to use common sense and he gotta take
that gut instinct. You can't completely take away when the hair stand in the back
of your neck when you pull over a car. There's something there. Maybe you
don't even know what it is yet but--and probably it's intelligence based, you just
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don't know what it is. Its certain gut feeling you can't get rid off. You just can't
be analytical.
Source: 11062184
The intelligence-based policing would definitely, we use it to a great deal, but by
bringing into the department it would-further what we do because our information
from the entire Department, intelligence would be more effective if we had a
system in place.
Source: 11087163
Absolutely; I think that, through the interview here today, we say that we're
utilizing some of that already and I think that, you know, I think better
cataloguing of some of these information and then, like you would tell earlier the
querying would be easy, the ability to query on things would be helpful, but there,
too, I think, a lot of that can go down, like the district law enforcement level, too.
And let's give them a part of this whole thing 'cause they're the, you know, boots
on the ground type of guys.
Source: 11257484
Well, because, I mean, narcotics section is always been an investigative unit and
the core, the core of our success is based on informants, which is to--and that to
me is intelligence-led. We are led by our informants in my investigations and by
[00:32:32 undercover] operations where we infiltrate specific groups. You know,
and that starts at the street level. It starts with the, you know, every single officer
here has the ability to just to go on an undercover vehicle to go out there for five
months and initiate the investigation. Since narcotics is unique since that we--that
we create our own investigations. We’re not like handed investigation; we create
our own and that to me is the core of intelligence-led policing.
Source: 11234773
In summary, these responses continue to emphasize the notion that the Department as
a whole and OCD in particular, employ Intelligence-led Policing. This is based on the
fact that much of what is accomplished by the OCD involves information management
that is focused on tactical resolutions involving specific cases; the process is sometime
referred to as doing good police work. Several respondents note that anything that could
improve on their ability to use analysis and manage information in a better fashion would
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be helpful. There is an inference the majority o these respondents see ILP as a model
intended to replace existing information practices in the OCD rather than as a tool
intended to enhance current practices.
Theme 71 was developed from the respondent’s perception that the tenets of
Intelligence-led Policing could contribute to the OCD’s efficiency beyond what is
currently accomplished using existing practices.
Yeah. I think that it would be, number one, you know, it increase the tactical
levels of our department in the execution of a strategic plan if they have that
information. It's leveraging your resources a lot more efficiently if you have, if
you say, “Okay, you know, we got four people working where are you going to
put them at?” We put them in the area where more likely all the crime is
happening and you give them the intelligence of what type of vehicles are
involved or people involved. You know, so you're leveraging all that for tactical
use. And then on the strategic level, I think, you know, it helps with strategic
planning.
Source: 11129230
Yes. I believe the concept of intelligence-led policing would greatly enhance the
efforts of the Organized Crime Division and make it more effective based upon,
you know the cliché, "Knowledge is power."
Source: 11105904
Anything that will improve--that wants to help along is going to put the role
effectively. There's nothing I can say. One thing, in particular, I can say that
would do it but I think as we go along as it was develop and this is one with
strategy. It would improve overall effectiveness as we go along as everybody
tends to use to it. If this is the basic strategy although, like I said, we essentially
already do it but now we are going to formalize it, there might be some little, I
don't call it missteps but it will be a process that we have to go though in order to
make sure we fall within that formalized strategy.
Source: 11148753
Yeah. I believe that if the concepts are good and I think that we do use them for
the most part of like anything. We could always get better at it. Yeah, it's the
concept is a solid concept in my opinion. Anytime that you (can be) forearmed,
so to speak. Anytime you have as much knowledge as you can about a particular
decision you have to make, you're bound to make a better decision.
Source: 11247602
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The above respondents infer the use ILP could improve the management of
information and intelligence processes for the OCD. Whereas the previous respondents to
this question emphasized intelligence in policing is already a practice, the above
respondents have a clearer understanding that ILP model represents a process intended to
enhance and otherwise build on what has already been developed.
Codes used in the previous question include ‘Value,’ ‘Preference,’ and ‘Concept
Use.’ Kappa (κ) = 0.71, 91% indicating substantial agreement with a strong degree of
association among the three terms and the responses to the question. Respondents to this
question see the value in the ILP concept through having a more manageable information
and intelligence system although many confuse their overall perception of what
constitutes intelligence with the distinctions provided in the ILP model.
Theme 72 was developed from the respondent’s perception that if ILP were
introduced to the OCD and did not take from available resources, whether the critical
factors of the model would be beneficial to the unit.
Yeah, I'd like to have an analysis, like I said it's just every team. Just to do the,
not just the PowerPoint but more like, yeah, all the intelligence stuff like--I mean
every time we need the backgrounds on these guys and stuff like that, I would
want to have that, just to keep the rest of the guys on the street because if I can
spend--the least time I can spend behind a computer, the better. And my
detectives, I'd rather have them on the streets working than filling out an IBDR
but I understand that we have to that but it would be nice.
Source: 11062184
You want to participate on anything that's going to improve effectiveness.
Sometimes even though it would be a drain you have to look at what's is going to
be the advantages for the future and if this is going to be an advantage for us as
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we go along into the future, most definitely we want to participate.
Source: 11148753
That would be great. I mean, I would love to have a couple of analysts. One girl
I had was really good. She hurt herself but she'll be coming back next year. But,
yeah that would be outstanding. I mean, I'd participate as long as it's, like you
said, it doesn't--it's not going to drain on available resources or my time or
anything like that.
Source: 11257484
I'm not really sure what the question means exactly, but I would be happy to lend
my participation in an initiative and try it and see if we can make it work and
make the Department work better divisionally.
Source: 11247602
Responses to this question were universally supportive of accepting and using the ILP
model provided it did not tax their existing resources. Most responses were simply
‘Absolutely’ or ‘Yes’ and the above responses are slightly more elaborate. Supervisors
like the idea of having trained analysts available to do work which would otherwise place
a drain on existing personnel. Most respondents perceive the application of the ILP model
as something that would complement or add to their unit’s effectiveness.
Codes used in the previous question include ‘Preference,’ ‘Value,’ and ‘Data
Management.’ Kappa (κ) = 0.82, 96% indicating near perfect agreement with a strong
degree of association among the three terms and the responses to the question.
Respondents were strongly in agreement that given the opportunity to participate in the
use of the ILP model, they would take advantage of the opportunity.
Each of the themes identified in this section could provide the basis for additional
research on police practices. It is clear that many of the responses which contributed to
these themes reflected on a variety of interpretations as to how intelligence processes are

160
managed within the OCD. This variety indicates there is little consensus with regard to
methods used to manage intelligence while on the other hand there is sufficient consensus
to indicate alternatives to assist the current intelligence practices.
The following chapter will address research findings and conclusion. Initially, the
three research questions will be answered within the context of the case study. Other
topics will include the refutability and generalizability of involved in this research, issues
of perception, language, and meaning as they apply to this research, unanticipated
findings, and implications for future research on the topic of Intelligence-led Policing.

CHAPTER FIVE
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

This chapter presents an overview of the significant findings from this study. The
initial section addresses the primary research questions of how the critical factors of
intelligence-led policing contribute to police efficiency in addition to that accounted for
existing practices and whether the critical factors of Intelligence-led policing can
contribute to organizational goals of the Chicago Police Department in addition to that
accounted for by existing practices. Additionally, other topics which resulted from this
research provide a basis for future research and will be discussed.
This research has provided a strong foundation for answering the questions posed in
Chapter One:
1. How can the critical factors of intelligence-led policing contribute to police
efficiency in addition to that accounted for by current practices in the Organized
Crime Division of the Chicago Police Department?
2. How can the critical factors of intelligence-led policing contribute to the
attainment of organizational goals of the Chicago Police Department beyond
that accounted for by current practices of the Department?
3. How does intelligence-led policing present a separate construct from existing
police practices used by the Organized Crime Division?
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The benefit from this research is intended to add insight to the generalizability of the
Intelligence-led Policing strategy for scholars, practitioners, and decision makers
interested in the use of intelligence in police work.
Findings
Limitations
The lack of detailed understanding of the relationships between intelligence and
decision behavior remains an obstacle to a more refined impact analysis. Because some
statistical methods may be applied to examine the issue of validity in coding schemes, a
second limitation, predicated by available data, may be the anticipated problem of multico linearity among responses. This is expected as respondents work in a quasi-military
organizational environment in which shared meanings are common. Further,
characteristics associated with decision making behavior do not operate independently
and are more likely to be found together. The generalizability derived from this research
may be used for topics of future reference, some of which will be discussed in this
Chapter. Question numbers in the following section refer to the question protocol in
Appendix A.
Research Question 1
Responses in interview from this research infer there is the perception among the
supervisors interviewed that the practices outlined in the tenets of Intelligence- led
policing would benefit the members of the Organized Crime Division in terms of
efficiency. Efficiency, for the purpose of this research, means the facility with which a
task is conducted and completed without wasting time, effort, or resources.
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I would say that if we had more intelligence-led policing, meaning we have
more analytical discussions then we have more people that were looking at
things analytically for us, would it be more effective to our section? Yeah,
I definitely think it would be. Sometimes, you know, that type of direction
is a shortcut to, you know, sitting people down for a week trying to come
up with an address or a location or whatever. If you had somebody that
have those--that information, those skills that can look for those types of
things and somebody you can connect with, I think yeah, it would
definitely--it would definitely be more effective.
Source: 11028961
Responses to whether the critical factors of Intelligence-led policing could contribute
to efficiency in the Organized Crime Division are positively supported throughout this
research (overall responses to: 12a κ =0.52, 95%, 12d κ =0.64, 88%, 13j κ=0.95, 99%,
14 κ= 0.71, 91 %). A number of respondents indicated their impression that Intelligenceled policing was already being practiced within the OCD; the consequences of this
impression will be discussed in more depth later in this Chapter. None of the respondents
dismissed the concept of ILP as unimportant to their work.
Yeah, I believe that it could be useful. You know, obviously, the people that
do the work still got to go out there and, you know, do the old-fashioned
police work and do what needs to be done for investigation-wise. But being
able to pinpoint direct and to focus on major offenders and to give a little
more direction for the activities and associations by--come out with that
information is--it could be quite a bit of a shortcut to you having to do that
information and research yourself. (Question 12a)
Source: 11028961
Intelligence-led policing is defined as strategy for decision makers whereby
intelligence is developed through analysis in order to focus resources on prolific
offenders with an intention to prevent crime from occurring. The critical factors included
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in the definition that was provided to the respondents reflect that Intelligence-led policing
involves the use of analytical resources for the purpose of maintaining criminal
intelligence files on specific targets in order to develop associations and links to criminal
networks and activities. This process requires (1) the management of centralized archives
to the extent that varieties of informational records can be archived, reviewed and
analyzed, (2) trained analysts to develop intelligence, and (3) a method for regularly
disseminating intelligence for decision makers. Several respondents inferred, as in the
example below, that existing OCD processes would be more efficient if they were
automated.
I think better cataloguing of some of this information and then, like you
would tell earlier the querying would be easy, the ability to query on things
would be helpful, but there, too, I think, a lot of that can go down, like the
district law enforcement level, too. And let's give them a part of this whole
thing 'cause they're the, you know, (boots) on the ground type of guys.
(Question 14)
Source: 11257484
There is the inference that parts of the Intelligence-led policing model are in use
by some supervisors within the OCD.
Yes, and actually, I think that the department, as I said earlier, does do some
of this already... We also have, in a federal level, with mostly the Organized
Crime Division, a main 21 list. Main 21 are the main 21 worst people in the
city; gang bangers, drug dealers, it's usually based along either a highmanagerial position in a gang or narcotics organization or if not of a highmanagerial position, an extremely vital character. Okay, we also have a
system called the Trap System which is Targeted Repeat Offender
Apprehension and Prosecution System…that's basically a joint venture
with the state's attorney’s office where our top 11 districts for public violence
submit names of their 10 worst subjects, much along like the lines of the top
10 or top 21. And what that does is when no subjects' are arrested, they notify
states attorney and the state's attorney is assigned to that case and stays with it.
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And that a state's attorney is assigned to that area to make sure that that
subject doesn't slip through the cracks on a minor offense. He gets taken; he's
prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law. But in short though, yes, I mean I
believe the concept is useful to any Police Department…in this day in age and
with limited resources, you cannot randomly just do random preventive
patrols and hope to come across something to prevent crime. You have to
have at least a good portion of your police department directed at known
targets and known conflicts. (Question 12a)
Source: 11247602
In the above response there is the inference that data collection is accomplished on
specific criminals for investigative purposes. Tracking the activities of high profile career
criminals who are actively engaged in current criminal activities is one aspect of
Intelligence-led policing and is useful in developing information for analysis. Dilemmas
may easily arise in the arrangement described by this response and center on who ‘owns’
the information that is to be developed. Both the federal ’21 list’ and the State’s Attorney
‘top 10’ lists are developed by agencies other than the Department’s OCD.
The individuals provided on the respective lists are included based on other agency
analysis without benefit of the criminal intelligence files that would be useful to the
OCD. Additionally, the OCD often develops information on the individuals which is
forwarded to outside agencies but there is no formal feedback mechanism to indicate
whether or how such information is used. For example, members of the OCD may
develop and provide information that an individual on one of the lists has fled out of the
country. When updated list appear from other agencies and the same individuals appear,
there will be some question as to how information provided was managed or whether it
was considered important. For specific internal use, beyond what is shared, intelligence
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developed through the processes of Intelligence-led policing within the OCD would
benefit that unit’s efficiency.
Yes…to some extent we try to do that now through information sharing but
the--a more formalized structure would be absolutely a benefit. (Question
12c)
Source: 11087163
As a supplement to existing practices, the use of the critical factors of Intelligence-led
policing can contribute to police efficiency in addition to that accounted for by current
practices in the Organized Crime Division (12c κ =0.57, 88% ).
Research Question 2
The organizational goals of the Chicago Police Department are summarized in the
Department Mission Statement which reads:
The Chicago Police Department, as part of, and empowered by, the
community, is committed to protect the lives, property, and rights of all
people, to maintain order, and to enforce the law impartially. We will provide
quality police service in partnership with other members of the community.
To fulfill our mission, we will strive to attain the highest degree of ethical
behavior and professional conduct at all times.
The Mission Statement of the Chicago Police Department provides an overview of
the core values which govern how the organization expects to operate. Intelligence-led
policing can compliment these values by providing a guide that enhances the quality of
police services offered to the community through raising the level of professionalism
within the Department. Professionalism in this context refers to the skills and
competencies expected of Department members engaged in the duties for which they are
trained. The tenets of Intelligence-led policing require participants to be proficient with
data management tools which will require officers to become involved in continuing
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professional development, a process that affords officers the opportunity for learning
techniques and new skill sets beyond those learned through regular police training.
Well, I see a continuous room for great improvement. Again, you know,
strategic direction of department is based on planning, in budget, and where do
you want your money to be put at in terms of its function and tactical
operations. So, to reduce violence, we were more committed to making
arrests, not gathering intelligence. I think there's got to be a major shift in
moving towards investing in people that can analyze, investing in technology
that can make the collection of information a lot more easier and a lot easier to
collect from everyone instead of just a few people. You can collect it from--if
you got one squad working on gangs you might get some reports. But if you
get a hundred people out in the same area working, you have the chances of
collecting a hundred pieces of information but you have the right technology in
place. (Question 11)
Source: 11129230
The notion of professional development is a concept that, in practice, would provide
officers the means for training that may be required to advance the critical factors of
Intelligence-led policing. Training that facilitates the use of the critical factors of
Intelligence-led policing could be provided in much the same way that professional
development courses are offered to teachers who are interested in strengthening their
skills beyond any level of previous training or education.
Training is always a benefit, as much training as we could possible get that's
possible to send somebody to. I think it should always be there. And it's
going to move to next question, we have deal our technological capabilities as
we go along also. I think we are somewhat--we're fortunate enough to have
our own computer support here in this unit, that sometimes we don't have to
depend on Information Services because they are slow in responding to
certain things, but I think we are also--misfortune that we are still limited in
our technology capabilities by the location on which we are. (Question 13j)
Source: 11148753
I believe that if the concepts are good and I think that we do use them for the
most part of like anything. We could always get better at it. Yeah, it's the
concept is a solid concept in my opinion. Anytime that you you’re (
forearmed), so to speak… anytime you have as much knowledge as you can
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about a particular decision you have to make, you're bound to make a better
decision.(Question 14)
Source: 11247602
A common component of the Chicago Police Mission Statement, and the critical
factors of Intelligence-led Policing, involves the notion of ‘maintaining order.’ As a
concept, ‘order maintenance’ in society defines the purpose of having a police
department; as a practice there is a distinction between the ‘order maintenance’
mentioned in the Chicago Police Mission Statement and the critical factors of
Intelligence-led policing. The Chicago Statement makes no reference to crime prevention
while the principle intention of Intelligence-led policing entails crime prevention as its
goal.
Respondents throughout this study infer there is a need to train personnel in the
techniques which contribute to the critical factors of Intelligence-led policing. This is a
positive indication that tenets of Intelligence-led Policing would contribute to the
attainment of the organizational goals of the Chicago Police Department beyond that
accounted for by current practices of the Department.
Yeah, generally, I would say that if we had more intelligence-led policing,
meaning we have more analytical discussions then we have more people
that were looking at things analytically for us, would it be more effective
to our section? Yeah, I definitely think it would be. Sometimes, you
know, that type of direction is a shortcut to, you know, sitting people
down for a week trying to come up with an address or a location or
whatever. If you had somebody that have those--that information, those
skills that can look for those types of things and somebody you can
connect with, I think yeah, it would definitely--it would definitely be more
effective. (Question 14)
Source: 11028961
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Research Question 3
The construct of current police practices within the OCD is grounded in investigative
procedures which require a crime to have been committed before it can be investigated.
Initial crime reporting begins with the preliminary report, done by a patrol officer; a
beat cop. Depending on the severity or the time of commission of the crime, if an arrest is
not immediately affected, the report is forwarded to the Bureau of Investigative Services
(BIS) for assignment to a detective. The detective does some rudimentary research to
become familiar with the victim(s) and crime circumstances and possibly to ascertain
whether the crime being reported is part of a trend related to similar instances. Based on
the collection of evidence and witness or victim interviews, the detective may develop
enough information to start building a case against an offender. If the information is
insufficient, the case may be suspended, i.e., not pursued pending new leads, but the case
is not ‘cleared.’ Cleared cases are those in which an arrest is made or otherwise closed for
exceptional circumstances such as the victim’s decision not to pursue the case. In any
case, if the circumstances of the crime involve narcotics, street violence involving guns,
or homicide, the case information will also be provided to the Organized Crime Division.
Because the Organized Crime Division works exclusively with incidents of street level
violence and narcotics, which are often related, the unit has a broader perspective on
citywide crime and can focus additional resources on an investigation. The overall effect
of their activity can and does impact a criminal type of activity (drugs, weapons sales,
homicide) but the focus of the OCD endeavor is to resolve the issue at hand through
arrest and move on to the next case. It should be noted that the current OCD teams are
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very successful at what they do and currently lead all other city police units in arrests for
the cases in which they are involved.
In contrast, Intelligence-led policing involves a focus on known prolific offenders,
sometimes referred to as career criminals, who have demonstrated, based on past actions,
their intention to perpetuate criminal activity. Although entire organizations, e.g. New
Jersey State Police, have adopted the Intelligence-led policing model as a standard of
practice, the model is intended to supplement, not replace, existing police practices. This
is an important distinction when compared among other policing programs and supports
that fact that Intelligence-led policing presents a different construct from practices
currently employed by the OCD.
To illustrate this contrast, a number of policing models have been advanced to meet a
perceived change in the role of policing in modern society. Most notable was the push for
Community Oriented Policing (COP) over the past twenty years. The COP program was
intended to be adopted as a philosophy that permeated every aspect of policing. Such is
not the case with Intelligence-led policing which instead is provided as a management
tool to augment existing police practices without reinventing the organization. The
benefit of an Intelligence-led policing over existing practices centers on the contention
that with the correct tools and methods there are instances when it is possible to interrupt
criminal activities to the extent that the possibility for future crime is eliminated and
thereby prevented.
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Other Considerations
Refutability and Generalizability
Karl Popper (1963) maintained that in addition to evidence in support of the scientific
method (and research) being necessary and sufficient it must also be subject to the notion
of refutability. Refutability contends that inductive inference limits, rather than aids, the
creation of knowledge in that the scientific method establishes universal knowledge
based on empirics which may be useful in order to corroborate findings among theories
but should not alone be used to determine knowledge because the process is subject to
falsification. Falsification is established when one exception to an accepted standard is
discovered thereby changing the universality of the standard; a common illustration
entails the discovery of the black swan. Often, in defense of inductive methods, Occam’s
razor which maintains in complex matters, the simplest solution is likely to be more
correct (than others) is employed.
This study emphasizes the roles of language, relations, and motivation in the
postmodernism tradition and includes a rejection of the assumption that objectively, what
is observed represents something which can be universally accepted. However, this
research does effectively bring forth a wide range of phenomena based on a few simple
postulates derived from a model of codified observations. The methodology can easily be
used as the basis of further research. In this research, examples derived through
interviews reveal there is a disconnect between the intention and use of intelligence, as
defined by the critical factors of Intelligence-led policing which lend themselves to
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policing tasks, and the actual processes, as they are understood and used by members of
the OCD, to develop intelligence products for use in policing tasks.
Language and Meaning
The critical factors of Intelligence-led policing include a definition of intelligence.
When the Department of Justice (DOJ) issued its manuals on Intelligence-led policing
(http://info.publicintelligence.net/IntelLedPolicing.pdf ) it was very specific in making
distinctions between terms that would be used to describe the concept. ‘Intelligence,’
according to the DOJ, is ‘produced after collected data is evaluated and analyzed.’
Further, the DOJ manual explained that the process of analysis, while aided by some
software, required trained individuals to synthesize information materials into a
manageable, easily understandable form for presentation to decision makers. Other
authors, notably Ratcliffe (2007), have contributed to the notion that success in
developing useful products from the Intelligence-led model depend on a complete
understanding of the terms. The principle reason for emphasizing what is meant by the
development of ‘intelligence’ is to avoid confusing it with the development of
information ‘information’ which is common in police work. Until information is
subjected to analysis, it remains little more than data of interest. When analysis begins to
tie associations among and between information, the intelligence process begins. In
contrast, the definition for ‘intelligence’ by the Chicago Police is a more elusive. The
term ‘intelligence’ is referenced in General Orders which serve as the policy directives
for the Department, but the term ‘intelligence’ is never defined.
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I don't know the Department's definition, (or) if there is one, to be perfectly
honest. (Question 3)
Source: 11257484
If there is a definition, I really don't know it. I think when people think
intelligence I think they also think like technology. They kind of go hand-inhand; I don't know if there is a specific definition and I don't think the
Department has ever used it. (Question 3)
Source: 11028961
In response to whether respondents were aware of a Department definition for
‘intelligence,’ responses were uniformly in agreement as to whether a definition existed
or, if there was a definition, whether it was used. (Q3. κ =0.94, 97%).
The researcher contends the intelligence related practices by which supervisors
develop and define their critical tasks contribute to the effectiveness of their missions and
ultimately to the understanding and perception of the use of intelligence in police work,
particularly in crime prevention.
If supervisors understand and define intelligence related activities in a manner which
differs from those required for a predictive or proactive response, emergent, rather than
desired consequences are likely to impact their effectiveness. Emergent consequences
arise from the failure to regard a sufficient number of variables prior to the
implementation of a program; some of these variables may be unknown while others are
ignored.
The Intelligence-led policing model provides well defined terms and direction as to
the methods and steps required to provide intelligence products that can assist decision
makers establish strategic plans. Current use of the same or similar terms used by the
Chicago Police Department gives rise to a wide range of interpretations.
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Intelligence is probably used in the Organized Crime Division more effectively
than in the rest of the department. We get intelligence and information from
confidential clients that we disseminate immediately or used for individual attacks
on problem area where that intelligence could be used specifically. As opposed to
patrol, that information doesn't get out as quickly. We're kind of setup to
disseminate information and intelligence based on gangs, everything from
hierarchy to anniversary dates where violence is to be possibly perpetrated as a
result of retaliation. (Question 2)
Source: 11087163
The above response addresses effectiveness in the use of intelligence by the OCD. The
language combines the terms of intelligence and information together and states that such
products are disseminated immediately. From a tactical perspective, this is method does
work well in investigations. Once data is used in this fashion, it has a tendency to decay
and without provisions for archiving, it may be lost entirely over time. The above
example illustrates how the critical factors of Intelligence-led policing would contribute
to the efficiency of current OCD practices but also provides the basis for future research
on the use or limitations of language, meaning, and understanding that can result in
disconnects between what is intended from a method of practice and what is delivered in
practice.
Disconnects in What is Expected from Intelligence
The perception of what constitutes intelligence or how it could be used is dependent
on the direct experience or education of most supervisors rather than on any literal
definition provided by the Department. Some of the supervisors interviewed have
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military training that included work in the field of intelligence. Each of the supervisors
interviewed is committed to the task of reducing street violence to the fullest extent
possible given the resources at their disposal. Most work long and irregular hours and all
are immersed in finding ways to improve the Division’s efficiency and effectiveness.
This includes managing equipment and manpower resources involving work schedules
which function on a 24/7/365 basis.
The supervisors themselves are accountable to others who are higher in the chain of
command and serve as the decision makers who determine the overall strategies for the
Department. Based on these strategic decisions, rank and file supervisors are tasked with
the responsibilities produce, i.e., provide quantitative indicators in support of strategic
decisions. Quantitative indicators of a successful strategy are generally measured by (1)
arrests and (2) reductions in crime. The tactics used to achieve results are discretionary
on the parts of tactical supervisors.
Okay. Well here. Let's be realistic here, this is the real answer. Real answer
is, what is the city of Chicago trying to cut down on? Burglaries? Stolen
cars? Narcotics? Violent crime! Homicides and shootings and if you want to
be more succinct, homicides; so I know that. I've been told that, I know what
I need to do with my people. If I get homicides down, that is going to be the
answer. So, what is sent by our leader is to get homicides down and do
everything we can to do that. That's what we'll do. If they change it, then
we'll change how we do it. But give me what you want done, what do you
want done? You want homicides down. Good. Thank you. We're going to
step back and we'll make that happen. (Question 13g)
Source: 11042566
The ability of the Organized Crime Division to successfully accomplish the tasks
delegated to them has never been at issue. At issue is whether models such as
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Intelligence-led policing can contribute to the units overall effectiveness by augmenting
the effect of current practices. If buy-in to a new approach or concept is to occur for an
organization, it must begin from the top. In organizations, when the message from top
management is clear, consistent, and persistent, members of the organization are able to
form a better picture of what is expected of them.
In an article for the Chicago Magazine (2009) which focused on technology used in
policing, the Chicago Police Superintendent stated he wanted to continue to push the
concept of intelligence-led policing, using real-time information to guide police resources
and be able to develop ‘intelligence that allows us to take action and move resources
with the ultimate goal of being able to get ahead of the crime.’ Subsequently, in a CBS
report, the Superintendent stated, “We've been harping on intelligence-led policing and
the best source of information, I would think, is the actual victim who was shot”
(cbs2chicago.com/local/police.jody.weis.2.1056999.html). Neither of these descriptions
conforms to the definition, nor the purpose, of Intelligence-led policing. Disparities as to
what constitutes Intelligence-led policing by a chief executive can send a mixed message
to those who are expected to be engaged in the program.
I would agree with it (the concept of ILP) but it sounds like a catch phrase
and sounds like a buzzword more than he (The Superintendent) believes in
anything, you know. (Question 5)
Source: 11062184
I think that some of this crime analysis theory is the flavor of the day. The
bottom line is you still have to have officers out on the street interacting with
people. I've never seen anyone sitting in their office and making arrests.
Obviously, it's trendy and it's a way to justify people's positions. It's just a
way to justify the planning for research. What I mean, I'm a little bit old
school, I still believe in the fact, I mean a combination of the theory is more
effective than the total embracing of, you know, everything has been
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researched down to the last. The bottom line is you still have to go out there
in police cars and stop cars, stop people, interact with people, and that
information's going to come from the street.(Question 12a)
Source: 11234773
Anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss (2004) noted that among primitive populations,
to be able to explain anything, one had to be able to understand everything. This
statement applied to the abilities of primitive populations to cope within the limits of their
knowledge and serves as the basis of myth. The notion is contrary to the scientific
approach but is used at times by organizations to dismiss objections to weak or spurious
planning. Organizational program designs may be weak as a result of what Herbert
Simon (1998) described as bounded rationality, which maintains that organizational
decisions are restricted by the information they possess. In both examples, members of
organizations or cultures which advance incomplete programs are required to align their
understanding of new programs in order to collaborate in program implementation. When
this occurs, disconnects between intention and implementation pose a viable threat to the
new program.
Intelligence-led policing was initially introduced to the Department by Phil Cline.
The program centered on a Deployment Operations Center (DOC) to serve as the clearing
house for specific reported crime related information. All reports of major crimes
involving shooting victims and homicides which occurred in the city were forwarded to
the DOC for review. Conceptually, Detectives assigned to the DOC were expected to
review these cases, ascertain if patterns or common constancies existed, and compile
reports based on their observations. The process was ad hoc; the majority of the reports
generated were limited to only the initial information received, and the emphasis of the
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DOC centered on providing as much information as possible to as wide an audience as
possible.
I think the Department does focus on intelligence-led policing. I think it
has for a few years, but it could always be pushed up to higher and higher
levels and become more and more efficient. I mean under Phil Cline, they
started the Deployment Operations Center which is basically the first step
in intelligence-led policing where it was the information gathering section
for the Department and then it spit out an analyzed and vetted intelligence
report, so, but I think we can always ramp it up and with this time of less
police officers, than we've had in the past, you have to do everything you
can to make the Department more efficient. (Question 5)
Source: 11247602
Members of the OCD contribute greatly to the information which the DOC receives.
Because they represent a specialized plain clothes (not uniformed) group which travels
through Chicago in unmarked vehicles of various descriptions; they would ordinarily not
be recognized as police. Without detailing the particulars, it must be noted that much of
their work is covert. Based on their assignments, these officers provide regular reports to
the DOC. Many of those interviewed had reservations about the value of the ‘intelligence’
they received in return.
It's informally we called it the round table and basically we go, we discuss
the current conflicts from each particular area. It's a short meeting …those
are--I think we get the best information and leaders at Area meetings, there are
maybe 21 meetings, you know, the DOC, just to be perfectly honest, I think
that's one least productive meetings because as you sit you're trying to--I think
it's a waste. (Question 13e)
Source: 11058231
Now we do send a lot of those reports up the chains to DOC, who want…they
are keeping it somewhere, God knows where. But when some of the gang
members stop them, they get dead and the girl who does see the stuff on the
narcotics side. We send her all sorts of stuff but really it's been--it's almost a
problem of too much information. Yeah, you can have every single GD on
the computer but you got to know if they're in the California Jackson GDs or
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New Orleans, right? (Question 13a)
Source: 11062184
When a separation between the intention and the use of a program such as
Intelligence-led policing begin, weaknesses attributable to disconnects can occur.
Disconnects are apparent when two groups within the same organization work to
complete the same tasks without either being aware of any benefit the other might
provide towards accomplishing the common task. The possibility of disconnects may be
reduced through strengthening the bonds of communications when tasks are focused on
common goals. The tenets of Intelligence-led policing provide one method for
strengthening communication bonds.
There is the inference in law enforcement that because a strategy is implemented
which requires subscription to a particular plan that all involved are (1) privy to the tools
required to execute the strategy and (2) have an understanding of what is to be
accomplished through the strategy. The reasons for organizational disconnects that occur
because one or both of these assumptions is missing is worth further study.
The Issue of Ownership, Latency, and Entropy
In addition to the practices involved with the development of intelligence are
concerns of ownership of information. Investigative procedures used to develop
information are based on training and experience. During the investigative process, which
involves the collection of evidence, including interviews, information is gathered for the
unique purpose of establishing a case. A case is intentionally developed to provide
sufficient and necessary information and evidence which can be used to identify and seek

180
prosecution of the offender. The progress of an individual case is determined by an
investigator who manages information according to how it is perceived as being related
to the case. In this sense, the investigator demonstrates the initial phase of developing
intelligence from data in that from all data available, the investigator parses what is of
interest, vets sources, and disregards anything that remains. In doing so, the investigator
becomes vested in all the case-related information, i.e., there is ownership.
The exchange of information that may become intelligence can involve several
persons and multiple agencies along both horizontal and vertical organization hierarchies.
Horizontally, information is passed to other detectives on a team within the Division or,
in some cases, the OCD analyst. Under specific instances, for example if information
indicates there is an immediate threat to life, a recommendation for action, involving
several teams, is initiated and general information is be distributed to command staff
outside of the OCD. The same information may be passed vertically to outside agencies
when it involves active cases in which there is collaboration. As long as the OCD has
sole control of the information, there is ownership.
Well, in the Organized Crime Division, we don't have per se our own
intelligence, I mean I'm sorry, analysis group such as the DOC, but each team
and each officer that's assigned to investigations in the Organized Crime
Division does analyze their information as it pertains to their investigation in
their cases. That information and analysis does go to the bigger cause of the
whole department at some point and also depending on the urgency of it. If
it's urgent, we do what's called an IBDR (Intelligence Based Deployment
Recommendation). (Question 7)
Source: 11247602
When collaboration with other agencies along a vertical hierarchy occurs, information
from the OCD becomes co-mingled with similar information obtained at the other level.
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The use of information by different agencies can be for different purposes and is related
to agency responsibilities. For example, local authorities seek information leading to
arrests while federal agencies may want the same information to strengthen an existing
case for prosecution at a later date.
In relying on ‘outside’ information, the notion of ownership becomes compromised to
varying degrees. As mentioned earlier, the OCD often works in conjunction with other
agencies representing federal or state interests. Because agencies often work to develop
cases on the same individuals, OCD members are unlikely to be surprised by the
individuals identified by outside agencies as ‘top ten’ targets. Most often, these
individuals represent persons who were originally introduced to the outside agencies by
the OCD. But the ‘same’ information can assume different forms because of two factors
which consistently effect information and intelligence that is passed back and forth
between agencies; those factors are latency and entropy.
Latency is a condition of delay between a time when information is gathered and
when it is dispersed. Information is more current for OCD members who are actively
engaged with street sources but the information may lose value during the time it takes to
reach other agencies. Entropy is the often referred to as a state of ‘disorder’ in
information but is more aptly represented as data which is ‘lost’ during the course of
transmission between the sender and receiver. Effects of entropy are evident in
information exchanges between analysts and end users, between agencies, and between
departments within the same organization. The ability to establish a centralized
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intelligence process deters the effects of both latency and entropy in that it can truly
serves as a real time center.
I could comment on this--the Organized Crime Division lacks a central
intelligence unit that would take all the difference intelligence products from
narcotics, organized crime, gang enforcement, and even the vice division.
And since there's no central location or intelligence collection manager to
review the added information, our use of criminal intelligence is lacking.
(Question 11)
Source: 11105904
(Decision makers) got to be careful about over-information, you can't throw
everything at the lawn and see what's gonna stick and then like DOC giving
you a 30-page report and half of it is about neighbors. Now, I don't even do
give a (expletive deleted) about that. Where is this guy? What kind of--what
gang is he in, who’s he shot at before and you never get anything. I know all
you get is an Accurant report that says he applied for a credit card in 1972,
you know… (Question 12b)
Source: 11062184
The effects of ownership of information are most evident in the results produced
from actionable intelligence. Actionable intelligence is that from which a specific
tactical engagement results usually leading to arrests. A longitudinal study in the
ways the same information is used by different law enforcement agencies is worth
further study. Implication on the future of policing, Intelligence-led programs,
evidence-based policing would benefit from further research into the manner and
methods used by police for managing and developing intelligence products in order to
bring more standardization processes into play.
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Implication on the Future of Policing, Intelligence-led Programs, and
Further Research
This research has provided a microcosm on some of the concerns that will impact the
future of policing as it strives to provide required services while faced with dwindling
resources. At the time of this research, well over half of the Police Departments in the
United States have been forced to reduce the size of their departments because of
budgetary restraints; for many departments this reduction has included layoffs. If this
trend continues, future United States models for policing will require agencies to work in
assistance or, in agreement, through instruments of mutual aid between departments.
Under such agreements, geographically adjoining agencies combine resources to address
mutual problems which might otherwise prove unmanageable if each agency were left to
their own device. These types of regional arrangements are relatively new in the United
States but are common in Europe, especially with Interpol. Most commonly, mutual
assistance is provided in the form of information and intelligence exchanges.
Current problems involving in exchanging and maintaining information and
intelligence revolve around interoperability. Several departments have their own methods
for collecting and archiving information which can not be easily transferred to others.
For example, the United States Navy has, since 2003, been involved with project
LinX, a law enforcement information exchange program intended to connect states to a
common crime and incident database in order for the Navy to avail itself of information
which it deems important. Each of the states involved in the project shares the common
characteristic of having at least on shoreline border. There are technical skills required to

184
set and maintain this application and the purpose of collection is to aid the Navy in
protecting U.S. Shores. Similar program designs intended to strengthen intelligence ties
between local and regional law enforcement agencies should be vigorously explored.
To date, no one application is used universally by local and regional law enforcement
agencies to share or maintain intelligence files. Certainly data is collected, but the steps
required for developing intelligence rests with human analysis, not applications or
software. Analysts often serve as an information buffer between strategists and tacticians
and can provide an important input to both. Decision makers can articulate to analysts the
focus of an intended strategy so that the value in meaning from the data collected can be
established and passed to those who will implement programs.
In addition to the logistics involved in developing a strong Intelligence-led policing
design for agencies, there are certain environmental dynamics which will dramatically
affect the ways in which the Department will use the tools required for Intelligence-led
policing in the near future. Chicago’s fiscal problems affect how many new officers will
be hired for the next police classes (2011-12). Current estimates indicate 450 officers will
be eligible to retire during this time while plans for new hires provide for approximately
200 positions. Although this may appear as a losing proposition in terms of attrition,
many of the new hires will represent a generation, the ‘Y Generation,’ that is generally
adept at, and familiar with, communication devices, media devices, and digital
technologies; this dynamic could positively impact the future of programs like
Intelligence-led policing. The ability to manage and understand the use of technology
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prior to being introduced to the tenets of programs can enhance progress in the
development of intelligence centers.
Unanticipated Findings
The interviews conducted for this research focused first on the research questions as
to whether the critical factors of Intelligence-led policing could serve to make the duties
of Chicago’s Organized Crime Division more efficient. The Intelligence-led policing
model emphasizes the use of analytics to transform information to actionable intelligence.
Actionable intelligence is information that has been distilled through the process of
analysis and serves as the basis for making decisions on how resources will be used. In
addition to structured responses, additional issues related to the development of useful
intelligence products within the OCD came to light.
Technology and the Development of Intelligence
Although the use of technology was addressed at the conclusion of the interviews,
many of the respondents introduced the topic during their responses to questions related
to the concept of intelligence. This infers respondents perceived a strong bond between
the notion of intelligence and technology.
My interpretation is that we need to use more technology in developing our
tactical strategies and operations for areas that are experiencing some high
rates of violence or gang violence, or drug activity that leads to gang violence
and shooting. (Question 5)
Source: 11129230
I think when people think intelligence I think they also think like
technology… (Question 3)
Source: 11028961
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Technology is a tool. In an age of ubiquitous computing, the tools most used by
society are devices which provide instant access to information that helps manage our
affairs. Technology tools can be represented as hardware, e.g., computers, cellular
devices including GPS equipment, cameras, etc., or software including database
applications, tracking applications, or camera analytics. Many of the tools available in
today’s technology arsenal can help manage decisions but the tools themselves do not
make decisions.
The Importance of Analysis
Decision makers required to review large amounts of information within finite time
frames need assistance in sense-making to avoid being overloaded. Such assistance is
provided through the use of analysts. Several respondents indicated the importance in
using an analyst.
Our analyst does a great job of connecting the dots on the overall picture
by using databases that the officers started using or don't have the access
to and sometimes putting everything together from another unit making
an arrest that they are not aware of. Connecting aliases where an
individual doesn't have the time to make that kind of analysis or an
analyst can bring it all together and analyze it often more effectively than
the officers themselves (Question 10)
Source: 11087163
So, therefore, I mean, there's--we know because he's got a history and we
got intelligence on him. We know that there's going to be a spike in
crime because prior to his incarceration, he was responsible for eight to
ten murders. So, I mean that intelligence derived from the analyst and
when you look at the map, you see a spike and had you not (gotten) the
intelligence from The analyst or some of the guys here that track that
person, particular person or target, you would not know why the spike is
there, because he just got released. (Question 10)
Source: 11105904
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I think that the analysts are the key to pulling the data together in
connecting crime intelligence and coming out with a report that would
leverage all our human resources and we talked about the analysts using
technology in using information, leveraging our human resources to be
more strategically focused and obviously more efficient and obviously
putting our officers at the right place at the right time at the right spot.
(Question 12a)
Source: 11129230
In response to the changing needs in government agencies for the need of
qualified analysts, several academic institutions are providing advanced degrees
in analytics and research based instruction centered on the development of police
intelligence processes. Michigan State’s Dr. David Carter offers graduate
programs specifically designed for training in police intelligence. Several
institutions provide similar courses which focus on the use of analysis to develop
intelligence products.
The Importance of Training as a Resource to Develop Intelligence
When asked what resources could improve the intelligence processes used by the
OCD responses centered on improving or obtaining additional software, training, and
teamwork among investigators (Q13i. κ =1,00 100%). The inference was that additional
software and training of investigators could aid in the implementation of Intelligence-led
policing. None of the responses indicated that trained analysts, civilian or sworn, might
be recruited from within the ranks of the Department or from universities to assist in
implementing the use of Intelligence-led policing.
Intelligence-led policing is one method for law enforcement to focus on critical
tasks necessary to deal with crime issues. Technologies that provided assistance with
geographical information systems, databases, or social network designs can assist the
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managers who use Intelligence-led policing but technology should not be interpreted as
the solution to the complex and difficult process of making hard decisions.
Respondents were specific as to which technologies were used but less clear on
which technologies could be used to manage the information or data which was
retrieved. Trained analysts are often familiar with the types of technology required to
enhance meaning from information. For example, products such as CopLink® or i2®
are software applications that accept data from a variety of sources and multiple
jurisdictions to link associations among suspects. To aid decision makers more
attention should be given to the use of trained analysts, techniques of critical thinking,
statistical testing for significance, and mission specific experience. Mission specific
experience involves the competencies of individuals as content experts when dealing
with a specific crime related problems.
Other Considerations
Respondents were aware that technology played into developing intelligence products
but felt disenfranchised from the decision process in selecting which products were
available or could be most useful to them in their tasks. As a result, a variety of software
applications available are restricted to specific users while others are underused because
investigators lack training and are compelled to rely on the data interpretation of other
agencies.
That is through, I believe, Research for Development Information and Services
Division that decides what technology can be available to us. However, I will
say that very seldom is the end user consulted on what they need in order to
develop an intelligent product. (Question 13d)
Source: 11105904
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Conclusion
Since the events of September 11th 2001, local law enforcement has been asked to
assume additional responsibilities for which they not prepared; responsibilities which
involved information sharing and exchanges that tied to expanded regional or federal
interests. Since that time, there has been an accelerated attempt to join information
sources along guidelines presented through federal agencies. Local law enforcement
became aware of the wide variety of tools and programs which could be used to serve
their own interests. Intelligence-led policing may serve as one of those tools.
This research determined to a high degree the respondent’s believe there is value in
the critical factors of Intelligence-led policing (Q14. κ =0.71, 91%). Additionally, if
provided so that the program could be implemented without draining existing resources,
respondents were similarly in agreement that it would a provide benefit to the duties
required in their tasks ( Q15. κ =0.82, 96% ). The respondents were equally in agreement
that there were no immediate plans to enhance existing intelligence processes within the
OCD (Q13j. κ =0.95, 99%).
Changes in the law enforcement have always been slow and often in reaction to
changes in the environment in which they serve. The experiences related through
interviews in this study demonstrate the Chicago Police and the OCD are aware that
changes are necessary in order to maximize resources and to function more efficiently; an
important step in realizing why change is necessary. Implications from this study indicate
the OCD, a unit called upon to implement Department strategies, realize new approaches
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intended to enhance, not replace, current practices, are welcome. Intelligence-led policing
is one such approach and if the critical factors involved can be fully integrated with
existing investigative procedures, the abilities of the Department’s OCD will be enhanced
beyond the level of detecting and interceding in street level violence to the point at which
crime prevention becomes a realistic and attainable goal.

REFERENCES
9/11 Commission. (2004). The 9/11 Commission Report. Washington DC: National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States.
Ackoff, R. L. (1981). Creating the corporate future. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
Agranoff, R., & and McGuire, M. (2001, 01-Nov-01). American federalism and the
search for models of management. Public Administration Review, 61(6), 671-681.
Argote, L., McEvily, B., & and Reagans, R. (2003). Introduction to the special issue on
managing knowledge in organizations. Management Science, 49(44), 5-8.
Argyris, C., & and Schon, D. (1978). Organizational learning: A theory of action
perspective. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
Ash, R. A. (1990). Information theory. New York: Dover Publications, Inc.
Block, R., & and Block, C. (1995). Space, Place and Crime: Hot-spot areas and hot
spaces of liquor-related crime. In J. Eck & and Weisburd D. (Eds.), Crime and
place. Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press.
Bloom, B. (1956). Taxonomy of educational objectives. New York: Longmans.
Boba, R. (2003, March). Problem Analysis in Poliicng. Police Foundation Reports
[Online]. Available:
http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/files/ric/Publications/Problem_Analysis_in_Policing.p
df.

Boyatzis, R. E. (1998). Transforming qualitative research. Thousand Oaks: Sage
Publications, Inc.
Brazelton, J., & and Gorry, G. (2003). Creating a Knowledge-sharing Community: If You
Build it, Will They Come? Communications of the AMC, 46(2), 23-25.
Brown, J., & and Duguid P. (1991). Organizational Learning and Communities of
Practice: Toward a Unified View of Working, Learning, and Innovation.
Organization Science, 2(1), 40-57.

258

259
Brown, J., & and Duguid P. (2000). The social life of information. Boston, MA: Harvard
Business School Press.
Campbell, J. (1982). Grammatical man. New York: Simon & Schuster.
Carter, D. (2004). Law Enforcement Intelligence: A Guide for State, Local, and Tribal
Law Enforcement Agencies. Office of Community Policing [Online]. Available:
http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/e09042536.pdf.
Chakravorti, B. (2003). The slow pace of fast change. Boston, MA: Harvard Business
School Press.
Chen, H., Zen, D., Wyzga, W., & and Schroeder, J. (2003). CopLink: Managing Law
Enforcement Data and Knowledge. Communications of the ACM, 46(1), 28-32.
Churchman, C. W. (1971). The design of inquiring sytems and organizations. New York:
Basic Books.
Coffey, A., B. Holbrook and P. Atkinson. (1996). Qualitative Data Analysis:
Technologies and Representations. Sociological Research Online [Online] 1(1).
Available: http://www.socresonline.org.uk/socresonline/1/1/4.html.

Cope, N. (2004). Intelligence Led Policing or Policing Led Intelligence. British Journal
of Criminology, 44, 188-203.
de Lint Willem, O'Connor, D., & Cotter, R. (2007). Controlling the Flow: Security,
Exclusivity, and Criminal Intelligence in Ontario. International Journal of the
Sociology of Law, 35, 41-58.
de Lint, W. (2006, March). Intelligence in Policing and Security: Reflections on
Scholarship. Policing & Society, 16(1), 1-6.
Department of Justice. (2003, October). National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan.
Bureau of Justice Assistance [Online]. Available:
http://www.it.ojp.gov/documents/NCISP_Plan.pdf.

Desouza, K., & and Hensgen, T. (2003). Every Citizen a Missel: The Need for an
Emergent Systems Approach for Law Enforcement. Government Informational
Quarterly, 20(3), 259-280.
Galbraith, J. (1973). Designing complex organizations. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
Gall, M., Gall, J., & & Borg, W. (2003). Educational research (7th Edition). Boston,
MA: Pearson Education, Inc.

260

Gazzaniga, M. (1992). Nature's Mind. New York: Basic Books.
Geertz, C. (1973). The inetrpretation of cultures. New York: Basic Books.
Geertz, C. (1983). Local knowledge. New York: Basic Books.
Gill, P. (2000). Rounding up the usual suspects?:Developments in contemporary law
enforcement intelligence. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing Co.
Gleick James. (2008). Chaos, making a new science. New York, NY: Penguin.
Goldstein, H. (1979). Problem oriented policing. New York: McGraw Hill.
Hale, C., Heaton, R., & and Uglow, S. (2006). Uniform Styles? Aspects of Police
Centralisation in England and Wales. Policing & Society, 14(44), 291-312.
Harcourt, B. H. (2001). Illusion of Order. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Janis, I. (1971). Groupthink. Psychology Today, 5(6), 43-46 and 74-76.
Johnson, R., Kantor, S., & Fishback, P. V. (2007, January). Striking at the Roots of
Crime: The Impact of Social Welfare Spending on Crime During the Great
Depression. National Bureau of Economic Research [Online]. Available:
http://www.nber.org/papers/w12825.
Johnston, R. (2005). Analytic culture in the U.S. intelligence community. Washington
DC: Central Intelligence Agency.
Kelling, G. L., Pate, T., Diekman, D., & Brown, C. (1974). The Kansas City Preventive
Patrol Experiment. Police Foundation Reports [Online]. Available:
www.policefoundation.org/docslibrary.html.

Kelling, G., & and Wilson, J. Q. (1982, March). Broken Windows
<http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/198203/broken-windows>. Atlantic Monthly
(Washington DC).
Krathwohl, D. R., & and Smith, N. L. (2005). How to prepare a disertation proposal.
Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.
Levitt, S. D. (2004, Winter). Understanding Why Crime Fell in the 1990's: Four Factors
that Explain the Decline and Six that Do Not. Journal for Economic Perspectives,
18(1), 163-190.

261
Lewins, A., & and Silver Christina. (2007). Using software in qualitative research.
London: Sage Publications, Ltd.
Lincoln, Y., & and Guba, E. (1981). Effective evaluation. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Maguire, M., & and John, T. (2006). Intelligence led policing, managerialism and
community engagement: Competing priorities and the role of the National
Intelligence Model in the UK. Policing and Society, 16(1), 67-85.
Miles, M., & and Huberman, A. (1984). Qualitative data analysis: A source book of new
methods. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, Inc.
Moore, H. (2003). Sizing up CompStat. Criminology & Public Policy, 3(2), 469-494.
Nonaka, I., & and Takeuchi, H. (1995). The knowledge-creating company: How
Japanese companies create the dynamics of innovation. New York, NY: Oxford
University Press.
Okensen, D., Mockford, R., & Pascoe, C. (2002). Does there have to be Blood on the
Carpet? Integrating partnerships, problem solving, and the Natinal Intelligence
Model in strategic and tactical police decison-making processes. Police Reserach
and Management, 5(44), 51-62.
Osborne, D. (2006). Out of Bounds: Innovation and change in law enforcement
Intelligence Analysis. Washington DC: Joint Military Intelligence College.
O'Shea, T., & and Nicholls, K. (2003, March). Crime Analysis in America; Findings and
Recommendations. Office of Community Policing [Online]. Available:
http://www.iaca.net/Articles/CAinAmerica.pdf.
Patton, M., Q. (1990). Qualitative evaluation and research methods (2nd ed.). Newbury
Park, CA: Sage Publications, Inc.
Peterson, M. (2005, September). Intelligence-led Policing: The New Intelligence
Architecture. In New Realities: Law Enforcement in the Post-9/11 Era [Online].
Available: www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bja/210681.pdf and
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/.

Pierce, J. R. (1980). An introduction to information theory. New York: Dover
Publications, Inc.
Pike, K. (1967). Language in relation to a unified theory of structure of human behavior
(2nd ed). The Hague: Mouton.

262
Popper, K. (1979). Objective knowledge. New York: Oxford University Press.
Popper, K. (2002). Conjecture and refutations. London: Routledge Classics.
Poundstone, W. (1992). Prisoner's dilemma. New York: Anchor Books.
Pulaski, M. A. S. (1971). Understanding Piaget. New York: Harper & Row.
Ratcliffe, J. (2008). Intelligence-led policing. Devon, UK: Willan Publishing.
Ratcliffe, J. H. (2007, August). Integrated Intelligence and Crime Analysis: Enhanced
Information Management for Law Enforcement Leaders. Police Foundation
Reports [Online]. Available: www.policefoundation.org/docslibrary.html and
www.cops.usdoj.gov/.
Saldana Johnny. (2009). The Coding Manual for Qualitative Researchers. London: Sage
Publications, Inc.
Saussure, F. (1916). Course in general linguistics. New York: McGraw Hill.
Senge, P. (1990). The Fifth Discipline. New York: Doubleday.
Shannon, C., & and Weaver, W. (1949). The mathematical theory of communication.
Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
Simon, H. (1947). Administrative behavior. New York: Free Press.
Simon, H. (1983). Reason in human affairs. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Simon, H. (1994). The sciences of the artificial. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Strauss, A., & and Corbin, J. (1998). Basics of qualitative research; Techniques and
Procedure for Developing Grounded Theory (2nd Ed). Thousand Oaks: Sage
Publications, Inc.
Taleb Nassim Nicholas. (2007). The Black Swan. New York: Random House.
Tilley, N. (2003). Community Policing, Problem-oriented Policing, and Intelligence-led
Policing. In T. Newburn (Ed.), Handbook of Policing (pp. 311-339). Cullompton.
U.K.: Willan Publishing.
Weisburd, D., Mastrofski, S., & and Greenspan, R. (2004, April). The Growth of
Compstat in American Policing. Police Foundation Reports, pp. 2-15.
Wenger, E. (1998). Communities of practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

263
White, J. (2004). Defending the homeland: Domestic intelligence, law enforcement, and
security. Belmont, CA.: Wadsworth Publishing.
Wiener, N. (1948). Cybernetics. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
Wilson, J. Q. (1985). Thinking about crime. New York: Random House, Inc.
Wittgenstein, L. (1980). Culture and vale. Basil Blackwell: Oxford University Press.
Wood, J., & and Shearing, C. (2007). Imagining Security. Cullompton. U.K.: Willan
Publishing.
Yin, R. A. (1993). Applications of case study research. Newbury Park, CA: Sage
Publications, Inc.
Yin, R. A. (2009). Case study research (4th Edition). Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications,
Inc.

